Nowadays, security defence of network uses the game theory, which mostly applies complete information game model or even the static game model. To get closer to the actual network and defend actively, we propose a net...Nowadays, security defence of network uses the game theory, which mostly applies complete information game model or even the static game model. To get closer to the actual network and defend actively, we propose a network attack-defence game model by using signalling game, which is modelled in the way of dynamic and incomplete information. We improve the traditional attack-defence strategies quantization method to meet the needs of the network signalling game model. Moreover, we give the calculation of the game equilibrium and analyse the optimal defence scheme. Finally, we analyse and verify effectiveness of the model and method through a simulation experiment.展开更多
The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. ...The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. Hence, a truthful revelation by the sender of his information does not necessarily imply that the signal he sends is correct. Also, the receiver can take a correct action even if the sender transmits an incorrect signal. The payoffs of the two players depend on their combined actions. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria which can result from different degrees of noise is analysed. The Bayesian updating of probabilities is explained. The fixed point theorem which makes the connection with the idea of rational expectations in economics is calculated. Given a number of equilibria, we comment on the most credible one on the basis of the implied payoffs for both players. The equilibrium signals are an example of the formation of a language convention discussed by D. Lewis.展开更多
Over the course of human history, influenza pandemics have been seen as major disasters, so studies on the influenza virus have become an important issue for many experts and scholars. Comprehensive research has been ...Over the course of human history, influenza pandemics have been seen as major disasters, so studies on the influenza virus have become an important issue for many experts and scholars. Comprehensive research has been performed over the years on the biological properties, chemical characteristics, external environmental factors and other aspects of the virus, and some results have been achieved. Based on the chaos game representation walk model, this paper uses the time series analysis method to study the DNA sequences of the influenza virus from 1913 to 2010, and works out the early-warning signals indicator value for the outbreak of an influenza pandemic. The variances in the CCR wall〈 sequences for the pandemic years （or ＋ -1 to 2 years） are significantly higher than those for the adjacent years, while those in the non-pandemic years are usually smaller. In this way we can provide an influenza early-warning mechanism so that people can take precautions and be well prepared prior to a pandemic.展开更多
The game of life represents a spatial environment of cells that live and die according to fixed rules of nature. In the basic variant of the game a cell’s behavior can be described as reactive and deterministic since...The game of life represents a spatial environment of cells that live and die according to fixed rules of nature. In the basic variant of the game a cell’s behavior can be described as reactive and deterministic since each cell’s transition from an actual state to a subsequent state is straight-forwardly defined by the rules. Furthermore, it can be shown that the alive cells’ spatial occupation share of the environment decreases quickly and levels out at a really small value (around 3%), virtually independent of the initial number of alive cells. In this study we will show that this occupation share can be strongly increased if alive cells become more active by making non-deterministic sacrificial decisions according to their individual positions. Furthermore, we applied signaling games in combination with reinforcement learning to show that results can be even more improved if cells learn to signal for navigating the behavior of neighbor cells. This result stresses the assumption that individual behavior and local communication supports the optimization of resourcing and constitute important steps in the evolution of creature and man.展开更多
This paper analyses adverse selection by signalingmodel and imcomplete information static game modelafter the review of Internet trust. The results showthat establishing credit grades system, decreasingcost difference...This paper analyses adverse selection by signalingmodel and imcomplete information static game modelafter the review of Internet trust. The results showthat establishing credit grades system, decreasingcost differences of Internet goods, increasing Internetmerchants participating in marking a price, reducingmerchants’ cost, concentrating purchase can improveInternet trust. The theoretical bias is provided for theresearch of trust in Internet.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No. 61303074 and No. 61309013the Henan Province Science and Technology Project Funds under Grant No. 12210231002
文摘Nowadays, security defence of network uses the game theory, which mostly applies complete information game model or even the static game model. To get closer to the actual network and defend actively, we propose a network attack-defence game model by using signalling game, which is modelled in the way of dynamic and incomplete information. We improve the traditional attack-defence strategies quantization method to meet the needs of the network signalling game model. Moreover, we give the calculation of the game equilibrium and analyse the optimal defence scheme. Finally, we analyse and verify effectiveness of the model and method through a simulation experiment.
文摘The paper provides an analysis of a sender-receiver sequential signaling game. The private information of the sender is transmitted with noise by a Machine, i.e. does not always correctly reflect the state of nature. Hence, a truthful revelation by the sender of his information does not necessarily imply that the signal he sends is correct. Also, the receiver can take a correct action even if the sender transmits an incorrect signal. The payoffs of the two players depend on their combined actions. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria which can result from different degrees of noise is analysed. The Bayesian updating of probabilities is explained. The fixed point theorem which makes the connection with the idea of rational expectations in economics is calculated. Given a number of equilibria, we comment on the most credible one on the basis of the implied payoffs for both players. The equilibrium signals are an example of the formation of a language convention discussed by D. Lewis.
基金Project supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant No. JUSRP21117)the Program for Innovative Research Team of Jiangnan University (Grant No. 2008CX002)
文摘Over the course of human history, influenza pandemics have been seen as major disasters, so studies on the influenza virus have become an important issue for many experts and scholars. Comprehensive research has been performed over the years on the biological properties, chemical characteristics, external environmental factors and other aspects of the virus, and some results have been achieved. Based on the chaos game representation walk model, this paper uses the time series analysis method to study the DNA sequences of the influenza virus from 1913 to 2010, and works out the early-warning signals indicator value for the outbreak of an influenza pandemic. The variances in the CCR wall〈 sequences for the pandemic years （or ＋ -1 to 2 years） are significantly higher than those for the adjacent years, while those in the non-pandemic years are usually smaller. In this way we can provide an influenza early-warning mechanism so that people can take precautions and be well prepared prior to a pandemic.
文摘The game of life represents a spatial environment of cells that live and die according to fixed rules of nature. In the basic variant of the game a cell’s behavior can be described as reactive and deterministic since each cell’s transition from an actual state to a subsequent state is straight-forwardly defined by the rules. Furthermore, it can be shown that the alive cells’ spatial occupation share of the environment decreases quickly and levels out at a really small value (around 3%), virtually independent of the initial number of alive cells. In this study we will show that this occupation share can be strongly increased if alive cells become more active by making non-deterministic sacrificial decisions according to their individual positions. Furthermore, we applied signaling games in combination with reinforcement learning to show that results can be even more improved if cells learn to signal for navigating the behavior of neighbor cells. This result stresses the assumption that individual behavior and local communication supports the optimization of resourcing and constitute important steps in the evolution of creature and man.
文摘This paper analyses adverse selection by signalingmodel and imcomplete information static game modelafter the review of Internet trust. The results showthat establishing credit grades system, decreasingcost differences of Internet goods, increasing Internetmerchants participating in marking a price, reducingmerchants’ cost, concentrating purchase can improveInternet trust. The theoretical bias is provided for theresearch of trust in Internet.
