Self-Certificating Root:A Root Zone Security Enhancement Mechanism for DNS

As a critical Internet infrastructure,domain name system(DNS)protects the authenticity and integrity of domain resource records with the introduction of security extensions(DNSSEC).DNSSEC builds a single-center and hierarchical resource authentication architecture,which brings management convenience but places the DNS at risk from a single point of failure.When the root key suffers a leak or misconfiguration,top level domain(TLD)authority cannot independently protect the authenticity of TLD data in the root zone.In this paper,we propose self-certificating root,a lightweight security enhancement mechanism of root zone compatible with DNS/DNSSEC protocol.By adding the TLD public key and signature of the glue records to the root zone,this mechanism enables the TLD authority to certify the self-submitted data in the root zone and protects the TLD authority from the risk of root key failure.This mechanism is implemented on an open-source software,namely,Berkeley Internet Name Domain(BIND),and evaluated in terms of performance,compatibility,and effectiveness.Evaluation results show that the proposed mechanism enables the resolver that only supports DNS/DNSSEC to authenticate the root zone TLD data effectively with minimal performance difference.

Fully distributed identity-based threshold signatures with identifiable aborts

Identity-based threshold signature(IDTS)is a forceful primitive to protect identity and data privacy,in which parties can collaboratively sign a given message as a signer without reconstructing a signing key.Nevertheless,most IDTS schemes rely on a trusted key generation center(KGC).Recently,some IDTS schemes can achieve escrow-free security against corrupted KGC,but all of them are vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks in the dishonest majority setting,where cheaters may force the protocol to abort without providing any feedback.In this work,we present a fully decentralized IDTS scheme to resist corrupted KGC and denialof-service attacks.To this end,we design threshold protocols to achieve distributed key generation,private key extraction,and signing generation which can withstand the collusion between KGCs and signers,and then we propose an identification mechanism that can detect the identity of cheaters during key generation,private key extraction and signing generation.Finally,we formally prove that the proposed scheme is threshold unforgeability against chosen message attacks.The experimental results show that the computation time of both key generation and signing generation is<1 s,and private key extraction is about 3 s,which is practical in the distributed environment.