Anglo-American Special Relations： Atomic Diplomacy and the Canadian Dimension, 1942-1948

In recent years, we have entered a period of increasing impact of world affairs on national politics and international security. Notwithstanding, the present debate on national security and nuclear proliferation, Anglo-American ＂special relations＂ continue to be a subject of vigorous discussion influenced by the impact of new international emergencies as unstable countries acquire nuclear power and refuse ＂to reign＂ in their nuclear programmes （The Globe and Mail, 12 January 2012）. Along these lines the 71st anniversary of the Anglo-American Manhattan Project presents a unique opportunity to reappraise the Anglo-American wartime collaboration （or lack of） in atomic energy developments that resulted in the tragedy of nuclear weapons escalation. The Quebec Agreements of 1943-1944 were crafted to address the controlled flow of scientific information. But did this mean a trend toward more effective collaboration or toward greater American control of the atomic project？ This study explores the subject of nuclear politics from an unique vantage point of Anglo-Canadian and American-Canadian atomic diplomacy. In doing so, it will show that both the American and British atomic policy makers violated the Quebec Agreements. It seeks to demonstrate that （1） in the tangle of competition replacing cooperation, Canada was more important to the American atomic monopolists than the Anglo-AmcTican partnership, （2） the US-Canada Trade and Defence Agreements contributed to United States retaining exclusive control of the ＂absolute weapon＂, and that （3） their post-war nuclear energy agenda delayed Britain＇s atomic venture and isolated Britain from full participation in Arctic research. In practical terms, the emerging atomic policy in Washington boiled down to maintaining the American edge, come what may, and reducing British prestige in the post-war world. The article concludes by raising the question： did the United States, Britain, and Canada really work for atomic control？

The Rise and Fall of Soviet-Egypt Special Relations, 1971-1974

This article is set to investigate the special relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt in early Sadat administration, 1971-1974. The Soviet-Egypt special relations were based on three factors-international system, states, and decision-makers. From the perspective of international system, since U.S. and Israel were the status quo powers, and the Soviet Union and Egypt were the revisionist countries that aimed to challenge such an unfavorable power structure, Moscow and Cairo were forced to form a coalition; from the national level, the pursuit of common security instead of economic interests became the important factor of promoting Soviet-Egypt special relations; from the decision-making level, the Soviet leaders viewed Egypt as the bridgehead to expand her interests in the Middle East. Likewise, Sadat acknowledged that the Soviet Union was the main source of obtaining advanced weapons on the one hand, but meanwhile was concerned that the Soviet Union could manipulate Egyptian leadership and may interfere in the internal affairs of Sadat administration. In fact, the two governments’ elites established asymmetrical special relations based on expediency and convenience, and hence such special relations were doom to fall apart with the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State in late 1973.

Preface to the special issue on electromagnetic phenomena related to seismic and volcanic activities from EMSEV in 2016

EMSEV, Electromagnetic Studies of Earthquake and Volcanoes, set up in 2002, is a joint academic organization by multi-associations in IUGG （International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics）, including IAGA （International Association of Geomagnetism and Aeronomy）, IASPEI （International Association of Seismology and Physics of the Earth＇s Interior）, IAVCEI （International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth＇s Interior）.