A Novel System Model based on Cost-prediction for Spectrum Leasing in Cognitive Radio

In current researches on spectrum leasing, Common model and Property-right model are two main approaches to dynamic spectrum sharing. However, Common model does not consider the obligation of Primary System (PS) and is unfair to Secondary System (SS), while the cooperation based on Property-rights model has problems on its feasibility. This paper proposes a novel system model, in which a Cost-Prediction scheme for Spectrum Leasing (CPSL scheme) is designed to forecast the cost that PS would pay for leasing spectrum. Cost Function is introduced as a criterion to evaluate the potential cost of spectrum leasing for PS. The simulation results show that compared with Common model based scheme, CPSL scheme substantially improves the QoS of the delay-sensitive traffic in SS at the cost of a small degradation of PS performance.

A Stackelberg Game for Spectrum Leasing in Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks

According to the property-rights model of cognitive radio, primary users （PUs） who own the spectrum resource have the right to lease part of spectrum to secondary users （SUs） in exchange for appropriate profit. In this paper, we propose a pricing-based spectrum leasing framework between one PU and multiple SUs. In this scenario, the PU attempts to maximize its utility by setting the price of spectrum. Then, the selected SUs have the right to decide their power levels to help PU s transmission, aiming to obtain corresponding access time. The spectrum leasing problem can be cast into a stackelberg game, where the PU plays the seller-level game and the selected SUs play the buyer-level game. Through analysis based on the backward induction, we prove that there exists a unique equilibrium in the stackelberg game with certain constraints. Numerical results show that the proposed pricing-based spectrum leasing framework is effective, and the performance of both PU and SUs is improved, compared to the traditional mechanism without cooperation.

Novel pricing model for spectrum leasing in secondary spectrum market

According to the property rights model of cognitive radio,primary users who own the spectral resource have the right to lease or trade part of it to secondary users in exchange for appropriate profit.In this paper,an implementation of this framework is investigated,where a primary link can lease the owned spectrum to secondary nodes in exchange for cooperation （relaying）.A novel pricing model is proposed that enables the trading between spectrum and cooperation.Based on the demand of secondary nodes,the primary link attempts to maximize its quality of service （QoS） by setting the price of spectrum.Taking the price asked by primary link,the secondary nodes aim to obtain most profits by deciding the amount of spectrum to buy and then pay for it by cooperative transmission.The investigated model is conveniently cast in the framework of seller/buyer （Stackelberg） games.Analysis and numerical results show that our pricing model is effective and practical for spectrum leasing based on trading spectral resource for cooperation.