The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competitio...The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competition. It is found that the Stackelberg firm may license his drastic innovation by a fixed royalty rate which is lower than innovalion size. The incentives of drastic innovation of Stackelberg firm facing input suppfiers with market power decrease considerably even onder royalty licensing, compared with facing perfectly competitive input market.展开更多
In this paper, we investigate the quantum Stackelberg duopoly （QSD） game in the noise environment with the depolarizing channel expressed by the Kraus-operator representation. It is found that the presence of the da...In this paper, we investigate the quantum Stackelberg duopoly （QSD） game in the noise environment with the depolarizing channel expressed by the Kraus-operator representation. It is found that the presence of the damping in the depolarizing channel always leads to the decrease of the quantities of the moves and payoffs of the two players in the QSD game. It is indicated that under certain conditions the first-mover advantage in the QSD game can be weakened due to the presence of the damping in the depolarizing channel.展开更多
文摘The licensing strategies and innovation incentives of downstream firms in a Stackelberg duopoly model were analyzed under three respective assumptions that upstream industry is monopoly, duopoly, or perfect competition. It is found that the Stackelberg firm may license his drastic innovation by a fixed royalty rate which is lower than innovalion size. The incentives of drastic innovation of Stackelberg firm facing input suppfiers with market power decrease considerably even onder royalty licensing, compared with facing perfectly competitive input market.
基金The project supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.10325523the National Fundamental Research Program of China under Grant No.2001CB309310
文摘In this paper, we investigate the quantum Stackelberg duopoly （QSD） game in the noise environment with the depolarizing channel expressed by the Kraus-operator representation. It is found that the presence of the damping in the depolarizing channel always leads to the decrease of the quantities of the moves and payoffs of the two players in the QSD game. It is indicated that under certain conditions the first-mover advantage in the QSD game can be weakened due to the presence of the damping in the depolarizing channel.
