This study conducts a systematic literature review(SLR)of blockchain consensus mechanisms,an essential protocols that maintain the integrity,reliability,and decentralization of distributed ledger networks.The aim is t...This study conducts a systematic literature review(SLR)of blockchain consensus mechanisms,an essential protocols that maintain the integrity,reliability,and decentralization of distributed ledger networks.The aim is to comprehensively investigate prominent mechanisms’security features and vulnerabilities,emphasizing their security considerations,applications,challenges,and future directions.The existing literature offers valuable insights into various consensus mechanisms’strengths,limitations,and security vulnerabilities and their real-world applications.However,there remains a gap in synthesizing and analyzing this knowledge systematically.Addressing this gap would facilitate a structured approach to understanding consensus mechanisms’security and vulnerabilities comprehensively.The study adheres to Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses(PRISMA)guidelines and computer science standards and reviewed 3749 research papers from 2016 to 2024,excluding grey literature,resulting in 290 articles for descriptive analysis.The research highlights an increased focus on blockchain consensus security,energy efficiency,and hybrid mechanisms within 60%of research papers post-2019,identifying gaps in scalability,privacy,and interoperability for future exploration.By synthesizing the existing research and identifying the key trends,this SLR contributes to advancing the understanding of blockchain consensus mechanisms’security and guiding future research and structured innovation in blockchain systems and applications.展开更多
针对存在多名持币用户和节点服务商的基于权益证明(proof of stake,PoS)共识机制的区块链,考虑节点服务商的收益分配方式、安全性均对持币用户的收益具有影响,构建了n人无限策略非合作博弈模型,对持币用户的委托策略进行分析.研究发现,...针对存在多名持币用户和节点服务商的基于权益证明(proof of stake,PoS)共识机制的区块链,考虑节点服务商的收益分配方式、安全性均对持币用户的收益具有影响,构建了n人无限策略非合作博弈模型,对持币用户的委托策略进行分析.研究发现,相较于安全性,持币用户应更加关注节点服务商的收益分配额;当某个节点服务商的收益分配额低于一定阈值时,持币用户应该委托其他节点服务商挖矿;持币用户委托收益的稳定性会随着节点服务商的收益分配额的提高而提高;当持币用户无法完全获得各节点服务商历史收益数据时,风险偏好型持币用户更适合委托PPLNS型节点服务商挖矿,风险规避型持币用户更适合委托FPPS型节点服务商挖矿.展开更多
基于演化博弈将监察机制与奖惩制度引入授权股份证明(delegated proof of stake,DPoS)共识机制,构建以代理节点、投票节点、监管节点为主体的三方演化博弈模型;分析共识方案改进前后节点的行为策略选择变化,在不同奖惩力度和惩罚因子下...基于演化博弈将监察机制与奖惩制度引入授权股份证明(delegated proof of stake,DPoS)共识机制,构建以代理节点、投票节点、监管节点为主体的三方演化博弈模型;分析共识方案改进前后节点的行为策略选择变化,在不同奖惩力度和惩罚因子下节点行为策略的演化趋势,并用Matlab仿真。研究结果表明:(1)改进方案能遏制恶意节点的合谋行为并提高投票节点的积极性;(2)奖惩力度能影响节点行为策略;(3)惩罚因子可以影响节点行为趋向稳定点的速度。展开更多
针对授权股权证明共识机制中节点投票不积极和节点腐败的问题,提出一种基于配对制度的DPoS共识机制(delegated proof-of-stake based on matching mechanism,DPoS-M2)。根据节点属性值将节点分为独立节点、主节点和配基节点,通过主节点...针对授权股权证明共识机制中节点投票不积极和节点腐败的问题,提出一种基于配对制度的DPoS共识机制(delegated proof-of-stake based on matching mechanism,DPoS-M2)。根据节点属性值将节点分为独立节点、主节点和配基节点,通过主节点和配基节点配对增加节点间相互作用力,提高各类节点参与共识的积极性,从而降低系统中心化程度。采用类别评定模块,计算节点行为权重值并更新节点类别,使系统对节点的奖惩更具有针对性。当新节点加入系统时,运用马氏距离计算公式求出最需要该节点的社区,以保证社区动态且平衡运行。在仿真环境下,DPoS-M2在运行了80 min时,与DDPoS、DPoS-PI和DPoS相比,节点的参与度分别提高21.9%、8.7%和32.4%;出块数量分别提高63.2%、44.8%和11.6%;新节点参与率分别提高22.8%、25.5%和28.7%;恶意节点的剔除速度分别提高12%、32%和48%。实验结果表明,DPoS-M2能有效地提高节点的积极性和系统去中心化程度,加快出块速度,提高可扩展性,增强系统安全性。展开更多
Blockchain technology has gained widespread adoption in recent years due to its ability to enable secure and trans-parent record-keeping and data transfer.A critical aspect of blockchain technology is the use of conse...Blockchain technology has gained widespread adoption in recent years due to its ability to enable secure and trans-parent record-keeping and data transfer.A critical aspect of blockchain technology is the use of consensus algorithms,which allow distributed nodes in the network to agree on the state of the blockchain.In this review paper,we exam-ine various consensus algorithms that are used in blockchain systems,including proof-of-work,proof-of-stake,and hybrid approaches.We go over the trade-offs and factors to think about when choosing a consensus algorithm,such as energy efficiency,decentralization,and security.We also look at the strengths and weaknesses of each algorithm as well as their potential impact on the scalability and adoption of blockchain technology.展开更多
针对委托股权证明(Delegated Proof of Stake,DPoS)共识机制系统中节点活跃度不高、错误节点剔除不及时、记账收益分配不合理等问题,提出了一种改进方案。改进方案主要改进了DPoS的计票机制和激励机制。改进的计票机制将节点的更多信息...针对委托股权证明(Delegated Proof of Stake,DPoS)共识机制系统中节点活跃度不高、错误节点剔除不及时、记账收益分配不合理等问题,提出了一种改进方案。改进方案主要改进了DPoS的计票机制和激励机制。改进的计票机制将节点的更多信息纳入了计票范围,使得选票能够更全面地反映节点的信用情况。根据节点的投票记录,动态调整节点选票的权重加快错误节点的剔除。对于激励机制的改进分为投票激励和记账激励两个部分,投票激励针对所有参与共识的节点给予相应的激励,激励系统中的节点积极参与投票。记账激励是根据博弈论中的权利指数来对收益进行二次分配,使得分配机制更为合理,有利于降低了系统的中心化趋势。通过实验验证了改进方案的有效性。展开更多
基金funded by Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS and grants(YUTP-PRG:015PBC-011).
文摘This study conducts a systematic literature review(SLR)of blockchain consensus mechanisms,an essential protocols that maintain the integrity,reliability,and decentralization of distributed ledger networks.The aim is to comprehensively investigate prominent mechanisms’security features and vulnerabilities,emphasizing their security considerations,applications,challenges,and future directions.The existing literature offers valuable insights into various consensus mechanisms’strengths,limitations,and security vulnerabilities and their real-world applications.However,there remains a gap in synthesizing and analyzing this knowledge systematically.Addressing this gap would facilitate a structured approach to understanding consensus mechanisms’security and vulnerabilities comprehensively.The study adheres to Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses(PRISMA)guidelines and computer science standards and reviewed 3749 research papers from 2016 to 2024,excluding grey literature,resulting in 290 articles for descriptive analysis.The research highlights an increased focus on blockchain consensus security,energy efficiency,and hybrid mechanisms within 60%of research papers post-2019,identifying gaps in scalability,privacy,and interoperability for future exploration.By synthesizing the existing research and identifying the key trends,this SLR contributes to advancing the understanding of blockchain consensus mechanisms’security and guiding future research and structured innovation in blockchain systems and applications.
文摘针对存在多名持币用户和节点服务商的基于权益证明(proof of stake,PoS)共识机制的区块链,考虑节点服务商的收益分配方式、安全性均对持币用户的收益具有影响,构建了n人无限策略非合作博弈模型,对持币用户的委托策略进行分析.研究发现,相较于安全性,持币用户应更加关注节点服务商的收益分配额;当某个节点服务商的收益分配额低于一定阈值时,持币用户应该委托其他节点服务商挖矿;持币用户委托收益的稳定性会随着节点服务商的收益分配额的提高而提高;当持币用户无法完全获得各节点服务商历史收益数据时,风险偏好型持币用户更适合委托PPLNS型节点服务商挖矿,风险规避型持币用户更适合委托FPPS型节点服务商挖矿.
文摘基于演化博弈将监察机制与奖惩制度引入授权股份证明(delegated proof of stake,DPoS)共识机制,构建以代理节点、投票节点、监管节点为主体的三方演化博弈模型;分析共识方案改进前后节点的行为策略选择变化,在不同奖惩力度和惩罚因子下节点行为策略的演化趋势,并用Matlab仿真。研究结果表明:(1)改进方案能遏制恶意节点的合谋行为并提高投票节点的积极性;(2)奖惩力度能影响节点行为策略;(3)惩罚因子可以影响节点行为趋向稳定点的速度。
文摘针对授权股权证明共识机制中节点投票不积极和节点腐败的问题,提出一种基于配对制度的DPoS共识机制(delegated proof-of-stake based on matching mechanism,DPoS-M2)。根据节点属性值将节点分为独立节点、主节点和配基节点,通过主节点和配基节点配对增加节点间相互作用力,提高各类节点参与共识的积极性,从而降低系统中心化程度。采用类别评定模块,计算节点行为权重值并更新节点类别,使系统对节点的奖惩更具有针对性。当新节点加入系统时,运用马氏距离计算公式求出最需要该节点的社区,以保证社区动态且平衡运行。在仿真环境下,DPoS-M2在运行了80 min时,与DDPoS、DPoS-PI和DPoS相比,节点的参与度分别提高21.9%、8.7%和32.4%;出块数量分别提高63.2%、44.8%和11.6%;新节点参与率分别提高22.8%、25.5%和28.7%;恶意节点的剔除速度分别提高12%、32%和48%。实验结果表明,DPoS-M2能有效地提高节点的积极性和系统去中心化程度,加快出块速度,提高可扩展性,增强系统安全性。
文摘Blockchain technology has gained widespread adoption in recent years due to its ability to enable secure and trans-parent record-keeping and data transfer.A critical aspect of blockchain technology is the use of consensus algorithms,which allow distributed nodes in the network to agree on the state of the blockchain.In this review paper,we exam-ine various consensus algorithms that are used in blockchain systems,including proof-of-work,proof-of-stake,and hybrid approaches.We go over the trade-offs and factors to think about when choosing a consensus algorithm,such as energy efficiency,decentralization,and security.We also look at the strengths and weaknesses of each algorithm as well as their potential impact on the scalability and adoption of blockchain technology.
文摘针对委托股权证明(Delegated Proof of Stake,DPoS)共识机制系统中节点活跃度不高、错误节点剔除不及时、记账收益分配不合理等问题,提出了一种改进方案。改进方案主要改进了DPoS的计票机制和激励机制。改进的计票机制将节点的更多信息纳入了计票范围,使得选票能够更全面地反映节点的信用情况。根据节点的投票记录,动态调整节点选票的权重加快错误节点的剔除。对于激励机制的改进分为投票激励和记账激励两个部分,投票激励针对所有参与共识的节点给予相应的激励,激励系统中的节点积极参与投票。记账激励是根据博弈论中的权利指数来对收益进行二次分配,使得分配机制更为合理,有利于降低了系统的中心化趋势。通过实验验证了改进方案的有效性。
