Cause of over Water Quality Standard and Control Measures of State-controlled Sections in Northern Water-deficient Area of Jiangsu

Taking state-controlled section of Xuzhou Peiyan river as an example,the current water quality was monitored,and the cause of over water quality standard was analyzed.The results showed that the pollutants of Peiyan river were mainly from the urban river segment,and the immediate cause of over standard was tributary pollutants in urban river segment with the runoff into rivers.So we should strengthen the maintenance of drainage control and gate-han,accelerate the construction of urban wastewater treatment facilities and supporting pipe network,promote rural decentralized sewage treatment,prevent and control livestock and poultry pollution,pesticides and fertilizers pollution,and intercept non-point source pollution by using eco-technology.

Corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from Chinese state-controlled listed firms

The association between corporate governance and firm value has been extensively studied in Chinese listed firms. Based on the characteristics of their ultimate shareholders, Chinese listed firms can be categorised as(1) central statecontrolled,(2) local state-controlled or(3) non-state-controlled. Some scholars have described Chinese government policy as ‘zhuada fangxiao', thus suggesting that the corporate governance mechanisms(CGMs) of central state-controlled listed firms(SCLFs) are better than those of local state-controlled listed firms. Therefore, this paper specifically examines the influence of CGMs on the value of central SCLFs and local SCLFs. Analysis of 2006 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009 suggests that the aggregate ownership of other large shareholders and the remuneration of top executives exhibit different effects on firm value in central and local SCLFs. The results also provide evidence that there is no endogenous effect of firm value on the ownership of the largest shareholder in central and local SCLFs.

Refining the Art of Reforming the Corporate Governance of Chinese State-Controlled Listed Companies： Venture Capital and Adaptive Efficiency

The corporate governance of Chinese state-controlled listed companies （SCLCs） has attracted much scholarly attention. Through reviewing the extant literature in this field, it is clear that the overwhelming majority is theoretically underpinned by the lens of agency costs. Another important perspective, adaptive efficiency, has yet to be equally emphasized by scholars. Reflecting on the experience of American venture capital （VC）, this article puts forth that the corporate governance of SCLCs has weakened the fundraising ability of Chinese domestic VC. Taking account of the positive link of a vibrant VC sector and the enhancement of adaptive efficiency, an obvious conclusion is that the corporate governance of SCLCs has already jeopardized the adaptive efficiency of the Chinese economy. Further, the normative implication of this finding is that the refined art of reforming the corporate governance of SCLCs ought to combine and harmonize agency costs with adaptive efficiency.