Building State-owned Assets Supervision System and Conducting Mixed Ownership Reforms to Reinforce Each Other’s Collaboration

Improving the state-owned assets supervision system(SOASS)can effectively get over the defects of systems and mechanisms and further promote the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises(SOEs);and the deepening of the reform can advance the change of the SOASS to the supervision on capital.By analyzing the relationship between the SOASS and the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,we have found that collaborative promotion of the change of the SOASS to the supervision on capital and promotion of the reform of mixed ownership can do good to ameliorating the corporate management mechanism,improving the market-oriented management mechanism of enterprises and completing the medium-and long-term incentive mechanisms,etc.to enhance business operation efficiency.Due to such prevailing problems as relative dispersion and vagueness of the policies relating to deepening the reform of SOEs,inconsistent progress of the reform of state-owned assets(SOAs)and SOEs,and corporate reform focusing on apprence,improving the SOASS and deepening collaborative development of the reform of mixed ownership of SOEs are hindered by some constraints.To construct and improve the SOASS and the reform of mixed ownership collaboratively,we should make efforts to promote the reform in the following five aspects,namely,placing importance to policy coordination,boosting synchronism of the reform of SOAs and SOEs at different levels and in different areas to coordinate the nationwide reform of SOAs and SOEs,facilitating reform of the mechanism of enterprises of mixed ownership through mixed capital,and promoting the SOASS and stimulating classified monitoring and reform of mixed ownership based on classified reform of SOEs.

描述与重构:国有资本投资运营公司外部董事独立性研究

普通公司法视域下,对外部董事独立性的探讨较多集中于其与公司内部管理层的相对隔离,这无力促进本土化殊为显著的国有资本投资运营公司外部董事与政府股东的关系界分。而政策文件中对国有资本投资运营公司外部董事选任权的割裂,暗含着其可能独立于政府股东的制度安排。在既有法律规则下,无论何种授权经营体制,政府股东均可借由掌控外部董事掌握国有资本投资运营公司治理权。基于更加宏观的法律机制视角,明确外部董事独立性的缺失肇因,为实现改革目标、迎合私法关系、移植淡马锡经验,有必要钩沉外部董事面向出资人代表机构的独立性需求,逐步明晰国有资产监管权力边界,并将降低改革的政治交易成本纳入考量,建基于此,进一步提出全面的修法建议,以破解外部董事的构成性迷思与建设性困惑。

国有资本授权经营体制改革与国有企业过度负债

防范债务风险是国资国企改革的重要目标,也是提升国有企业核心竞争力的必要保障。本文以2010—2021年A股上市国有企业为样本,采用多期双重差分法,考察了国有资本授权经营体制改革对过度负债的影响。研究发现,国有资本授权经营体制改革可显著降低国有企业过度负债水平。减少政策性负担、硬化预算软约束以及缓解管理层代理问题是国有资本授权经营体制改革降低国有企业的过度负债水平的内在机制。在政府放权意愿较高、国有资本运营公司控股的企业中,国有资本授权经营体制改革降低过度负债水平的作用更显著;在具有过度负债问题的国有企业中,国有资本授权经营体制改革显著提升了资本结构调整速度;国有资本授权经营体制改革通过抑制过度负债显著降低了国有企业的经营风险、提升了国有企业的经营效率。本文丰富了关于国有资本授权经营体制改革作用后果以及国有企业过度负债影响因素的研究,研究结论对于国资监管机构的制度完善和国有企业的债务风险防范具有一定的现实启示。

国有企业70年改革发展历程与趋势展望

我国社会主义公有制采取国家所有与集体所有的形式。国家所有集中体现为国有企业占用及使用国有资产,从国有企业全面建立到做强做优做大国有企业,再到剥离国有企业的国有资本运营职能,实行国有资本运营的专业化,国有企业已经走过了70年的发展历程。国有企业的发展及改革,支持了我国工业化进程并支撑了国家工业体系,促进了国防工业技术水平的不断提高,推动了若干重要重大技术进步及创新突破,增强与提高了支柱性产业的国际竞争力,国有企业改革贯穿于改革开放的全过程,对我国经济社会发展产生了重大影响力。随着市场经济的不断完善与更大力度实施对外开放,国有企业发展及改革还要继续。新形势新环境新要求下的国有企业发展及改革,集中体现为做强做优做大国有资本。