Modernization of Governance System and Governance Capability of State-Owned Enterprises

State-owned enterprises are important pillars of socialism with Chinese characteristics,and the modernization of their governance system and governance capacity is an important part of the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity.Through case study and specific practice,this paper carries out an in-depth thinking and serious analysis on how to promote the modernization of the governance system and governance capacity of state-owned enterprises under the new situation and requirements.This paper puts forward three kinds of management and control mechanism to enhance core competence in addition to the specific implementation path by using digital governance means.

Political governance in China's state-owned enterprises

State-owned enterprises(SOEs)are both the economic and political bases of the Chinese Communist Party(the Party)and the Chinese state.The overarching principle of SOE reform is to firmly implement the Party’s leadership and the modern enterprise system.This principle creates a political governance system in China’s SOEs—a Party-dominated governance system characterized by Party leadership,state ownership,Party cadre management,Party participation in corporate decision-making,and intra-Party supervision.This survey explains the logic of political governance in China’s SOEs,presents the evolution and current practices of each element of the system,and discusses findings from both academic research and the field.

The Reforming Logic of State-owned Enterprise Corporate Governance:Proceeding from National Governance to Corporate Governance

The top-level design of national governance plays a leading role in reforming the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)at the micro level.Following the overall objectives of comprehensively deepening reforms,this paper argues that the objective of SOEs corporate governance reform at this stage should be to improve and develop the SOEs corporate governance system with Chinese characteristics and modernize SOEs corporate governance system and governance capacity.To achieve this ambitious objective,this paper considers the theory of SOEs corporate governance with Chinese characteristics,and then explores the concrete manifestation and implementation pathway to the modernization of SOEs corporate governance system and governance capacity.This paper thus enriches the theory of corporate governance and provides insights into the newera SOEs corporate governance reform.

我国民营企业的新发展

1997年以来 ,我国民营企业发展出现了一些与以往显著不同的新特点。但总的来说 ,民营企业的发展环境比以前更宽松、更有利了。为迎接 2 1世纪的挑战 ,实现可持续发展 ,我国民营企业必须进行自身变革 ,进一步发展所遇到的政策障碍也亟待克服 ,主要有 :投资领域限制问题、融资难问题、法律地位与法律保护问题 ,以及政府管理与服务问题。

浅谈政府主导下的“多校一企”、“多校多企”工学结合模式

工学结合教育模式历史悠久,在英国、德国等西方国家均有成功经验,但在我国实质上是尚处于探索阶段。制约工学结合有效实施的瓶颈,表面上表现为学校、企业、学生的问题,实质上却存在着一个更深层次的问题主体———各级政府部门。基于现状,本文提出了一种突破校企合作瓶颈的新思路———政府主导下的"多校一企"、"多校多企"工学结合模式。

我国国有企业治理障碍的经济伦理意蕴研究

我国国有企业治理是中国企业走向现代化的重要组成部分,其能否顺利推进会对国民经济的可持续发展产生深远影响。事实上,我国国有企业治理变迁由于受到两权机制混同、混杂体系、中介组织障碍、政府角色定位难、法律制度缺陷以及残缺激励等约束而变得困难,根源在于各参与方经济伦理义利观的缺失。因此,只有不断培育符合社会主义市场经济的经济伦理思维意识,创新组织保障,研究探索新的具体制度设计,才能实现顺利推进,持续不断提高全体社会成员的共同利益。

中国市场规范运行的三大基础障碍

本文认为,在中国经济转轨和完善市场经济体制的进程中,主要存在三方面的基础障碍影响现实的市场规范运行:首先,政府控股公司上市发行股票。这不符合市场经济的基本运行规则,因为股票市场是民营企业的融资渠道。其次,相当多的政府企业性质嬗变。政府企业脱离政府控制,严重干扰了竞争性市场的秩序。其三,缺少现代农业生产组织。这意味着中国经济现代化的实现缺失相应的中国农业现代化的基础。文章提出,为规范资本市场,应将政府控股上市公司的未上市国有股的一部分上市发行,将政府控股上市公司未流通的国有股以净资产的评估价格为参考,转让给民营企业或外资企业,将政府控股上市公司的现有国有股拍卖;为规范市场秩序,一要尽快制定政府投资法,二要尽快制定政府企业法;为建立现代农业生产组织,必须冲破观念缚束,改革农村土地制度,使农民获得土地的永久使用权,培养出大批的合格的农场经营者,完成农村人口向城市的大规模转移。

小微企业融资履约影响因素及治理机制探究

结合小微企业融资履约的现状和环境,剖析了小微企业融资履约特征。从组织模式不规范、规则流程不健全、抗风险能力较弱、金融市场信号失真四个方面总结了小微企业融资履约存在的问题。从弱化信息不对称、多样化制约机制、规范化监管体系三个方面提出了小微企业融资履约的治理机制及优化对策。

Corporate governance and firm value: Evidence from Chinese state-controlled listed firms

The association between corporate governance and firm value has been extensively studied in Chinese listed firms. Based on the characteristics of their ultimate shareholders, Chinese listed firms can be categorised as(1) central statecontrolled,(2) local state-controlled or(3) non-state-controlled. Some scholars have described Chinese government policy as ‘zhuada fangxiao', thus suggesting that the corporate governance mechanisms(CGMs) of central state-controlled listed firms(SCLFs) are better than those of local state-controlled listed firms. Therefore, this paper specifically examines the influence of CGMs on the value of central SCLFs and local SCLFs. Analysis of 2006 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009 suggests that the aggregate ownership of other large shareholders and the remuneration of top executives exhibit different effects on firm value in central and local SCLFs. The results also provide evidence that there is no endogenous effect of firm value on the ownership of the largest shareholder in central and local SCLFs.

Female directors in the boardroom and intellectual capital performance:Does the“critical mass”matter?

This research aims to investigate the influence of female directors on Intellectual Capital Performance(ICP)using a sample of manufacturing-listed companies in China.Our study investigates the link between having two or more female directors and the Modified Value-Added Intellectual Coefficient(MVAIC)methodology,employing the critical mass theory from 2004–2017.We find that having a critical mass of female directors(three or more)shows a significant positive impact on MVAIC and its components,including human capital efficiency,structural capital efficiency,relational capital efficiency,and physical capital efficiency,with physical capital being the critical driver.Our study reveals that the critical mass participation of female directors substantially influences the IC efficiency of privately owned companies compared to state-owned companies.Moreover,the number of female directors also affects the IC performance of manufacturing companies in multiple regions.Our findings support the validity of group classification identified by Kanter and Critical Mass Theory.To the best of our knowledge,this is one of the few pieces of research that studies the role of female board directors in IC performance and Chinese manufacturing firms using MVAIC as an IC measure.

Local fiscal distress and investment efficiency of local SOEs

In this paper, we use A-share listed firms between 2002 and 2010 to investigate the relationship between local fiscal distress and the investment efficiency of local SOEs, along with the effect of corporate tax payments on this relationship. We find a positive relationship between the extent of local SOEs' overinvestment and the fiscal distress of the corresponding local government where the enterprise and this relationship become stronger for firms that pay fewer taxes. The pattern of underinvestment among local SOEs was in contrast,and these relationships do not exist for non-SOEs or central SOEs. Moreover,we find that expanding a firm's investment scale leads to an increase in total taxes paid, including income and turnover taxes, which further result in more local fiscal revenue. Overall, we conclude that local governments have an incentive to increase fiscal revenue when faced with fiscal distress by raising the investment scale of local SOEs and that the incentives and effects of such interventions appear to be stronger among firms that contribute less to local fiscal revenue.ó 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.