State-owned enterprises are important pillars of socialism with Chinese characteristics,and the modernization of their governance system and governance capacity is an important part of the modernization of the nationa...State-owned enterprises are important pillars of socialism with Chinese characteristics,and the modernization of their governance system and governance capacity is an important part of the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity.Through case study and specific practice,this paper carries out an in-depth thinking and serious analysis on how to promote the modernization of the governance system and governance capacity of state-owned enterprises under the new situation and requirements.This paper puts forward three kinds of management and control mechanism to enhance core competence in addition to the specific implementation path by using digital governance means.展开更多
The top-level design of national governance plays a leading role in reforming the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)at the micro level.Following the overall objectives of comprehensively deepening r...The top-level design of national governance plays a leading role in reforming the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)at the micro level.Following the overall objectives of comprehensively deepening reforms,this paper argues that the objective of SOEs corporate governance reform at this stage should be to improve and develop the SOEs corporate governance system with Chinese characteristics and modernize SOEs corporate governance system and governance capacity.To achieve this ambitious objective,this paper considers the theory of SOEs corporate governance with Chinese characteristics,and then explores the concrete manifestation and implementation pathway to the modernization of SOEs corporate governance system and governance capacity.This paper thus enriches the theory of corporate governance and provides insights into the newera SOEs corporate governance reform.展开更多
State-owned enterprises(SOEs)are both the economic and political bases of the Chinese Communist Party(the Party)and the Chinese state.The overarching principle of SOE reform is to firmly implement the Party’s leaders...State-owned enterprises(SOEs)are both the economic and political bases of the Chinese Communist Party(the Party)and the Chinese state.The overarching principle of SOE reform is to firmly implement the Party’s leadership and the modern enterprise system.This principle creates a political governance system in China’s SOEs—a Party-dominated governance system characterized by Party leadership,state ownership,Party cadre management,Party participation in corporate decision-making,and intra-Party supervision.This survey explains the logic of political governance in China’s SOEs,presents the evolution and current practices of each element of the system,and discusses findings from both academic research and the field.展开更多
Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under differe...Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives' economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.展开更多
This research aims to investigate the influence of female directors on Intellectual Capital Performance(ICP)using a sample of manufacturing-listed companies in China.Our study investigates the link between having two ...This research aims to investigate the influence of female directors on Intellectual Capital Performance(ICP)using a sample of manufacturing-listed companies in China.Our study investigates the link between having two or more female directors and the Modified Value-Added Intellectual Coefficient(MVAIC)methodology,employing the critical mass theory from 2004–2017.We find that having a critical mass of female directors(three or more)shows a significant positive impact on MVAIC and its components,including human capital efficiency,structural capital efficiency,relational capital efficiency,and physical capital efficiency,with physical capital being the critical driver.Our study reveals that the critical mass participation of female directors substantially influences the IC efficiency of privately owned companies compared to state-owned companies.Moreover,the number of female directors also affects the IC performance of manufacturing companies in multiple regions.Our findings support the validity of group classification identified by Kanter and Critical Mass Theory.To the best of our knowledge,this is one of the few pieces of research that studies the role of female board directors in IC performance and Chinese manufacturing firms using MVAIC as an IC measure.展开更多
Based on the non-financial listed enterprises data from 2000 to 2014,this paper calculates the level of environmental governances of enterprises with environmental investment,and empirically analyzes the impact of pro...Based on the non-financial listed enterprises data from 2000 to 2014,this paper calculates the level of environmental governances of enterprises with environmental investment,and empirically analyzes the impact of provincial official tenure and Five-Year Plan target assessment on the environmental governance of enterprises.The results show that the enterprise environmental investment presents a significant periodic trend in the Five-Year Plan,while the trend is not significant in official’s tenure.The further test suggests that with the clear requirement of“environmental performance”incorporated into the performance evaluation system of local government officials,it has become significant in the periodic trend in the impact of officials’tenure on environmental investment.In contrast,the trend has become less prominent in the Five-Year Plan,which indicates that there is a substitute relation between the two evaluation systems.The mechanism test also finds that both environmental subsidies and pollution abatement expenditures present a significantly periodic trend in the Five-Year Plan.And official’s tenure plays a regulatory role in the Five-Year Plan periodic trend in the environmental governance of enterprise,showing that it is more significant when the time about officials’tenure evaluation is earlier than Five-Year Plan target assessment.The above results indicate that it is beneficial to improve local environment governance from the perspective of top institutional design by both strengthening the environmental evaluation.展开更多
由于对企业是否履行CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility)行为进行监督需要可观的监督成本,且对政府来说,严格的监督还可能对短期内GDP政绩指标表现造成不利影响。因此,在缺乏媒体监督的社会环境中,政府和核心企业都有不采取措施监督...由于对企业是否履行CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility)行为进行监督需要可观的监督成本,且对政府来说,严格的监督还可能对短期内GDP政绩指标表现造成不利影响。因此,在缺乏媒体监督的社会环境中,政府和核心企业都有不采取措施监督供应链成员履行CSR的动机。针对这一现实问题,可运用进化博弈理论,在前人研究基础上引入GDP政绩和媒体监督的环境因素,构建政府和核心企业CSR监督的进化博弈模型,对彼此博弈策略的稳定性进行分析。研究表明:政府和核心企业对供应链成员的CSR行为是否进行监督一方面取决于监督成本、公众的CSR意识、GDP政绩指标权重以及社会媒体的监督力量等因素,另一方面也与博弈对手的策略选择的概率相关。展开更多
The association between corporate governance and firm value has been extensively studied in Chinese listed firms. Based on the characteristics of their ultimate shareholders, Chinese listed firms can be categorised as...The association between corporate governance and firm value has been extensively studied in Chinese listed firms. Based on the characteristics of their ultimate shareholders, Chinese listed firms can be categorised as(1) central statecontrolled,(2) local state-controlled or(3) non-state-controlled. Some scholars have described Chinese government policy as ‘zhuada fangxiao', thus suggesting that the corporate governance mechanisms(CGMs) of central state-controlled listed firms(SCLFs) are better than those of local state-controlled listed firms. Therefore, this paper specifically examines the influence of CGMs on the value of central SCLFs and local SCLFs. Analysis of 2006 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009 suggests that the aggregate ownership of other large shareholders and the remuneration of top executives exhibit different effects on firm value in central and local SCLFs. The results also provide evidence that there is no endogenous effect of firm value on the ownership of the largest shareholder in central and local SCLFs.展开更多
文摘State-owned enterprises are important pillars of socialism with Chinese characteristics,and the modernization of their governance system and governance capacity is an important part of the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity.Through case study and specific practice,this paper carries out an in-depth thinking and serious analysis on how to promote the modernization of the governance system and governance capacity of state-owned enterprises under the new situation and requirements.This paper puts forward three kinds of management and control mechanism to enhance core competence in addition to the specific implementation path by using digital governance means.
基金This paper is supported by the Key Project of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71432008).The authors thank Prof.LI Shanmin,Prof.YI Zhihong,Prof.JIANG Dongsheng,Prof.LIU Zhibiao,Prof.LU Zhengfei,Prof.WANG Huacheng,Prof.LÜChangjiang,Prof.TANG Guliang,Prof.WANG Changyun,Prof.ZHENG Hongliang,Prof.WANG Dehua,Prof.XU Feng,Prof.ZHANG Mubin,and friends from central enterprises and financial institutions,such as Mr.YOU Hua,Dr.WANG Yuntong,Dr.QIAN Zhonghua,Dr.QIN Yihu,for their constructive comments and suggestions on this paper.Opinions expressed in this paper are the authors’sole responsibility。
文摘The top-level design of national governance plays a leading role in reforming the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)at the micro level.Following the overall objectives of comprehensively deepening reforms,this paper argues that the objective of SOEs corporate governance reform at this stage should be to improve and develop the SOEs corporate governance system with Chinese characteristics and modernize SOEs corporate governance system and governance capacity.To achieve this ambitious objective,this paper considers the theory of SOEs corporate governance with Chinese characteristics,and then explores the concrete manifestation and implementation pathway to the modernization of SOEs corporate governance system and governance capacity.This paper thus enriches the theory of corporate governance and provides insights into the newera SOEs corporate governance reform.
基金supported by the National Social Science Fund of China Key Project(Study on the Reform and Innovation of Monitoring System of SOEs,No.17ZDA086)
文摘State-owned enterprises(SOEs)are both the economic and political bases of the Chinese Communist Party(the Party)and the Chinese state.The overarching principle of SOE reform is to firmly implement the Party’s leadership and the modern enterprise system.This principle creates a political governance system in China’s SOEs—a Party-dominated governance system characterized by Party leadership,state ownership,Party cadre management,Party participation in corporate decision-making,and intra-Party supervision.This survey explains the logic of political governance in China’s SOEs,presents the evolution and current practices of each element of the system,and discusses findings from both academic research and the field.
文摘Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives' economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.
文摘This research aims to investigate the influence of female directors on Intellectual Capital Performance(ICP)using a sample of manufacturing-listed companies in China.Our study investigates the link between having two or more female directors and the Modified Value-Added Intellectual Coefficient(MVAIC)methodology,employing the critical mass theory from 2004–2017.We find that having a critical mass of female directors(three or more)shows a significant positive impact on MVAIC and its components,including human capital efficiency,structural capital efficiency,relational capital efficiency,and physical capital efficiency,with physical capital being the critical driver.Our study reveals that the critical mass participation of female directors substantially influences the IC efficiency of privately owned companies compared to state-owned companies.Moreover,the number of female directors also affects the IC performance of manufacturing companies in multiple regions.Our findings support the validity of group classification identified by Kanter and Critical Mass Theory.To the best of our knowledge,this is one of the few pieces of research that studies the role of female board directors in IC performance and Chinese manufacturing firms using MVAIC as an IC measure.
文摘Based on the non-financial listed enterprises data from 2000 to 2014,this paper calculates the level of environmental governances of enterprises with environmental investment,and empirically analyzes the impact of provincial official tenure and Five-Year Plan target assessment on the environmental governance of enterprises.The results show that the enterprise environmental investment presents a significant periodic trend in the Five-Year Plan,while the trend is not significant in official’s tenure.The further test suggests that with the clear requirement of“environmental performance”incorporated into the performance evaluation system of local government officials,it has become significant in the periodic trend in the impact of officials’tenure on environmental investment.In contrast,the trend has become less prominent in the Five-Year Plan,which indicates that there is a substitute relation between the two evaluation systems.The mechanism test also finds that both environmental subsidies and pollution abatement expenditures present a significantly periodic trend in the Five-Year Plan.And official’s tenure plays a regulatory role in the Five-Year Plan periodic trend in the environmental governance of enterprise,showing that it is more significant when the time about officials’tenure evaluation is earlier than Five-Year Plan target assessment.The above results indicate that it is beneficial to improve local environment governance from the perspective of top institutional design by both strengthening the environmental evaluation.
文摘由于对企业是否履行CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility)行为进行监督需要可观的监督成本,且对政府来说,严格的监督还可能对短期内GDP政绩指标表现造成不利影响。因此,在缺乏媒体监督的社会环境中,政府和核心企业都有不采取措施监督供应链成员履行CSR的动机。针对这一现实问题,可运用进化博弈理论,在前人研究基础上引入GDP政绩和媒体监督的环境因素,构建政府和核心企业CSR监督的进化博弈模型,对彼此博弈策略的稳定性进行分析。研究表明:政府和核心企业对供应链成员的CSR行为是否进行监督一方面取决于监督成本、公众的CSR意识、GDP政绩指标权重以及社会媒体的监督力量等因素,另一方面也与博弈对手的策略选择的概率相关。
文摘The association between corporate governance and firm value has been extensively studied in Chinese listed firms. Based on the characteristics of their ultimate shareholders, Chinese listed firms can be categorised as(1) central statecontrolled,(2) local state-controlled or(3) non-state-controlled. Some scholars have described Chinese government policy as ‘zhuada fangxiao', thus suggesting that the corporate governance mechanisms(CGMs) of central state-controlled listed firms(SCLFs) are better than those of local state-controlled listed firms. Therefore, this paper specifically examines the influence of CGMs on the value of central SCLFs and local SCLFs. Analysis of 2006 firm-year observations from 2007 to 2009 suggests that the aggregate ownership of other large shareholders and the remuneration of top executives exhibit different effects on firm value in central and local SCLFs. The results also provide evidence that there is no endogenous effect of firm value on the ownership of the largest shareholder in central and local SCLFs.