State-Owned Capital Participation in Private Enterprises:A Perspective of Debt Financing

This study takes debt financing as the entry point and explores the impact of state-owned capital participation in private enterprises from the perspectives of“unarticulated rules”and“articulated rules”.The study finds that state-owned capital participation significantly reduces the debt financing costs of private enterprises and expands the scale of their debt financing.This conclusion remains valid after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests.Further analysis of the mechanism reveals that state-owned capital participation improves the debt financing of private enterprises through multiple channels:Enhancing their social reputation,mitigating the“statistical bias”they face,optimizing their information quality,and reducing the“shareholder-creditor”agency problems.This paper conceptualizes these benefits as the“complementary advantages of heterogeneous shareholders”.This not only constructs a theoretical framework for“reverse mixed-ownership reform”but also better narrates the Chinese story of“mixed-ownership reform”by adopting a more universally applicable theory of equity structure.Additionally,the paper supplements existing research on the macro-and meso-level relationship between the government and the market by exploring the government’s positive role at the micro-level.

Study on Correlative Issues about State-owned Enterprises Restructuring in Resource-based Cities in China

The ＂sediment＂ formed in the process of long-term development of the resource-based cities not only restricts the economic structure trans/brmation, but also increases the difficulties for restructuring the state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, it makes current ways of reforming staffs＇ identity replacement and managers＇ shareholding mode inefficient in state-owned enterprises reformation in resource-based cities. According to the characteristics of resource-based cities and property right reform theory, cash and share right compensation for the different staffs in the process of staffs＇ identity replacement have been identified. In addition, different profitable investment policies have also been suggested. For managers＇ share holding, the stimulant share ownership should be adopted principally, at the same time corresponding restrictions should be set up for managers＇ investment share ownership due to share ownership structure.

国有非控股股东对民营企业价值创造的影响研究

根据创造共享价值理论中企业经济和社会价值的双重内涵,将国有非控股股东增强民营企业终极控制人的经济价值创造效用、社会价值创造努力以及资源掏空成本,引入终极控制人最优效用函数,并通过实证分析检验理论假设,为混合所有制改革背景下,更加有效发挥国有股权积极作用的政策制定提供借鉴。理论推导与实证结果表明:国有股东委派能够增强终极控制人对目标公司经济价值和社会价值的提升作用,不能起到协同抑制目标公司资源掏空的作用,而国有持股仅对终极控制人提升公司社会价值的努力具有促进作用;国有股东委派能够直接提升目标公司的经济价值,并减少目标公司资源被掏空,但国有持股不能产生直接影响,且国有股东在提升企业社会价值方面还需加强。

国有银行控股比例与管理授权——基于混合寡占模型的研究

本文结合中国银行业竞争日趋激烈的现实背景,从国有银行股份制改革和管理授权入手构建了银行业混合寡占、国有银行混合持股的两阶段古诺竞争模型,分析国有银行为达到既定目标如何选择国有控股比例及适当的管理激励合同。研究表明,国有银行会选择利润收益合同作为占优管理授权,而放弃相对表现激励合同;当国有银行将最大化社会福利作为目标时,国有银行成为市场垄断者,私有银行被挤出市场;仅在利润收益激励合同下,国有银行将最大化利润和消费者剩余之和作为目标。

论证券民事责任与股东诉讼方式

证券民事责任与股东诉讼方式在维护股东利益和上市公司信用中具有特殊的功能 ,可以弥补行政责任和政府监管的不足。股东诉讼是股东实现权利救济的方式 ,根据不同标准 ,可以分为股东直接诉讼和派生诉讼 ,以及股东单独诉讼、共同诉讼与代表人诉讼。本文在全面梳理的基础上 ,结合公司法、证券法和民事诉讼法的相关条款 ,跨跃和融合了实体法与程序法两大不同的法域 ,着重分析了股东派生诉讼与代表人诉讼 ,并评点了一些不妥当的看法 。

The Reform of State-owned Commercial Banks in China: A Political Economy Perspective

This paper analyzes the logic of the reform of state-owned commercial banks during 1997-2006 from a political economy perspective, mainly by discussing three fields of the reform: shareholding system reform, marketization, and financial restructuring. It also points out the existing problems in each field. The conclusion is that although the reform is heading in the right direction and has already made great progress, it has largely been conducted at the technical level and the Government has avoided dealing with the core issue of the reform. More importantly, the consequences of the Government's policy—pursuing short-term objectives, like improving the short-term financial status of banks—puts the entire system in danger by accumulating long-term risks. This paper also provides some policy proposals and points out potential directions for further studies.

Mixed oligopoly,state-owned banks’shareholding reform and foreign capital penetration

This paper examines the impact of the policy on eliminating the ratio of foreign shareholding in banks in a mixed oligopoly model.Its analytic results show that state-owned banks should encourage privatisation along with an increasing proportion of the domestic share in multinational banks.Furthermore,we argue that the increase in domestic stockholding of multinational banks raises domestic private firms’profits but decreases their social welfare in the deposit market.The results of numerical simulation show that when the quantity of private banks is fixed,foreign banks tend to enlarge their stake and strengthen their controlling power.

Unpacking the patterns of corporate restructuring during China’s SOE reform

State-owned enterprises(SOEs)in China have undergone significant restructuring since the mid-1990s.To date,scholars have devoted considerable attention to the constraints upon and motives for corporate restructuring in China.Yet the majority of the existing studies treat restructuring as a simple ownership transfer from the state to non-state entities without considering the resulting ownership structure of the firm.Consequently,we know relatively little about why otherwise similar SOEs were restructured at different times and through different means.This study intends to fill this gap by examining the determinants of both the timing and the methods of restructuring in a unique longitudinal survey of 145 SOEs over an 11-year period.Using a competing-risks model,we demonstrate that political as well as economic factors determine the possibility,nature and speed of restructuring.In particular,we show that political constraints on employee retention increase the likelihood that a SOE will be restructured as shareholding as opposed to its ownership being directly transferred to private hands.These findings shed new light on the economic and political logic of corporate restructuring in China.

Board faultlines and the value of cash holdings:Evidence from Chinese listed companies

Faultlines can affect a board of director’s effectiveness in supervising senior managers,which in turn affects the value of a company’s cash holdings.Based on sample data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2016,we examine the relationship between board faultlines and the value of cash holdings.The empirical results indicate that board faultlines have a significant inhibitory effect on cash holding value.This inhibitory effect is stronger for board faultlines resulting from deep-level attributes.Furthermore,the inhibitory effect of board faultlines is stronger in state-owned enterprises(SOEs)than in non-SOEs.As an important governance mechanism,management shareholdings can reduce agency costs and mitigate the negative impact of board fissures on cash holdings.Overall,we enrich the literature on the economic consequences of board faultlines and their influence on cash holding value.We also offer companies practical suggestions for improving the supervisory mechanism of their board of directors.