The unilateral disposition of stock rights＇ voting rights detracts from the welfare of the other shareholders. Contractual arrangements restricting or prohibiting the transfer of stock rights under the capital majori...The unilateral disposition of stock rights＇ voting rights detracts from the welfare of the other shareholders. Contractual arrangements restricting or prohibiting the transfer of stock rights under the capital majority rule may infringe upon shareholders＇ fight of withdrawal, further weakening stock market constraints on senior management and indirectly raising the agency cost of management abuse of power for private ends. In creating a legal structure for stock rights transfer, we need to find an appropriate balance between freedom of contract, capital majority rule and reduction of agency costs. Judges should determine that the transfer of voting rights is invalid in order to ensure that voting rights match residual claim rights and maintain the constraints on senior management represented by shareholder voting rights. The general prohibition of stock fights transfer in the articles of association blocks shareholders＇ right of withdrawal; this is not conducive to restraining potential abuses of power on the part of senior management and should be made invalid. Judges must differentiate between long- and short-term contracts and the initial and revised clauses of the articles of association in order to distinguish between the efficacy of different arrangements limiting transfer of stock rights as laid down in the articles of association.展开更多
This paper considers stock halts to study the impact of stock liquidity loss on the managerial learning effect based on stock prices.We examine stock halts’impact on corporate innovation and find that discretionary h...This paper considers stock halts to study the impact of stock liquidity loss on the managerial learning effect based on stock prices.We examine stock halts’impact on corporate innovation and find that discretionary halts hinder innovation.We also find that discretionary halts reduce information quality and increase financial constraints and agent costs.Cross-sectional tests show that this negative impact is more pronounced in samples with high shareholding ratios by large shareholders,institutional investors and private firms.The results indicate that the loss of non-institutional stock trading rights,represented by discretionary stock halts,affects revelatory price efficiency in the secondary market,hinders managers’learning effect and affects enterprises’production and operation decisions.These findings have policy implications for stock circulation-right protection and Chinese capital-market reform.展开更多
基金an initial product(in Economic Law)of the Discipline Construction(Legal Science)Program in Shanghai universities
文摘The unilateral disposition of stock rights＇ voting rights detracts from the welfare of the other shareholders. Contractual arrangements restricting or prohibiting the transfer of stock rights under the capital majority rule may infringe upon shareholders＇ fight of withdrawal, further weakening stock market constraints on senior management and indirectly raising the agency cost of management abuse of power for private ends. In creating a legal structure for stock rights transfer, we need to find an appropriate balance between freedom of contract, capital majority rule and reduction of agency costs. Judges should determine that the transfer of voting rights is invalid in order to ensure that voting rights match residual claim rights and maintain the constraints on senior management represented by shareholder voting rights. The general prohibition of stock fights transfer in the articles of association blocks shareholders＇ right of withdrawal; this is not conducive to restraining potential abuses of power on the part of senior management and should be made invalid. Judges must differentiate between long- and short-term contracts and the initial and revised clauses of the articles of association in order to distinguish between the efficacy of different arrangements limiting transfer of stock rights as laid down in the articles of association.
基金funded by grants from the Natural Science Foundation of China(No.7227213271872048).
文摘This paper considers stock halts to study the impact of stock liquidity loss on the managerial learning effect based on stock prices.We examine stock halts’impact on corporate innovation and find that discretionary halts hinder innovation.We also find that discretionary halts reduce information quality and increase financial constraints and agent costs.Cross-sectional tests show that this negative impact is more pronounced in samples with high shareholding ratios by large shareholders,institutional investors and private firms.The results indicate that the loss of non-institutional stock trading rights,represented by discretionary stock halts,affects revelatory price efficiency in the secondary market,hinders managers’learning effect and affects enterprises’production and operation decisions.These findings have policy implications for stock circulation-right protection and Chinese capital-market reform.
