To reduce the cost of backfilling coal mining and utilize the underground space of coal mines,a new backfilling mining method with low backfilling rate called constructional backfilling coal mining(CBCM)is proposed.Th...To reduce the cost of backfilling coal mining and utilize the underground space of coal mines,a new backfilling mining method with low backfilling rate called constructional backfilling coal mining(CBCM)is proposed.The "backfilling body-immediate roof" cooperative bearing structure of CBCM is analyzed by establishing the model of the medium thick plate on an elastic foundation.The influence of the backfilling rate on the stability of overlying strata is analyzed by the numerical simulation experiment.The control effect of CBCM is verified by a physic similar simulation test.The economic benefit of CBCM is analyzed.The conclusions are:the deformation characteristics of the immediate roof and critical backfilling spacing in CBCM can be analyzed based on the Hu Haichang’s theory.Exerting the bearing capacity of the immediate roof is beneficial to the stability of the overlying strata.The CBCM has a good control effect on the overburden in Xinyang Mine when the backfilling rate is lower than 25%.The backfilling cost of per ton coal is 37.39 yuan/t when the backfilling rate is 13.7%,with a decrease rate of 56.63%than the full-filling.The research results can provide theoretical support for the application of CBCM in coal mining.展开更多
Based on patent cooperation data,this study used a range of city network analysis approaches in order to explore the structure of the Chinese city network which is driven by technological knowledge flows.The results r...Based on patent cooperation data,this study used a range of city network analysis approaches in order to explore the structure of the Chinese city network which is driven by technological knowledge flows.The results revealed the spatial structure,composition structure,hierarchical structure,group structure,and control structure of Chinese city network,as well as its dynamic factors.The major findings are:1) the spatial pattern presents a diamond structure,in which Wuhan is the central city;2) although the invention patent knowledge network is the main part of the broader inter-city innovative cooperation network,it is weaker than the utility model patent;3) as the senior level cities,Beijing,Shanghai and the cities in the Zhujiang(Pearl) River Delta Region show a strong capability of both spreading and controlling technological knowledge;4) whilst a national technology alliance has preliminarily formed,regional alliances have not been adequately established;5) even though the cooperation level amongst weak connection cities is not high,such cities still play an important role in the network as a result of their location within ′structural holes′ in the network;and 6) the major driving forces facilitating inter-city technological cooperation are geographical proximity,hierarchical proximity and technological proximity.展开更多
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the d...The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.展开更多
基金supported by the Youth Funds of National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.52004173)the Distinguished Youth Funds of National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.51925402)+2 种基金the Science and Technology Innovation Project of Colleges and Universities in Shanxi Province(No.2020L0066)the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(No.2022M712922)the Shanxi-Zheda Institute of Advanced Materials and Chemical Engineering(Nos.2021SX-TD001 and 2022SXTD008).
文摘To reduce the cost of backfilling coal mining and utilize the underground space of coal mines,a new backfilling mining method with low backfilling rate called constructional backfilling coal mining(CBCM)is proposed.The "backfilling body-immediate roof" cooperative bearing structure of CBCM is analyzed by establishing the model of the medium thick plate on an elastic foundation.The influence of the backfilling rate on the stability of overlying strata is analyzed by the numerical simulation experiment.The control effect of CBCM is verified by a physic similar simulation test.The economic benefit of CBCM is analyzed.The conclusions are:the deformation characteristics of the immediate roof and critical backfilling spacing in CBCM can be analyzed based on the Hu Haichang’s theory.Exerting the bearing capacity of the immediate roof is beneficial to the stability of the overlying strata.The CBCM has a good control effect on the overburden in Xinyang Mine when the backfilling rate is lower than 25%.The backfilling cost of per ton coal is 37.39 yuan/t when the backfilling rate is 13.7%,with a decrease rate of 56.63%than the full-filling.The research results can provide theoretical support for the application of CBCM in coal mining.
基金Under the auspices of Major Project of National Social Science Foundation of China(No.13&ZD027)National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.41201128,71433008)
文摘Based on patent cooperation data,this study used a range of city network analysis approaches in order to explore the structure of the Chinese city network which is driven by technological knowledge flows.The results revealed the spatial structure,composition structure,hierarchical structure,group structure,and control structure of Chinese city network,as well as its dynamic factors.The major findings are:1) the spatial pattern presents a diamond structure,in which Wuhan is the central city;2) although the invention patent knowledge network is the main part of the broader inter-city innovative cooperation network,it is weaker than the utility model patent;3) as the senior level cities,Beijing,Shanghai and the cities in the Zhujiang(Pearl) River Delta Region show a strong capability of both spreading and controlling technological knowledge;4) whilst a national technology alliance has preliminarily formed,regional alliances have not been adequately established;5) even though the cooperation level amongst weak connection cities is not high,such cities still play an important role in the network as a result of their location within ′structural holes′ in the network;and 6) the major driving forces facilitating inter-city technological cooperation are geographical proximity,hierarchical proximity and technological proximity.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.7117112071373262 and 71571108)+3 种基金Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
文摘The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.