Influence mechanism of government subsidy on the green transformation of coal company in China

The optimization of government subsidies to enhance the efficiency of coal companies’green transformation constitutes a critical component in the pursuit of global sustainability.We investigate the influence mechanism of government subsidies on the green transformation using data from the listed coal companies in China from 2007 to 2022.According to our findings and hypothesis testing,previous government subsidies did not have a significant direct impact on coal companies’green transformation.Nevertheless,government subsidies can help coal companies transition to greener practices by promoting innovative green initiatives.Furthermore,we confirmed an indirect route:that government subsidies enable the adoption of low-carbon initiatives,which in turn could facilitate the transition of coal companies towards green practices.In addition,we discovered that the coal company’s digitization will improve this indirect route.Thus,we propose increasing the effectiveness of government subsidies in facilitating coal companies’transition to green practices by focusing on technological advancements and enhancing company digitalization.

Carbon Abatement Cost-Sharing Strategy for Electric Power Sector Based on Incentive and Subsidy Mechanisms

The green and low carbon transition and development of the electricity industry is the most crucial task in realizing the“dual-carbon target”,and it is urgent to explore the incentive and subsidy mechanism to promote green electricity consumption and the cost-sharing strategy of carbon reduction,to alleviate the pressure of carbon abatement cost of each subject of the electricity supply chain.Against this background,this paper takes into account the low-carbon subsidies provided by the government and the incentive subsidies for users,and studies the optimal decision-making of each subject in the electricity supply chain,so that each of them can obtain the optimal profit and achieve carbon emission reduction at the same time.Firstly,taking into account the direct power purchase mode of large users and the electricity-selling companies emerging after the reform of the power sales side,we have established a cooperative mechanism for sharing the cost of carbon emission reduction in the electricity supply chain and clarified the relationship between the supply and demand of electricity among the main parties.Subsequently,considering government low-carbon subsidies and user incentive subsidies,the optimal decisionmaking model is established under two scenarios of decentralized and centralized cooperative games in the supply chain,respectively,with the objective of maximizing profits and carbon reduction rates.Solving for the optimal proportion of carbon abatement costs shared by each participant in the electricity supply chain in achieving game equilibrium.Finally,we analyze the role of the government’s low-carbon subsidies,users’incentive subsidies,and other factors on the profit and carbon reduction effect of the electricity industry through the example analysis and further analyze the impact of carbon abatement cost-sharing measures to provide recommendations for the electricity industry to realize low-carbon abatement and make decisions.

Subsidy Policy System for Agricultural Natural Disasters in China

From theories and cases,this paper analyzed current situation of subsidy policy system for agricultural natural disasters in China.Improvement and perfection of subsidy policies for agricultural natural disasters need clear classification and additional special subsidy plan.It is recommended to improve and perfect subsidy policy system for agricultural natural disasters through attaching importance to scientific studies on reduction and prevention of agricultural disasters and gradually supplementing agricultural disaster reduction and prevention system.

Inspiration of Direct Grain Production Subsidy System in Typical Countries and Regions

Through comparison of direct grain production subsidy system in typical countries and regions,such as the United States,EU,Japan and South Korea,this paper evaluated the performance of direct grain production subsidy system. On the basis of comparison and analysis,it summed up experience of the direct grain production subsidy system in typical countries and regions. Finally,it came up with countermeasures and recommendations for improving the direct grain production subsidy system in China.

Problems in Construction of Subsidy System for Agricultural Product Identification and Countermeasures——A Case Study of Xingjiang

In line with current situations of extension of Xinjiang's agricultural products,the paper put forward and analyzed existing problems in extension works of agricultural product identification.The problems mainly include:(i) general identification of agricultural products is basically blank and both producers and consumers lack awareness of identification;(ii) creating(famous) brand is a weak point of agriculture in Xinjiang;(iii) certification of non-hazard,green and organic agricultural products lags behind;(iv) it neglects problem of agricultural product packaging.On the basis of these problems,the paper present our recommendations:(i) government provides financial subsidy to actively guide certification of agricultural products;(ii) it should increase financial fund input in brand construction and support(famous) brand construction of agricultural products;(iii) it should provide subsidy for those enterprises creating famous brand,to encourage agricultural producing and processing enterprises to strive for famous brands;(vi) it should stress agricultural product packaging from the source and provide subsidy for agricultural producers who have affixed the identification;(v) it should gradually promote agricultural product identification,to constantly improve the farmers' awareness of agricultural product identification.

Analysis of the System of Direct Subsidy for Grain Production in China

This paper introduces the status quo of the system structure of direct subsidy for grain production in China,and analyses the function and essence of direct subsidy for grain production in China as follows:the function of direct subsidy for grain production in China is to protect and promote the development of food industry,ensure food supply and national food security,protect grain growers' interests,and maintain the dominant position of national food trade;the essence of direct subsidy for grain production is the compensation for grain producers' reasonable interests,the compensation for positive externality of grain production,and social costs of adjusting equilibrium between food supply and demand.We discuss the problems existing in the system of direct subsidy for grain production in China and put forward corresponding countermeasures as follows:first,adhere to improving synergetic system of direct subsidy for grain production;second,adjust the direct subsidy method of grain production;third,establish long-term mechanism of subsidy for grain production;fourth,promote the information-based service level of the system of direct subsidy for grain production.

Research on the Game Theory and Logic Optimization and the Applications on Construction of China＇s New Energy Subsidy System

In this paper, we conduct research on the game theory and the logic optimization and the applications on construction of China’s new energy subsidy system. The management of energy and the general optimization of energy structure play an important role in the development of the national economy and the upgrading of industrial structure. Therefore, it is the inevitable choice to build a well-off society in an all-round way. The energy projects management in tradition adopts way from bottom to top, namely from the floor of project management starts to collect the data, progressive upward transmission to the high-level, after analysis carries on the management and control to the project, this method had guaranteed the project pays according to progress, quality, cost and other requests, in view of the management of single project. This paper integrates the game theory and the logic optimization to construct the revised system that will be meaningful.

双重制度视角下政府补贴对企业研发投入影响悖论的新解与验证

本文利用中国A股上市公司2008—2020年的样本数据实证考察了政府补贴对企业研发投入的影响,并基于双重视角,即企业外部非正式制度层面的政治关联和内部正式制度层面的股权激励,探讨其对政府补贴与企业研发投入之间关系的调节作用。研究结果表明:(1)适度的政府补贴有助于促进企业研发投入,即政府补贴对研发投入会产生倒U型影响;(2)政治关联会负向调节政府补贴与研发投入之间的倒U型关系;(3)股权激励与政府补贴之间具有互补作用,不仅能抵消过度补贴可能带来的抑制效应,还能进一步增强补贴初期对企业研发投入的激励效应,将两者的倒U型关系转变为正向线性关系。此外,内生性问题分析结果表明上述结论具有稳健性。该研究结论有助于我国政府合理制定补贴政策,为企业科学使用政府补贴以促进研发活动提供有益启示。

环境补贴能提升企业碳绩效吗--基于A股上市公司实证分析

环境补贴既是国家实现“双碳”目标的宏观调控手段,也是减轻企业环保负担、引导企业节能减排的推动力。选取2014~2019年接受环境补贴的1094家A股上市公司3735个观测值作为研究样本,采用双向固定效应模型,实证探究环境补贴对企业碳绩效的影响。研究表明,环境补贴与企业碳绩效显著正相关且具有滞后性特征,异质性检验发现,成立时间长的企业、国有企业、东部地区与中低污染企业环境补贴作用效果显著;进一步研究发现,环境补贴中的节能减排补贴与企业碳绩效显著正相关,环境治理补贴对企业碳绩效起负向作用。据此,提出环境补贴应以降碳为重点、减污降碳协同增效为目的等建议。

土地租金销蚀了粮食补贴的“稳粮”效果吗?

尽管近年来政府不断加大粮食补贴力度,但种粮成本不断攀升,尤其土地流转租金明显跟涨,影响农民种粮积极性。农业补贴存在资本化为地租的倾向可能是推动土地成本上升的原因之一。鉴于此,基于2010-2020年玉米生产省级面板数据,采用事件研究法分析玉米生产者补贴的动态效应,以明晰粮食补贴的资本化效应对补贴“稳粮”效果的影响。研究结果表明:玉米生产者补贴导致下年土地流转租金增加了5.7元/亩,并进一步证实了补贴资本化为地租一定程度上削弱了生产者补贴应有的政策效果。若切断粮食补贴与土地流转租金之间的联动关系,生产者补贴稳定种粮面积的正向效果将进一步增强,其削减生产投入的负向影响将进一步减弱。由此提出未来粮食支持政策应进一步优化增量补贴方式,规避其与地租的联动关系,从生产技术模式结合、新型经营体系对接的角度,提高补贴精度和支持效率。

政府补助在激励企业“卡脖子”技术创新中能否提供助力——以企业参与内循环程度为调节变量

如何推动“卡脖子”技术企业创新,是近年来我国面临的重要战略问题。尝试引入锦标赛理论解释政府补助的激励机理,基于2011—2020年我国半导体及芯片行业上市企业数据,结合近年国家提出以内循环为主的新发展战略,以企业参与内循环程度为调节变量,实证研究政府补助对“卡脖子”技术企业创新产出的激励作用。结果表明,政府补助与“卡脖子”技术企业创新产出间具有倒U型关系,企业参与内循环程度在政府补助与“卡脖子”技术企业创新产出的倒U型关系中起调节作用。研究结论可为“卡脖子”技术企业在新发展格局下开展高质量创新提供参考。

环境规制、绿色技术创新与可持续发展——被调节的中介效应分析

基于创新理论、可持续发展理论,探讨环境规制、绿色技术创新对可持续发展的影响路径。对中国30个省区市2000—2020年的面板数据样本的研究发现:环境规制正向影响可持续发展,环境规制显著促进绿色技术创新,绿色技术创新对可持续发展有正向推动作用。环境规制通过绿色技术创新对可持续发展发挥部分正向中介效应,政府补贴正向调节绿色技术创新在环境规制与可持续发展之间第二阶段的中介效应。此外研究还发现企业规模、政府干预在各自的最优区间内,能够最大程度提高环境规制对可持续发展的正向影响。

产业政策促进企业创新的传递机制与情境条件——来自沪深A股上市公司的经验证据

近年来,随着中国企业逐渐接近技术创新的前沿,技术追赶的空间被进一步压缩,经济发展和产业政策面临着越来越大的挑战。文章以2008—2021年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察产业政策对企业创新的影响,并分析了其传递机制和情境条件。实证结果表明,产业政策对企业的创新活动表现出“双重利好”效应,将同时提高被支持行业中企业的创新数量与创新质量。传递机制分析表明,产业政策主要通过抑制企业金融化程度、提高政府补贴力度、降低债务融资成本、带来更多分析师关注等中介因素驱动企业创新水平的提升。情境条件分析发现,产品竞争市场治理、新闻媒体治理、公司治理、研发投入和高管团队研发经验会加强产业政策对企业创新的正向效应。进一步研究表明,发明专利对企业价值有正向影响且该效应具有一定的持续性,而非发明专利对企业价值有负向影响且该效应不具有持续性。研究揭示了产业政策促进企业创新的传递机制与情境条件,为客观评估中国产业政策的经济效应提供了微观依据。

“价补分离”改革对中国玉米生产的影响效应与作用机制

基于2009—2020年玉米主产省市域层面数据,采用DID模型和中介效应模型,探究“价补分离”改革对中国玉米生产的影响效应与作用机制。研究表明:价补分离政策显著减少了玉米播种面积,提高了玉米单位面积产量,并降低了玉米总产量;价补分离政策对玉米生产的影响具有时效性,这一影响随时间推移而减弱;价补分离政策通过增加竞争作物种植比例来减少玉米播种面积,同时促进了粮食作物种植结构优化;价补分离政策通过增加农业机械化水平促进了玉米单产;玉米播种面积的负向效应大于玉米单产的正向效应,价补分离政策通过减少玉米播种面积,最终使玉米总产量降低。

政府补贴下平台赋能中小企业数字化转型的演化策略研究

已有研究关注到政府补贴、平台赋能可以弥补中小企业数字化转型在资源和能力上的不足,但三者间的互动关系及其相应的行为策略调整还有待深入研究。理顺三者间的协同演化关系,对于推动中小企业数字化转型、促进平台持续健康发展及提升政府补贴有效性具有重要意义。基于此,本文构建中小企业、平台和政府的三方演化博弈模型,运用Matlab2016对不同因素影响下的三方协同策略进行仿真分析。结果表明,政府加大对中小企业、平台的补贴力度能够提升中小企业选择加入平台、平台选择优化服务的概率,但为了发挥市场主体作用及减轻财政负担等,随着补贴力度的增加,政府选择补贴的速率会降低;平台或中小企业的吸收能力小于临界值、平台赋能资源量大于临界值均不利于三方良性互动;平台承载中小企业的数量存在最低规模边界,低于边界值平台倾向选择一般服务;政府加大对平台的惩罚力度能够提升平台选择优化服务的概率。该研究结论有助于明晰政府补贴、平台赋能和中小企业数字化转型的内在逻辑关系,为中小企业、平台和政府的行为决策提供理论借鉴,以期促进平台赋能中小企业数字化转型。

颠覆性技术多元化投入的利益分配及激励机制

我国颠覆性创新多元化投入机制的平台支撑体系建设亟待完善,因此需深入研究适用于颠覆性技术多元化投入的利益分配以及政府补贴机制。其中,公平的利益分配和合理化的激励机制是促使颠覆性技术多元投入有效性的关键因素。因此,针对颠覆性技术多元化投入利益分配以及激励机制设计等问题,采取合作-非合作博弈分析颠覆性技术多元投入的各个参与主体行为,引入风险因子探讨不同主体主导下的情况,并进一步研究政府补贴对各主体投入积极性的影响,进而以明晰多元化投入的激励机制方案选择。研究发现:在颠覆性创新多元化投入的过程中会存在创新投入积极性不足的情况,这是由于各主体出于自身利益最大化考虑;由政府牵头时,整个颠覆性技术投入合作较由其他主体主导下的合作收益高;在政府主导下采取政府补贴形式,可以有效激励其他各个颠覆性创新投入主体的积极性。为此,促进颠覆性创新的投入多元化,政府要构建多元化投入机制,设计合理的利益分配机制与激励机制,并在参与合作时设定恰当的成本补贴额度。

托育服务补助制度:理论逻辑与可行性分析

儿童照顾服务具有公共产品属性和社会投资属性,儿童照顾的责任和成本应当由家庭和国家共同承担。在家庭照顾资源减少、托育服务供给有限、养育成本高企的背景下,国家应当建立托育服务补助制度,以降低家庭照顾儿童的成本,并增加有效需求以促进社会化托育服务发展。通过建立适合于全国和各地的估算模型,基于对未来0~2岁婴幼儿人口的预测和适度补助标准,估算2024—2035年托育服务补助制度的财政资金规模发现,这项制度的财务成本可以承受。为此,建议政府积极创造条件尽快实行这项制度,同时健全人口动态监测系统,采用多种补助形式,实行托育服务补助申请制,加强补助资金监管和引导。

政府补贴会提升返乡农民工创业绩效吗——基于西部地区脱贫县的调查

借助892份西部地区脱贫县的调研数据,运用Logit模型实证研究政府补贴对返乡农民工创业绩效的影响。研究发现,政府补贴显著提升返乡农民工的创业绩效,结果在进行稳健性检验后依然有效。异质性分析结果表明,政府补贴对涉农创业、新生代及家庭位于山区的农民工创业绩效的促进作用更明显;获得政府补贴的返乡农民工通过扩大创业规模来提高创业绩效。因此,应有效利用政府补贴,促进返乡农民工创业规模扩张;鼓励新生代农民工返乡创业,为涉农创业者群体提供多元指导,优化山区农民工家庭的创业保障体系,拓宽贫困山区农民创业路径。

电厂和政府行为策略演化博弈与仿真研究——基于农林生物质与煤耦合发电产业发展视角

“双碳”背景下,农林生物质与煤耦合发电成为煤电转型的新路径。政府如何制定有效的补贴和监管政策,以及电厂如何进行正确的策略选择是促进农林生物质与煤耦合发电产业发展的关键。通过构建政府和电厂的混合策略博弈模型,分析双方的博弈关系和行为策略动态演变过程,并运用系统动力学进行建模仿真,进一步探析关键因素对政府和电厂行为策略的影响路径。结果表明:政府和电厂的行为策略在较长时期里无法趋于稳定,而是在相互影响中波动变化。政府制定补贴和监管策略、提高耦合发电收益、降低耦合发电成本,都将促进更多电厂选择农林生物质与煤耦合发电,从而进一步促进产业发展。

数字化转型能否促进企业绿色创新绩效的提高?——基于我国A股上市公司数据

以2016—2021年沪深两市A股上市公司的数据作为研究样本,运用固定效应面板模型就数字化转型对企业绿色创新绩效的影响进行实证分析,同时探究融资约束的中介效应及风险承担水平、政府补助的调节作用。研究发现:数字化转型能显著促进企业绿色创新绩效的提高,且该作用在国有企业、非重污染企业及市场化程度较低的企业中更明显。进一步分析发现:融资约束在数字化转型对企业绿色创新绩效影响的过程中发挥了部分中介作用;风险承担水平和政府补助均发挥了正向调节作用。因此,企业层面应积极进行数字化转型,通过缓解融资约束来促进绿色创新绩效的提高,并积极发挥风险承担水平和政府补助的调节作用;政府层面应完善补助政策,推动企业绿色创新绩效的持续提高。