This paper investigates the theoretical relationship between corporate governance,fair value accounting,and debt contracts.It primarily examines the individual impacts of corporate governance and fair value accounting...This paper investigates the theoretical relationship between corporate governance,fair value accounting,and debt contracts.It primarily examines the individual impacts of corporate governance and fair value accounting on debt contracts,while also exploring the influence of corporate governance on fair value accounting.The study emphasizes the importance of considering the interests and legal status of creditors in the context of debt contracts.The findings indicate that strong corporate governance can reduce the likelihood of debt default and that the company’s restructuring costs in the event of a default determine whether improved corporate governance will increase or decrease debt costs.Additionally,the study reveals that the strength of corporate governance affects the value relevance of fair value accounting.However,the impact of fair value accounting on debt contracts is not inherently positive or negative;for instance,companies may use fair value adjustments with manipulative intent to enhance performance.Ultimately,the research highlights that discussions about corporate governance should not prioritize shareholder interests exclusively but also consider the legitimate position of creditors.展开更多
Local governmental debts in China seem to be in a more precarious position than local government debts in the USA. The scale of Chinese local government debts far surpasses that of the USA. Further, Chinese local gove...Local governmental debts in China seem to be in a more precarious position than local government debts in the USA. The scale of Chinese local government debts far surpasses that of the USA. Further, Chinese local government debts appear to be expanding at an alarming rate in the past decade or so. This research focuses on grand strategies for dealing with Chinese local government debts. There are five research questions for this paper： 1） What is the size of the Chinese government debts？ 2） Are Chinese local government debts controllable？ 3） Who or what caused the rapid increase of the Chinese local government debts？ 4） Is it possible to have individual accountability for increasing local government debts in the future？ and 5） Will it be helpful to create a local government debt management organization in the Chinese central government？ Based on the available literature, this analysis also utilizes in death interviews with 13 government officials, policy analyst, and scholars. First, this paper identifies the size and categories of debts related to Chinese local governments. Then this paper illustrates various ways and methods of Chinese local governments to obtain leverage. After analyzing the causes and origins of these debts, the research demonstrates a potential local systematic risk. By contrast to its advantages and disadvantages, the paper suggests that the local governmental debts need to be constrained. It is important to restrict debt growth in terms of issuing, buying, repurchasing, collateralizing, etc. within a legal framework. With the consideration of political mechanisms in China, the research suggests that the central government establishes a specific organization to help normalize the local governmental debts with the function of supervision and management. The research also believes that it will be an effective way to control the growth of local debts if the central government can hold the relevant top leaders/officials of local governments to be accountable for their performances related to debt accumulation.展开更多
Decentralization can alter the incentive structure of local governments and one outcome of this is debt accumulation. Based on the “Province-Managing-County” pilot policy, a fiscal decentralization reform devolving ...Decentralization can alter the incentive structure of local governments and one outcome of this is debt accumulation. Based on the “Province-Managing-County” pilot policy, a fiscal decentralization reform devolving fiscal power from the prefecture-level city to the county level, we assess the impact of fiscal decentralization on local government debt using a difference-in-differences model with a unique county-level dataset from 2011 to 2019. According to the study findings, the “Province-Managing-County” reform resulted in an average increase of 5.758 percent in the local government debt ratio across the pilot counties. Mechanism analyses suggest that this may have arisen from changes in the incentive structure, including external pressures from government assessments and internal developmental needs for promotion, leading to a rise in expenditure pressures on local governments. The role of supervision in mitigating the impact of fiscal decentralization on debt growth was also demonstrated, indicating that an appropriate supervision mechanism must be in place in conjunction with a decentralization policy.展开更多
The paper aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and debt management of Vietnam＇s small and medium enterprises （SMEs）, in a case study of a specific enterprise. It reveals one case that corpo...The paper aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and debt management of Vietnam＇s small and medium enterprises （SMEs）, in a case study of a specific enterprise. It reveals one case that corporate governance factors have strong correlation with performance, due to transparency to the lender, innovative and consistent to the debt management. The results indicate that timely reporting and level of disclosure positively affect corporate performance and ability to raise funds in the financial market. The paper seeds new light into the relationship between corporate governance and debt management of Vietnam＇s SMEs in current context. It finds ways to solve financial dilemma and raise corporate equity value that most SMEs are facing.展开更多
文摘This paper investigates the theoretical relationship between corporate governance,fair value accounting,and debt contracts.It primarily examines the individual impacts of corporate governance and fair value accounting on debt contracts,while also exploring the influence of corporate governance on fair value accounting.The study emphasizes the importance of considering the interests and legal status of creditors in the context of debt contracts.The findings indicate that strong corporate governance can reduce the likelihood of debt default and that the company’s restructuring costs in the event of a default determine whether improved corporate governance will increase or decrease debt costs.Additionally,the study reveals that the strength of corporate governance affects the value relevance of fair value accounting.However,the impact of fair value accounting on debt contracts is not inherently positive or negative;for instance,companies may use fair value adjustments with manipulative intent to enhance performance.Ultimately,the research highlights that discussions about corporate governance should not prioritize shareholder interests exclusively but also consider the legitimate position of creditors.
文摘Local governmental debts in China seem to be in a more precarious position than local government debts in the USA. The scale of Chinese local government debts far surpasses that of the USA. Further, Chinese local government debts appear to be expanding at an alarming rate in the past decade or so. This research focuses on grand strategies for dealing with Chinese local government debts. There are five research questions for this paper： 1） What is the size of the Chinese government debts？ 2） Are Chinese local government debts controllable？ 3） Who or what caused the rapid increase of the Chinese local government debts？ 4） Is it possible to have individual accountability for increasing local government debts in the future？ and 5） Will it be helpful to create a local government debt management organization in the Chinese central government？ Based on the available literature, this analysis also utilizes in death interviews with 13 government officials, policy analyst, and scholars. First, this paper identifies the size and categories of debts related to Chinese local governments. Then this paper illustrates various ways and methods of Chinese local governments to obtain leverage. After analyzing the causes and origins of these debts, the research demonstrates a potential local systematic risk. By contrast to its advantages and disadvantages, the paper suggests that the local governmental debts need to be constrained. It is important to restrict debt growth in terms of issuing, buying, repurchasing, collateralizing, etc. within a legal framework. With the consideration of political mechanisms in China, the research suggests that the central government establishes a specific organization to help normalize the local governmental debts with the function of supervision and management. The research also believes that it will be an effective way to control the growth of local debts if the central government can hold the relevant top leaders/officials of local governments to be accountable for their performances related to debt accumulation.
基金The authors are grateful for support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.71973118,72173136,and 72103208)National Social Science Foundation of China(No.20&ZD080)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law(No.2722024AK004).
文摘Decentralization can alter the incentive structure of local governments and one outcome of this is debt accumulation. Based on the “Province-Managing-County” pilot policy, a fiscal decentralization reform devolving fiscal power from the prefecture-level city to the county level, we assess the impact of fiscal decentralization on local government debt using a difference-in-differences model with a unique county-level dataset from 2011 to 2019. According to the study findings, the “Province-Managing-County” reform resulted in an average increase of 5.758 percent in the local government debt ratio across the pilot counties. Mechanism analyses suggest that this may have arisen from changes in the incentive structure, including external pressures from government assessments and internal developmental needs for promotion, leading to a rise in expenditure pressures on local governments. The role of supervision in mitigating the impact of fiscal decentralization on debt growth was also demonstrated, indicating that an appropriate supervision mechanism must be in place in conjunction with a decentralization policy.
文摘The paper aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance and debt management of Vietnam＇s small and medium enterprises （SMEs）, in a case study of a specific enterprise. It reveals one case that corporate governance factors have strong correlation with performance, due to transparency to the lender, innovative and consistent to the debt management. The results indicate that timely reporting and level of disclosure positively affect corporate performance and ability to raise funds in the financial market. The paper seeds new light into the relationship between corporate governance and debt management of Vietnam＇s SMEs in current context. It finds ways to solve financial dilemma and raise corporate equity value that most SMEs are facing.
