In this paper we propose three modes of alliance structures of supply chains and discuss the cooperation mechanisms among enterprises firstly, and by analyzing the dyadic supply chains we apply the game theory to the ...In this paper we propose three modes of alliance structures of supply chains and discuss the cooperation mechanisms among enterprises firstly, and by analyzing the dyadic supply chains we apply the game theory to the research on cooperative relation among enterprises respectively for the three modes of alliance structures of supply chains, point out the conditions on which the supply chains can be set up and steadily keep up for a long time, and scientifically interpret the cooperative relation among enterprises.展开更多
Based on the two-stage Stackelberg game method, value creation of supply chain cooperation between coal enterprise and power utilities is studied by formulating profit functions of coal and power enterprises and calcu...Based on the two-stage Stackelberg game method, value creation of supply chain cooperation between coal enterprise and power utilities is studied by formulating profit functions of coal and power enterprises and calculating the maximum profit. According to the analysis, it is found that the profit from supply chain cooperation between coal and power enterprises is more than that of non- cooperation. The cooperation is validated to be beneficial for both units; however, the profit is mainly taken by the power enterprise. Thus, it is necessary to set up the incentive mechanism to distribute cooperation value between coal and power enterprises to promote their continual cooperation.展开更多
The research of cluster supply chains is a new direction and a hotspot of the industrial cluster theory. On the condition of the coordination game, the enterprises may be stuck on the non-efficient equilibrium status,...The research of cluster supply chains is a new direction and a hotspot of the industrial cluster theory. On the condition of the coordination game, the enterprises may be stuck on the non-efficient equilibrium status, which becomes an important problem that must be considered on cluster supply chains. A symmetrical coordination game model is constituted to describe the competition and cooperation relationship of the same-quality manufacturers on cluster supply chains. The methods of the non-cooperation game theory and the evolutionary game theory are respectively used to analyze the model, whose parameters＇ influences under each method are then compared. It can be concluded that the analysis of the evolutionary game theory is more realistic and practical. Finally, three approaches are considered to break away from being path-dependence locked-in non-efficient status during this coordination game evolutionary process, which provide the development of cluster supply chains with an effective forecasting and Pareto optimizing method.展开更多
A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymme...A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymmetric information） are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios： coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario （without disruption）; and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario （ with retailer cost disruptions）. It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound. This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer＇ s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound. Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party＇ s as well as the system＇ s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.展开更多
This paper studies the cooperative mechanism for a three-echelon supply chain with remanufacturing outsourcing comparing a supplier,a manufacturer,and a third-party remanufacturer,wherein we take the relative fairness...This paper studies the cooperative mechanism for a three-echelon supply chain with remanufacturing outsourcing comparing a supplier,a manufacturer,and a third-party remanufacturer,wherein we take the relative fairness concerns into consideration.The Stackelberg game theory is introduced to analyze the best values for the supply chain and each member.Nash bargaining solution is used as the relative fairness-concerned reference to discuss the corresponding optimal solutions of these models.By determining and comparing the equilibrium solutions across the five models,we discover that given the Nash bargaining fairness-concerned behavior,the system profits in the completely decentralized and three cooperative scenarios are lower than they are for products in the completely centralized decision model.The results show that in the centralized channel,the optimal profit and market demand in the three-echelon supply chain are maximized.Furthermore,it turns out that a cooperative mechanism can bring great benefits to its performance.展开更多
文摘In this paper we propose three modes of alliance structures of supply chains and discuss the cooperation mechanisms among enterprises firstly, and by analyzing the dyadic supply chains we apply the game theory to the research on cooperative relation among enterprises respectively for the three modes of alliance structures of supply chains, point out the conditions on which the supply chains can be set up and steadily keep up for a long time, and scientifically interpret the cooperative relation among enterprises.
文摘Based on the two-stage Stackelberg game method, value creation of supply chain cooperation between coal enterprise and power utilities is studied by formulating profit functions of coal and power enterprises and calculating the maximum profit. According to the analysis, it is found that the profit from supply chain cooperation between coal and power enterprises is more than that of non- cooperation. The cooperation is validated to be beneficial for both units; however, the profit is mainly taken by the power enterprise. Thus, it is necessary to set up the incentive mechanism to distribute cooperation value between coal and power enterprises to promote their continual cooperation.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60374023)the Natural ScienceFoundation of Guangdong Province (011629).
文摘The research of cluster supply chains is a new direction and a hotspot of the industrial cluster theory. On the condition of the coordination game, the enterprises may be stuck on the non-efficient equilibrium status, which becomes an important problem that must be considered on cluster supply chains. A symmetrical coordination game model is constituted to describe the competition and cooperation relationship of the same-quality manufacturers on cluster supply chains. The methods of the non-cooperation game theory and the evolutionary game theory are respectively used to analyze the model, whose parameters＇ influences under each method are then compared. It can be concluded that the analysis of the evolutionary game theory is more realistic and practical. Finally, three approaches are considered to break away from being path-dependence locked-in non-efficient status during this coordination game evolutionary process, which provide the development of cluster supply chains with an effective forecasting and Pareto optimizing method.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No70671021)Jiangsu Postdoctoral Foundation (No0601015C)
文摘A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymmetric information） are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios： coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario （without disruption）; and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario （ with retailer cost disruptions）. It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound. This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer＇ s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound. Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party＇ s as well as the system＇ s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of P.R.China(71832008).
文摘This paper studies the cooperative mechanism for a three-echelon supply chain with remanufacturing outsourcing comparing a supplier,a manufacturer,and a third-party remanufacturer,wherein we take the relative fairness concerns into consideration.The Stackelberg game theory is introduced to analyze the best values for the supply chain and each member.Nash bargaining solution is used as the relative fairness-concerned reference to discuss the corresponding optimal solutions of these models.By determining and comparing the equilibrium solutions across the five models,we discover that given the Nash bargaining fairness-concerned behavior,the system profits in the completely decentralized and three cooperative scenarios are lower than they are for products in the completely centralized decision model.The results show that in the centralized channel,the optimal profit and market demand in the three-echelon supply chain are maximized.Furthermore,it turns out that a cooperative mechanism can bring great benefits to its performance.
