Quantity discount contracts for supply chain coordination under asymmetric information and disruptions

The quantity discount contracts are investigated for a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain with asymmetric information when the retailer's cost is disrupted. While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric information, two all-unit quantity discount contract models, fixed expected-profit percentage discount(FEPD) and fixed wholesale-pricing percentage discount(FWPD) under asymmetric information are proposed in a regular scenario. When the retailer's cost distribution fluctuates due to disruptions, the optimal emergency strategies of supply chains are obtained under asymmetric information. Using numerical methods, the impact of cost disruptions on decisions about the regular wholesale price, discount wholesale price, order quantity and expected profits of the retailer, the supplier as well as the total system are analyzed. It is found that the FEPD policy is more robust and adaptable than the FWPD policy in disruption circumstances.

Privacy preserving supply chain quantity discount contract design

The development and deployment of privary preserving supply chain quantity discount contract design can allow supply chain collaborations to take place without revealing any participant＇s data to others, reaping the benefits of collaborations wbile avoiding the drawbacks of privacy information disclosure. First, secure multi-party computation protocols are applied in the joint-ordering policy between a single supplier and a single retailer, the joint-ordering policy can be conducted without disclosing private cost information of any of the other supply chain partners. Secondly, secure multi-party computation protocols are applied in the privacy preserving supply chain quantity discount contract design between a single supplier and a single retailer. The information disclosure analyses of the algorithm show that： the optimal quantity discount of the jointordering policy can be conducted without disclosing private cost information of any of the other supply chain partners; the above protocol can be implemented without mediators; the privacy preserving quantity discount algorithm can be mutually verifiable and has solved the problem of asymmetric information.

DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT FOR SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH EXPONENTIAL DEMAND FUNCTION

The coordination problem of a supply chain comprising one supplier and one retailer under market demand disruption is studied in this article. A novel exponential demand function is adopted, and the penalty cost is introduced explicitly to capture the deviation production cost caused by the market demand disruption. The optimal strategies are obtained for different disruption scale under the centralized mode. For the decentralized mode, it is proved that the supply chain can be fully coordinated by adjusting the price discount policy appropriately when disruption occurs. Furthermore, the authors point out that similar results can be established for more general demand functions that represent different market circumstances if certain assumptions are satisfied.

Quantity Discount Scheme in Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

Quantity discount scheme plays an important role in supply chain management. The different quantity discount schemes under symmetric （full） information and asymmetric information, are analyzed by using principal-agent and optimal control theory. As a result, the research reveals that the optimal quantity discount solution under symmetric information is a special case of that under asymmetric information. At the same price, the critical value of quantity discount under asymmetric information is much lower than that under asymmetric information. Therefore, this leads to less cost for retailers and smaller profit for their supplier.

Supply chain coordination with CCPP for a short-life-cycle product

Supply chain coordination for short-life-cycle products with price-dependent demand is a focus in present operation management and management science fields. This paper considers the supply chain coordination problem for a single-cycle and two-selling-stage short-life-cycle product. Firstly, the inventory model of whole system is depicted with a stochastic dynamics programming. Then, a new combined contract CCPP （combined contract with pending prices） is developed to coordinate the decentralized system, and its validity for channel coordination is proved. Finally, the analysis on system performances is simulated with some examples.

Optimal pricing and production decisions in a supply chain with e-marketplace

The concept of the e-marketplace is introduced.Considering a supply chain with a single manufacturer who sells a single item in an e-marketplace,an analytical model for the use of the e-marketplace in a supply chain is provided.Assuming the market demand is stochastic and price-dependent,the conditions under which the manufacturer and the e-marketplace owner share the market in equilibrium is developed.The existence and uniqueness of the optimal selling price,quantity and transaction percentage are proved.An integrated supply chain is put forward,and then the efficiency of supply chain coordination is studied by comparing the integrated supply chain with the decentralized supply chain.To gain further insights on the theoretical models,extensive simulations are then carried out.

SUPPLY CHAIN DECISION-MAKING AND COORDINATION UNDER PRICE-DEPENDENT DEMAND

This paper studies the decision-making and coordination of supply chain （SC） considering the effect of price-dependent demand. By assuming demand decreases as the price increases, we analyse the impacts of the dependence on the SC in three different models： decentralized without coordination, centralized coordination and decentralized with coordination by revenue sharing contract. The existence of the best solution in the different models is proved, and the performance of revenue sharing coordination SC is similar to the centralized one. We find that the more evidently the price affects the demand, the more revenue sharing contract improves the performance of SC. The dependence affects the decision-making and the parameter setting of revenue sharing contract is also found.

Pricing and ordering strategies in a two-echelon supply chain under price discount policy:a Stackelberg game approach

Supply chain management coordinates different strategies for the production system.The manufacturer requires some incentive schemes to motivate the retailer to change his policy,optimal for the whole system.This paper suggests a discount mechanism by which companies can coordinate their ordering and pricing strategies throughout a supply chain model with a single manufacturer and single retailer.Also,the demand curve is iso-elastic price sensitive.Channel members have decided their selling price and order quantity jointly and independently to maximize the supply chain profit.A coordination mechanism is proposed based on quantity discounts to correlate pricing and ordering strategies simultaneously.The decentralized case is analyzed under the manufacturer-Stackelberg game approach.The result of numerical investigation shows that the suggested discount mechanism has improved the supply chain profit as well as each channel member’s profit in comparison with the centralized and decentralized decisions without discount.

Ordering policies and coordination in a twoechelon supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns

This paper investigates the ordering policies of two competitive retailers,and the coordination status of a two-echelon supply chain by considering the fairness concerns of channel members.We consider that two retailers compete with each other over price,where overstock and shortage are allowed.We assume that the demand is stochastic and considered with additive form.First,based on the Nash bargaining fairness reference point,we obtain the optimal decisions of the fairness-concerned channel members in both the centralized and the decentralized cases using a two-stage game theory.Secondly,we analyze the coordination status of the supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns using ideas of optimization.Finally,numerical experiments are used to illustrate the influence of some parameters,the fairness-concerned behavioral preference of the channel members on the optimal decisions and the coordination status of supply chain.Some managerial insights are obtained.

Centralized Decisions for a Two-Stage Supply Chain with Price-Discount Dependent Demand

In this paper,we study a centralized supply chain for a two-stage with selling price discount.This supply chain consists of a supplier and a retailer. Based on the feature that the product’s selling season is short and the supply chain faces great demand uncertainty. We consider a two-stage scenario where,at the beginning of stage 1,the supplier reserves production capacity based on historic data in advance,stage 2 comes to us after some leadtime,both the supplier and the retailer update the demand information,the retailer then places an order not exceeding the reserved capacity based on the selling-pricing discount dependent demand. We make optimal decisions on the reserved capacity in stage 1,selling price discount and order quantity in stage 2. In this supply chain,the pattern in stage2 is figured out first,and then stage 1 is cleared as well. Then we present a numerical example to give some insights. Finally we get some conclusions.

碳交易机制下双渠道供应链定价与协调研究

文中运用博弈论求得了集中决策和分散决策下双渠道供应链最优定价决策和单位碳减排决策,分析了碳交易价格、消费者渠道偏好和低碳偏好对最优决策的影响,采用了收益共享-成本分担契约协调供应链,并通过数值算例验证了模型和结论的有效性.结果表明:在一定的条件下,两种渠道的定价均随碳交易价格的增加而降低;线上直销渠道价格与线上渠道偏好成正相关,线下零售渠道价格则相反;合理的碳交易价格、渠道偏好和低碳偏好有助于碳减排和供应链整体利润的提高;集中决策下单位产品碳减排量和供应链整体利润均高于分散决策时;收益共享-成本分担契约能使供应链成员的利润实现Pareto改进.

考虑网络口碑的供应链定价与协调研究

随着电子商务和社交网络的迅速发展,网络口碑正在影响和改变消费者的购买习惯,并对企业决策产生重要影响。本文考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链,通过建立两阶段定价模型研究网络口碑对供应链定价和协调的影响。首先,文章分析了集中决策下网络口碑对供应链最优定价策略和整体利润的影响;其次,设计批发价契约和收益共享契约对分散决策下的供应链进行协调。研究表明:当受正面口碑影响时,系统会降低第一阶段价格,提高第二阶段价格,且口碑影响力度越大,两阶段的价格差异越小,供应链整体利润越高;当受负面口碑影响时,系统会提高第一阶段价格,降低第二阶段价格,且口碑影响力度越大,两阶段的价格差异越大,供应链整体利润越低;批发价契约无法实现供应链的协调,收益共享契约可以同时改善制造商、零售商和供应链整体利润,实现供应链协调。

闭环供应链中制造商以旧换新渠道决策

考虑制造商和零售商构成的闭环供应链,双方都可能提供以旧换新服务并承担相应的固定成本,研究了制造商应该自主提供以旧换新服务还是让零售商提供以旧换新服务的问题,分别构建了无以旧换新服务、制造商提供以旧换新服务和零售商提供以旧换新服务3种闭环供应链决策模型,分析了考虑以旧换新固定成本时供应链成员提供以旧换新服务与否的博弈。结果表明:随着以旧换新固定成本的变化,制造商和零售商可能会因都想提供以旧换新而产生冲突,也可能会因都想让对方提供以旧换新而成为“搭便车”者。此时,制造商或零售商可以通过给对方提供适当补偿来消除这种冲突或“搭便车”现象,以使双方利润都比无以旧换新时更高,但闭环供应链系统总利润仍为次优。为此,制造商可进一步基于集中决策模型设计相应的契约来实现闭环供应链协调。

制造商公平关切下的供应链契约协调研究

针对制造商公平关切下的二级供应链,构建非合作博弈模型,考察批发价契约与收益共享契约的供应链协调功能。通过逆向归纳求解博弈均衡,分析发现:与零售商公平关切时不同,制造商公平关切时批发价契约总是无法协调供应链,制造商将利用其先动优势使得自己总是处于优势不公平(即其利润总大于零售商);当市场潜在需求足够大,且制造商的优势不公平感知足够强时,若令收益共享率为1/2,且制造商以成本价供货,则该收益共享契约可实现供应链协调。

碳交易下考虑公平关切的低碳供应链定价及协调机制研究

为落实政府碳减排要求并保证企业经济的可持续发展,碳交易机制成了一种有效的经济手段。碳交易背景下,制造企业为实现低碳目标而增加减排投资成本,往往更容易关注利润分配的公平性。此时,如何基于公平关切偏好进行减排投资和利润分配成为供应链协调决策的重点。以一家生产低碳产品的制造商和一家负责产品销售的零售商为对象,综合考虑碳交易机制、企业碳减排投资和公平关切偏好因素的影响,构建了一个可持续的低碳供应链,并利用博弈理论和收益分配绝对公平方法,探讨了制造商公平关切决策情形下供应链系统最优定价以及减排决策过程,进一步采用碳减排成本分担契约对供应链系统决策过程进行协调,并获得了最优的契约参数值。研究结果表明:制造商采取了提高产品批发价格和降低减排率的策略以减少因减排技术投资而产生的利润分配不公平对待,该策略损失了自身和合作者的利润。为了实现低碳供应链成员之间利益的有效协调,本文设计的成本分担契约在提高供应链系统减排率的同时还可以实现各成员利润的帕累托改进。另外,碳交易机制有利于促使企业进行碳减排投资以提高产品的减排水平。研究结果为进一步改善上下游企业之间的关系和促进供应链系统经济与环境的可持续发展提供参考。

参考价格效应下两期绿色供应链定价和协调

在一个由绿色制造商和零售商构成的两期供应链系统中,考虑了参考价格效应,运用博弈论研究了绿色供应链的定价、绿色决策和协调问题。通过对集中和分散两种决策情形均衡结果的比较,发现集中比分散更有利于供应链的经济绩效和绿色产品的市场扩张,产品绿色水平的确定和决策结构无关。研究进一步设计两部收费契约实现了两期绿色供应链的完全协调。定价策略方面,协调前供应链成员都倾向于差异化定价,引入协调契约后,零售商的定价策略未发生改变,而制造商则转变为一致定价。此外,还研究了参考价格效应对供应链的影响,指出了一个高的参考价格敏感度有益于市场需求和供应链系统的经济效益。

基于资金约束的竞争供应链融资策略研究

针对制造商存在资金约束时供应链成员的运营问题,分别研究了链与链竞争的结构中无资金约束、有资金约束且不融资、融资有利息且批发价格无折扣、融资无利息且批发价格有折扣4种不同模式下供应链成员的利润。当制造商存在资金约束时,其所在供应链上的零售商倾向于融资无利息且批发价格有折扣的模式。除了有资金约束且不融资的模式外,其他3种模式下竞争强度的增大不利于2条供应链上成员利润的提高。相同的竞争强度下,制造商可以通过调整单位生产成本投入来改变自己及竞争方的最优决策策略,进而影响供应链成员的利润。最后,仿真结果验证了所得结论。

供应商主导下的生鲜农产品供应链定价及协调模型研究

针对由单个的生鲜供应商、生鲜电商和第三方物流组成的三级供应链,同时考虑价格和新鲜度对生鲜农产品需求的影响,研究了生鲜农产品供应链定价及协调问题。首先,分别构建集中决策下和以生鲜供应商为主导的分散决策下的生鲜农产品供应链定价模型,并进行对比分析;其次,在分散决策的基础上,采用“收益共享+保鲜成本共担”契约构建协调模型;最后,通过算例分析和敏感度分析,验证了模型得出的结论,并分析了重要参数对模型的影响。研究发现,集中式定价决策下的零售价格、保鲜努力水平和供应链利润均优于分散式定价决策的对应值,在此基础上,建议采用“收益共享+保鲜成本共担”的契约协调模型,以使分散式定价决策下的供应链达到协调状态。

代销平台参与下易腐农产品供应链决策研究

易腐农产品存在生命周期短、损耗率高等特性,所以对易腐农产品采用预售成为非常受欢迎的销售方式。在众多预售方法中,代销平台开展线上直播“预售+直销”的促销方式,使得易腐农产品能够更好地售卖。鉴于此,文章考虑由供应商和代销平台主导的二级供应链中,构建直播“预售+直销”模式下的供应链博弈模型,并对供应商和代销平台的利润和价格进行决策研究。研究发现:直销模式相比预售模式需要更高的佣金水平才能使销量提高。直销模式下折扣次数过多会导致供应商利润下降,但销量会增加。合理的佣金能够促进代销平台促销,且不会降低供应商最终利润。文章的研究结果可以为进行线上直播售卖并促销的代销平台提供支持,并为供应商和平台的最终利润提供理论依据。

双渠道供应链下易腐品的库存和定价决策

以现实易腐产品供应链为背景,研究单一零售商和单一供应商组成的双渠道供应链模型,即供应商可通过直接在线渠道和间接零售渠道销售易腐产品,除了产品数量下降外,产品质量也会随着时间的推移而下降,同时,产品质量的下降会影响零售渠道的需求率。分别建立集中式和分散式两类模型,并提出相应算法求解最佳价格、订购频率和订购周期等。结果显示,分散式的供应链不仅会侵蚀两家公司的利润,并且产品的浪费率也较高。通过采用收入分享和二部定价法的方式能够协调供应链,减少供应链的总浪费率。同时,随着产品劣化率的提高,两家公司会更倾向于进行供应链协调,协调合同对零售商利润的提升更为显著。在模型扩展部分考虑直接渠道的交货时间,结果表明,分散式模型的供应商会投入更多资金以缩短交货时间。