The cooperative evolutionary stability under self-organized organization is discussed in this paper. The differences between the objects studied by cooperative game theory and the ones studied by cooperative game in s...The cooperative evolutionary stability under self-organized organization is discussed in this paper. The differences between the objects studied by cooperative game theory and the ones studied by cooperative game in science ＆ technology alliance are analyzed. The mutant probability of agent＇s utility under endoge- nous technical factor condition is analyzed. By clarifying the connotation of Pareto-dominate institution in cooperative game, the efficient and feasible managerial definition of Pareto-dominate Institution in science ＆ technology alliance is presented. The evolutionarily cooperative game for the agent in Pareto-dominate institution is explained. And then the necessary condition of cooperative evolutionary stabilization based on multi-agent utility＇s dynamic equilibrium is put forward. Finally, the model of alliance＇s utility＇s dynamic equilibrium under self-organization is established.展开更多
基金Sponsored by Humanities and Social Sciences Fund of Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China (MEPRC) (07JA880011)the Eleventh Fives Educational Plan Fund of Beijing Municipal Commission of Education (ADA07067)the Graduate Educational Inno-vation Program of MEPRC (P-0801)
文摘The cooperative evolutionary stability under self-organized organization is discussed in this paper. The differences between the objects studied by cooperative game theory and the ones studied by cooperative game in science ＆ technology alliance are analyzed. The mutant probability of agent＇s utility under endoge- nous technical factor condition is analyzed. By clarifying the connotation of Pareto-dominate institution in cooperative game, the efficient and feasible managerial definition of Pareto-dominate Institution in science ＆ technology alliance is presented. The evolutionarily cooperative game for the agent in Pareto-dominate institution is explained. And then the necessary condition of cooperative evolutionary stabilization based on multi-agent utility＇s dynamic equilibrium is put forward. Finally, the model of alliance＇s utility＇s dynamic equilibrium under self-organization is established.
