In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the United States claimed to be neutral, but was in fact pro-Japanese. Before the war, it repeatedly refused mediation requests by China and Korea and rejected Britain＇s joint m...In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the United States claimed to be neutral, but was in fact pro-Japanese. Before the war, it repeatedly refused mediation requests by China and Korea and rejected Britain＇s joint mediation proposal while tacitly agreeing to or inciting Japan＇s launching a war. During the war, American diplomats, as wartime protectors of both Japanese and Chinese nationals, frequently went beyond the limits of international law to protect Japanese spies in China. As the only mediator between China and Japan, the United States rejected the joint mediation efforts of European powers and helped reduce international pressure on Japan. At the same time, it unilaterally convinced the Qing government to accept Japan＇s aggressive demands so as to help Japan achieve its war aims. The main reason for the United States＇ bias towards Japan was that it hoped to use Japan to end the tributary relationship between China and Korea in order to further open the door to China while weakening the influence of Britain and Russia in East Asia.展开更多
Around the time of the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, France reiterated that it had no direct interest in the Korean issue, and professed to be an onlooker. But from the very beginning, in fact, France viewe...Around the time of the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, France reiterated that it had no direct interest in the Korean issue, and professed to be an onlooker. But from the very beginning, in fact, France viewed the war as an opportunity to consolidate its alliance with Russia and further encroach on China＇s southwest frontiers; it was therefore happy to see war break out between China and Japan, and took Russia＇s position on stopping Britain from playing a dominant role in mediation between them. As the outcome of the war became clear, exposing Japan＇s ambition to invade China, France turned from its wait-and-see attitude to intervention, taking an active part in the peacemaking activities of Russia, Britain and France and the triple intervention of Russia, France and Germany. In so doing, it attempted to safeguard general European interests and consolidate its alliance with Russia, as well as preventing Japan from replacing Europe as the dominant force in China. At the same time, it demanded a quidpro quo from the victim. During negotiation over the return of the Liaodong Peninsula, France put aside its conflicts mediate in disputes between Germany and with its old enemy Germany and endeavored to Russia so as to maintain concerted action under thetriple intervention. It proposed to sacrifice the interests of China to satisfy the wishes of Japan and Russia for a swift resolution of the issue of the Liaodong Peninsula.展开更多
文摘In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the United States claimed to be neutral, but was in fact pro-Japanese. Before the war, it repeatedly refused mediation requests by China and Korea and rejected Britain＇s joint mediation proposal while tacitly agreeing to or inciting Japan＇s launching a war. During the war, American diplomats, as wartime protectors of both Japanese and Chinese nationals, frequently went beyond the limits of international law to protect Japanese spies in China. As the only mediator between China and Japan, the United States rejected the joint mediation efforts of European powers and helped reduce international pressure on Japan. At the same time, it unilaterally convinced the Qing government to accept Japan＇s aggressive demands so as to help Japan achieve its war aims. The main reason for the United States＇ bias towards Japan was that it hoped to use Japan to end the tributary relationship between China and Korea in order to further open the door to China while weakening the influence of Britain and Russia in East Asia.
文摘Around the time of the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War, France reiterated that it had no direct interest in the Korean issue, and professed to be an onlooker. But from the very beginning, in fact, France viewed the war as an opportunity to consolidate its alliance with Russia and further encroach on China＇s southwest frontiers; it was therefore happy to see war break out between China and Japan, and took Russia＇s position on stopping Britain from playing a dominant role in mediation between them. As the outcome of the war became clear, exposing Japan＇s ambition to invade China, France turned from its wait-and-see attitude to intervention, taking an active part in the peacemaking activities of Russia, Britain and France and the triple intervention of Russia, France and Germany. In so doing, it attempted to safeguard general European interests and consolidate its alliance with Russia, as well as preventing Japan from replacing Europe as the dominant force in China. At the same time, it demanded a quidpro quo from the victim. During negotiation over the return of the Liaodong Peninsula, France put aside its conflicts mediate in disputes between Germany and with its old enemy Germany and endeavored to Russia so as to maintain concerted action under thetriple intervention. It proposed to sacrifice the interests of China to satisfy the wishes of Japan and Russia for a swift resolution of the issue of the Liaodong Peninsula.
