State-owned Enterprises' Outward Investment and the Structural Reform in China

Since China＇s accession to the WTO in 2001, China has been on a steep learning curve in terms of engaging in outward direct investment, and state-owned enterprises （SOEs） have played a predominant role in this drive. We argue that investment overseas by SOEs is a double-edged sword as far as its impact on domestic reform is concerned. Investing overseas offers opportunities to deepen structural reform in China, but such investment could also strengthen the monopoly position of some SOEs, which is inconsistent with the objective of domestic reform. Therefore, it is important for China to deepen domestic reform with respect to competition, ownership and regulations, to maximize the benefits from investing overseas＇. The present paper also discusses how building market-compatible institutions will resuh in increased innovation. This provides opportunities for Chinese firms to effectively catch up with the advanced technologies to remain competitive in overseas markets.

Comparative Analysis of the Determinants of China's State-owned Outward Direct Investment in OECD and Non-OECD Countries

Chinese outward direct investment （ODI） is expanding at an unprecedented rate. The present study augments the understanding of the determinants and drivers of Chinese ODI. It reviews the literature on Chinese 0191 and analyzes investment by state-owned enterprises （SOE） for the period 2003-2008, focusing specifically on the differences between the determinants of Chinese investment in developed （OECD） and developing （non-OECD） economies. In addition, the study assesses the appropriateness of the general framework used for investigating ODI determinants （Dunning＇s eclectic paradigm） to analyze the experience of Chinese SOE. The findings indicate that Dunning＇s eclectic paradigm provides an excellent theoretical framework for analyzing the determinants of Chinese SOE investment in developed countries, and provides a good starting point for analysis of Chinese investment in developing countries. However, Dunning＇s specification requires refinement for developing countries. This paper finds a distinct difference between the motivations for Chinese SOE investment in developed and developing countries.

State-owned Enterprises in China as Macroeconomic Stabilizers: Their Special Function in Times of Economic Policy Uncertainty

China has many state-owned enterprises(SOEs)and they have accounted for a large proportion of China's GDP over the last four decades.China's rapid growth contradicts literature that focuses on the inefficiency of SOEs.This study shows that,in periods of economic policy uncertainty(EPU),SOEs have performed a special function as"macroeconomic stabilizers."Using Chinese listed firm data from 2008 to 2019,we investigate five aspects of SOEs'unique functions as macroeconomic stabilizers:employment,investment,growth,financial operation,and expectations.When EPU increased,SOEs had more employment,higher investment expenditure,lower performance volatility,more robust financial structures,and more stable expectations than private firms.We employ the US-China trade war as an exogenous shock on EPU to conduct a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach to mitigate the problem of potentially omitted variables.The findings of this study provide a new perspective to better explain the functions of SOEs in the 21st century.

Global production aspirations and internationalization by state-owned enterprises:A Co-evolutionary view of statedriven industrialized economy

The study aims to explore whether internationalization by state-owned enterprises is a curse or blessing in the context of aspirant industrial economies,such as China.What do state-owned enterprises'global production aspirations,such as outward foreign direct investment,bring into their home country?To answer this question,this study proposes a unique,co-evolutionary perspective of the state-driven industrialized economy by leveraging insights from economic discoveries such as Adam Smith's wealth of nations,David Ricardo's comparative advantage,and Michael Porter's competitive advantage.This view suggests that an outward foreign investment strategy may likely provide state-owned enterprises with access to resources and advanced production technologies,enhance innovation capabilities,gain more competitive advantage,and achieve superior performance,thus leading to spillover effects on their home country's wealth,comparative advantage,and competitiveness.This study discusses China's grand policies,economic performance,and successful cross-border industrial acquisitions.

国有独资公司董事长的权源结构与运行

国有独资公司董事长作为董事会之常设机构和代表职位 ,在国有独资公司内部居于领导者的地位。但由于目前我国公司法设计上的固有缺陷 ,且在董事长的权力源结构中 ,非规范性法外权力实际大大超过了公司法上赋予的规范性权力 ,致使董事长集董事会职权于一身成为可能 ,权力变型运作成为一种普遍现象。基于此 ,跳出现有制度框架 ,在现行《公司法》之外寻求对国有独资公司内部治理结构的制度创新 ,从规范董事会、董事长之权力源入手 ,改善监事会的结构 ,充实监事会的力量 ,提升监事会的地位 ,建立全新的由监事会→董事会→经理机构的二层制治理结构模式 ,应是解决目前国有独资公司治理结构进退维局面艰较为可行的制度方案。为此 ,把国有独资公司从现行公司法中析出 ,适时制定单行的《国有独资公司法》

独资、合伙企业会计制度制定对策探讨

分析了个人独资企业、合伙企业的特征。从企业的资产、负债、所有者权益、会计报表等几个方面探讨了个人独资企业和合伙企业会计制度的制定对策。

跨国公司进入策略及东道国福利分析

跨国公司选定一个投资目标国后,有若干个可供选择的进入策略。本文概括分析了三种进入策略:直接投资,合资和排他性许可,以及这些方式给跨国公司带来的投资利润和对东道国福利的影响。我们的分析表明,在东道国政府不加限制的情况下,较低的进入成本,跨国公司较大的成本优势,东道国较大的市场容量以及较高的贴现率水平都会促使跨国公司选择FDI作为其最优的进入策略。反之,许可方式会给跨国公司带来最大的投资利润。然而,在适当的所有权安排下,合资方式会给东道国带来最大的社会福利。

跨国公司对华投资独资化影响与对策探析

近年来,跨国公司在华直接投资数量不断增多,进入模式已由当初的合资、合作转为独资。独资化趋势不是偶然现象,主要是由跨国公司的全球发展战略和避免技术外溢以及在华投资环境的改善引起。跨国公司独资化对中国经济既有积极影响,又有消极影响,需要区别对待,促进积极影响的发挥,最大限度降低消极影响。

Building State-owned Assets Supervision System and Conducting Mixed Ownership Reforms to Reinforce Each Other’s Collaboration

Improving the state-owned assets supervision system(SOASS)can effectively get over the defects of systems and mechanisms and further promote the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises(SOEs);and the deepening of the reform can advance the change of the SOASS to the supervision on capital.By analyzing the relationship between the SOASS and the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises,we have found that collaborative promotion of the change of the SOASS to the supervision on capital and promotion of the reform of mixed ownership can do good to ameliorating the corporate management mechanism,improving the market-oriented management mechanism of enterprises and completing the medium-and long-term incentive mechanisms,etc.to enhance business operation efficiency.Due to such prevailing problems as relative dispersion and vagueness of the policies relating to deepening the reform of SOEs,inconsistent progress of the reform of state-owned assets(SOAs)and SOEs,and corporate reform focusing on apprence,improving the SOASS and deepening collaborative development of the reform of mixed ownership of SOEs are hindered by some constraints.To construct and improve the SOASS and the reform of mixed ownership collaboratively,we should make efforts to promote the reform in the following five aspects,namely,placing importance to policy coordination,boosting synchronism of the reform of SOAs and SOEs at different levels and in different areas to coordinate the nationwide reform of SOAs and SOEs,facilitating reform of the mechanism of enterprises of mixed ownership through mixed capital,and promoting the SOASS and stimulating classified monitoring and reform of mixed ownership based on classified reform of SOEs.