China＇s economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question： ls it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth？ B...China＇s economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question： ls it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth？ Based on our analysis on market entry, we discovered that reforming administrative approval will spur economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. Administrative approval may suppress social cost and propel China＇s economic growth; China＇s gradualist approval reforms may indeed propel economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. With the data of prefecture-level cities during 2000-2013 and data of companies listed on the SME board during 2010-2014, we tested the effects of approval reforms on economic growth and on transaction cost, and employed instrumental variable and PSM for the treatment of the endogeneity problem - all these tests led to robust and consistent results. Moreover, we discovered that difference in government policy implementation in the approval process is the root cause of corruption and rent seeking.展开更多
Whether registration system reform(RSR)can curb administrative intervention and create a fair market environment has long been a concern in China.We explore this issue from the perspective of the initial public offeri...Whether registration system reform(RSR)can curb administrative intervention and create a fair market environment has long been a concern in China.We explore this issue from the perspective of the initial public offering(IPO)preference based on the entropy balancing method,and findings are as follows.First,an IPO ownership preference exists under approval system.That is,state-owned enterprises(SOEs)are more likely than private enterprises to obtain IPO approval.However,RSR significantly changes this preference,especially for non-politically connected private enterprises.Second,the post-IPO market performance of SOEs is inferior to that of private enterprises under approval system,thus excluding the view that approval is prioritized for SOEs because of superior performance.Third,compared with SOEs,private enterprises are more likely to switch the issuance system from approval system to registration system;this change makes it easier for them to obtain IPO approval,indicating that private enterprise owners perceive the registration channel to be fairer.Fourth,the effect of RSR on IPO ownership preference mainly occurs in companies in three major urban agglomerations in China—the Pearl River Delta,the Yangtze River Delta,and the Beijing–Tian jin–Hebei region—and in technology-intensive industries.Collectively,our findings reveal that RSR cultivates a fairer IPO approval process.展开更多
From ＂the case that three girls have some fate but have different value＂ to ＂the case that Hai Cheng took a police substation to court with three times＂, currently the household registration system of our country ...From ＂the case that three girls have some fate but have different value＂ to ＂the case that Hai Cheng took a police substation to court with three times＂, currently the household registration system of our country not only plays the role of account registration and account management, but also undertakes the limitation of migration movement, and for the additional functions of the lowest life guarantee, social insurance, compulsory education, employment and other social security benefits, it also makes a difference between local registered permanent residence habitant and nonlocal registered permanent residence habitant. Just because of these additional functions, the household registration system has become complicated, which originally has clear nature. Therefore, only it is necessary to define the legal nature of our country＇s current household registration system, can executive power be supervised and the rights of citizens get relief.展开更多
Decentralization and strengthening supervision are the two wings of the reform of administrative examination and approval system. At present, in the supervision process of Chinese government, the phenomenon of strict ...Decentralization and strengthening supervision are the two wings of the reform of administrative examination and approval system. At present, in the supervision process of Chinese government, the phenomenon of strict approval and slack supervision still exists in some local governments. And the dynamic supervision mechanism and supervision restriction mechanism of some local governments are still not perfect. These problems directly lead to"regulatory vacuum"and service absence and other circumstances. The existence of these circumstances will block the process of China's administrative examination and approval system reform. As a result to explore how to promote government supervision innovation and optimize government services is the first important thing, and then to create conditions for the rapid, stable and orderly progress of the administrative examination,what's more to approval system reform.Based on this thesis, the author realizes legal supervision, implement informatization supervision.It not only has increased normalized supervision, improve the administrative examination and approval all-round supervision mechanism, but also established the third party assessment normalization mechanism, and optimize the administrative examination and approval policy advocacy mechanism as well.展开更多
Starting from the initial conditions of China＇s financial reform, this article analyzes the reasons of the External Institutional Financial Organizations （the EIFOs） stepping into a tight comer. The financial margi...Starting from the initial conditions of China＇s financial reform, this article analyzes the reasons of the External Institutional Financial Organizations （the EIFOs） stepping into a tight comer. The financial marginal reform carded out by the authority has no endogenous solution under the initial conditions such as the dominance of state-owned finance, the lack of market basement for interest forming, of real finance price, administrative approval system, and of market basement for financial supervision.展开更多
文摘China＇s economic growth miracle despite complicated administrative approval formalities prompted us to raise the following question： ls it true that reforming administrative approval will promote economic growth？ Based on our analysis on market entry, we discovered that reforming administrative approval will spur economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. Administrative approval may suppress social cost and propel China＇s economic growth; China＇s gradualist approval reforms may indeed propel economic growth by reducing transaction cost for firms. With the data of prefecture-level cities during 2000-2013 and data of companies listed on the SME board during 2010-2014, we tested the effects of approval reforms on economic growth and on transaction cost, and employed instrumental variable and PSM for the treatment of the endogeneity problem - all these tests led to robust and consistent results. Moreover, we discovered that difference in government policy implementation in the approval process is the root cause of corruption and rent seeking.
基金support from the Natural Science Foundation of China(72062012)the Natural Science Foundation of Hainan Province(722RC636)+2 种基金Hainan Province Doctoral Students Innovative Scientific Research Project(Qhyb2022-25)Key Research Project on Higher Education and Teaching Reform in Hainan Province(Hnjg2023ZD-2)Key Subject of Education and Teaching Reform in Hainan University(hdyj2303).
文摘Whether registration system reform(RSR)can curb administrative intervention and create a fair market environment has long been a concern in China.We explore this issue from the perspective of the initial public offering(IPO)preference based on the entropy balancing method,and findings are as follows.First,an IPO ownership preference exists under approval system.That is,state-owned enterprises(SOEs)are more likely than private enterprises to obtain IPO approval.However,RSR significantly changes this preference,especially for non-politically connected private enterprises.Second,the post-IPO market performance of SOEs is inferior to that of private enterprises under approval system,thus excluding the view that approval is prioritized for SOEs because of superior performance.Third,compared with SOEs,private enterprises are more likely to switch the issuance system from approval system to registration system;this change makes it easier for them to obtain IPO approval,indicating that private enterprise owners perceive the registration channel to be fairer.Fourth,the effect of RSR on IPO ownership preference mainly occurs in companies in three major urban agglomerations in China—the Pearl River Delta,the Yangtze River Delta,and the Beijing–Tian jin–Hebei region—and in technology-intensive industries.Collectively,our findings reveal that RSR cultivates a fairer IPO approval process.
文摘From ＂the case that three girls have some fate but have different value＂ to ＂the case that Hai Cheng took a police substation to court with three times＂, currently the household registration system of our country not only plays the role of account registration and account management, but also undertakes the limitation of migration movement, and for the additional functions of the lowest life guarantee, social insurance, compulsory education, employment and other social security benefits, it also makes a difference between local registered permanent residence habitant and nonlocal registered permanent residence habitant. Just because of these additional functions, the household registration system has become complicated, which originally has clear nature. Therefore, only it is necessary to define the legal nature of our country＇s current household registration system, can executive power be supervised and the rights of citizens get relief.
基金the Research on Government Responsibility in the Process of Purchasing Public Service and the project of social science in Anhui Province(AHSKY 2014018)It is also a cooperation fund of the national administrative institute and one of the results of A Study on the Construction of the Responsibility List and the Government of the Rule of Law
文摘Decentralization and strengthening supervision are the two wings of the reform of administrative examination and approval system. At present, in the supervision process of Chinese government, the phenomenon of strict approval and slack supervision still exists in some local governments. And the dynamic supervision mechanism and supervision restriction mechanism of some local governments are still not perfect. These problems directly lead to"regulatory vacuum"and service absence and other circumstances. The existence of these circumstances will block the process of China's administrative examination and approval system reform. As a result to explore how to promote government supervision innovation and optimize government services is the first important thing, and then to create conditions for the rapid, stable and orderly progress of the administrative examination,what's more to approval system reform.Based on this thesis, the author realizes legal supervision, implement informatization supervision.It not only has increased normalized supervision, improve the administrative examination and approval all-round supervision mechanism, but also established the third party assessment normalization mechanism, and optimize the administrative examination and approval policy advocacy mechanism as well.
文摘Starting from the initial conditions of China＇s financial reform, this article analyzes the reasons of the External Institutional Financial Organizations （the EIFOs） stepping into a tight comer. The financial marginal reform carded out by the authority has no endogenous solution under the initial conditions such as the dominance of state-owned finance, the lack of market basement for interest forming, of real finance price, administrative approval system, and of market basement for financial supervision.
