Objective To study the reasonable pricing strategy to effectively reduce the risk of drug supply disruption.This paper studies the vertical competition between drug purchasers and pharmaceutical enterprises,and the ho...Objective To study the reasonable pricing strategy to effectively reduce the risk of drug supply disruption.This paper studies the vertical competition between drug purchasers and pharmaceutical enterprises,and the horizontal competition between different pharmaceutical enterprises.Based on the wholesale price of drugs made by pharmaceutical enterprises,drug purchasers adopt different procurement strategies.Methods A multi-stage game model was used to analyze the collusion and competition between two drug procurement parties.Results and Conclusion(1)Enterprise B can choose the optimal game strategies according to the stability of enterprise A;(2)Two procurement parties should choose collusion when the risk of supply interruption is low;(3)Emergency dual sourcing strategy is better than single sourcing strategy;(4)The optimal procurement quantity is irrelevant to the monotonicity of the stability of enterprise A in Cournot game.Through numerical analysis,the optimal decisions of pharmaceutical enterprises and drug purchasers are obtained respectively.展开更多
As an integrated part in supply chain,third-party logistics(3PL)has intrinsic connections with upstream manufacturer and downstream retailer.Using a Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer,a retailer and a...As an integrated part in supply chain,third-party logistics(3PL)has intrinsic connections with upstream manufacturer and downstream retailer.Using a Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer,a retailer and a 3PL to explicitly capture the interaction of firms’operations decisions,this paper attempts to better understand the role of integrated logistics and procurement service(ILPS)provided by a 3PL firm in supply chain management.Compared with a supply chain without ILPS,a Pareto region,in which all the supply chain members benefit from working with a 3PL firm offering ILPS,is disclosed.We also show that the Pareto region is more likely to occur with higher demand uncertainty.Finally,we reveal that the manufacturer obtains the highest profit in the Pareto region,and that the retailer can improve his profit share as the standard deviation of demand increases.展开更多
This paper considers tripartite pricing issues in a two-echelon supply chain involving duopolistic manufacturers and a single retailer.Firstly,a tripartite competitive model is conducted,in which both a Stackelberg ga...This paper considers tripartite pricing issues in a two-echelon supply chain involving duopolistic manufacturers and a single retailer.Firstly,a tripartite competitive model is conducted,in which both a Stackelberg game and a Bertrand game occur simultaneously.It is shown that the manufacturer who possesses a higher sales quantity gains more profits than the other one.Secondly,a definition of optimal vertical pricing alliance is proposed when cooperation exists between the retailer and some manufacturer.We conduct two-player games when partial cooperation exists among the three participants.It is demonstrated that the total profit of the alliance is higher than the sum profit of the corresponding two participants in the tripartite competition model,and meanwhile the profit of the manufacturer who is not in the alliance suffers a loss.Further,a criterion is given to judge which manufacturer the retailer will choose to cooperate in order to maximize the total increased profits.From the perspective of game theory,we examine the stability of the vertical alliance with considering the dominance of the retailer.Finally,a numerical illustration is designed to examine the judging criteria of which manufacturer is the member of the optimal alliance under different potential market demands.展开更多
文摘Objective To study the reasonable pricing strategy to effectively reduce the risk of drug supply disruption.This paper studies the vertical competition between drug purchasers and pharmaceutical enterprises,and the horizontal competition between different pharmaceutical enterprises.Based on the wholesale price of drugs made by pharmaceutical enterprises,drug purchasers adopt different procurement strategies.Methods A multi-stage game model was used to analyze the collusion and competition between two drug procurement parties.Results and Conclusion(1)Enterprise B can choose the optimal game strategies according to the stability of enterprise A;(2)Two procurement parties should choose collusion when the risk of supply interruption is low;(3)Emergency dual sourcing strategy is better than single sourcing strategy;(4)The optimal procurement quantity is irrelevant to the monotonicity of the stability of enterprise A in Cournot game.Through numerical analysis,the optimal decisions of pharmaceutical enterprises and drug purchasers are obtained respectively.
基金We thank the financial support of National Natural Science Foundation of China(grant number 71531010).
文摘As an integrated part in supply chain,third-party logistics(3PL)has intrinsic connections with upstream manufacturer and downstream retailer.Using a Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer,a retailer and a 3PL to explicitly capture the interaction of firms’operations decisions,this paper attempts to better understand the role of integrated logistics and procurement service(ILPS)provided by a 3PL firm in supply chain management.Compared with a supply chain without ILPS,a Pareto region,in which all the supply chain members benefit from working with a 3PL firm offering ILPS,is disclosed.We also show that the Pareto region is more likely to occur with higher demand uncertainty.Finally,we reveal that the manufacturer obtains the highest profit in the Pareto region,and that the retailer can improve his profit share as the standard deviation of demand increases.
文摘This paper considers tripartite pricing issues in a two-echelon supply chain involving duopolistic manufacturers and a single retailer.Firstly,a tripartite competitive model is conducted,in which both a Stackelberg game and a Bertrand game occur simultaneously.It is shown that the manufacturer who possesses a higher sales quantity gains more profits than the other one.Secondly,a definition of optimal vertical pricing alliance is proposed when cooperation exists between the retailer and some manufacturer.We conduct two-player games when partial cooperation exists among the three participants.It is demonstrated that the total profit of the alliance is higher than the sum profit of the corresponding two participants in the tripartite competition model,and meanwhile the profit of the manufacturer who is not in the alliance suffers a loss.Further,a criterion is given to judge which manufacturer the retailer will choose to cooperate in order to maximize the total increased profits.From the perspective of game theory,we examine the stability of the vertical alliance with considering the dominance of the retailer.Finally,a numerical illustration is designed to examine the judging criteria of which manufacturer is the member of the optimal alliance under different potential market demands.
