Evolutionary analysis of green credit and automobile enterprises under the mechanism of dynamic reward and punishment based on government regulation

To explore the green development of automobile enterprises and promote the achievement of the“dual carbon”target,based on the bounded rationality assumptions,this study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model of gov-ernment,commercial banks,and automobile enterprises;introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism;and analyzed the development process of the three parties’strategic behavior under the static and dynamic reward and punish-ment mechanism.Vensim PLE was used for numerical simulation analysis.Our results indicate that the system could not reach a stable state under the static reward and punishment mechanism.A dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively improve the system stability and better fit real situations.Under the dynamic reward and punishment mechan-ism,an increase in the initial probabilities of the three parties can promote the system stability,and the government can im-plement effective supervision by adjusting the upper limit of the reward and punishment intensity.Finally,the implementa-tion of green credit by commercial banks plays a significant role in promoting the green development of automobile enter-prises.

Carbon Abatement Cost-Sharing Strategy for Electric Power Sector Based on Incentive and Subsidy Mechanisms

The green and low carbon transition and development of the electricity industry is the most crucial task in realizing the“dual-carbon target”,and it is urgent to explore the incentive and subsidy mechanism to promote green electricity consumption and the cost-sharing strategy of carbon reduction,to alleviate the pressure of carbon abatement cost of each subject of the electricity supply chain.Against this background,this paper takes into account the low-carbon subsidies provided by the government and the incentive subsidies for users,and studies the optimal decision-making of each subject in the electricity supply chain,so that each of them can obtain the optimal profit and achieve carbon emission reduction at the same time.Firstly,taking into account the direct power purchase mode of large users and the electricity-selling companies emerging after the reform of the power sales side,we have established a cooperative mechanism for sharing the cost of carbon emission reduction in the electricity supply chain and clarified the relationship between the supply and demand of electricity among the main parties.Subsequently,considering government low-carbon subsidies and user incentive subsidies,the optimal decisionmaking model is established under two scenarios of decentralized and centralized cooperative games in the supply chain,respectively,with the objective of maximizing profits and carbon reduction rates.Solving for the optimal proportion of carbon abatement costs shared by each participant in the electricity supply chain in achieving game equilibrium.Finally,we analyze the role of the government’s low-carbon subsidies,users’incentive subsidies,and other factors on the profit and carbon reduction effect of the electricity industry through the example analysis and further analyze the impact of carbon abatement cost-sharing measures to provide recommendations for the electricity industry to realize low-carbon abatement and make decisions.

Understanding the deterrence effect of punishment for marine information security policies non-compliance

In the organizational setting of marine engineering,a significant number of information security incidents have been arised from the employees’failure to comply with the information security policies(ISPs).This may be treated as a principal-agent problem with moral hazard between the employer and the employee for the practical compliance effort of an employee is not observable without high cost-.On the other hand,according to the deterrence theory,the employer and the employee are inherently self-interested beings.It is worth examining to what extent the employee is self-interested in the marine ISPs compliance context.Moreover,it is important to clarify the proper degree of severity of punishment in terms of the deterrent effect.In this study,a marine ISPs compliance game model has been proposed to evaluate the deterrence effect of punishment on the non-compliance behavior of employee individuals.It is found that in a non-punishment contract,the employee will decline to comply with the marine ISPs;but in a punishment contract,appropriate punishment will lead her to select the marine ISPs compliance effort level expected by the employer,and cause no potential backfire effect.

Behaviours of Multi-Stakeholders under China’s Renewable Portfolio Standards:A Game Theory-Based Analysis

China has implemented both quantitative and policy incentives for renewable energy development since 2019 and is currently in the policy transition stage.The implementation of renewable portfolio standards(RPSs)is difficult due to the interests of multiple stakeholders,including power generation enterprises,power grid companies,power users,local governments,and the central government.Based on China’s RPS policy and power system reform documents,this research sorted out the core game decision problems of China’s renewable energy industry and established a conceptual game decision model of the renewable energy industry from the perspective of local governments,power generation enterprises and power grid companies.The results reveal that for local governments,the probability of meeting the earnings quota or punishments for not reaching quota completion are the major determinants for active participation in quota supervision.For power grid firms,the willingness to accept renewable electricity quotas depends on the additional cost of receiving renewable electricity and governmental incentives.It is reasonable,from the theoretical perspective,to implement the RPS policy on the power generation side.Electricity reform will help clarify the electricity price system and increase the transparency of the quota implementation process.Policy implications are suggested to achieve sustainable development of the renewable energy industry from price incentives and quantity delivery.

The Impacts of Agricultural Machinery Purchase Subsidies on Mechanized Crop Residue Recycling

Crop residue recycling can improve the quality of the cropland,and it has multiple economic and ecological benefits.However,such practice is with low adoption due to different constraints.In this paper,we use the survey data from Baoding,Hebei province,and use the probit model to explore how the agricultural machinery purchase subsidies affect the mechanized crop residue recycling.The results showed that several factors that affect farmers in adopting the practice of mechanized crop residue crop recycling.Among these factors,the cost of adopting such practice is significant.The agricultural machinery purchase subsidies can effectively reduce the cost of such practice,as well as promote mechanized crop residue recycling.The paper also proposed several actions in the future.They include increasing the subsidies on agricultural machinery purchase and increasing farmers' awareness on crop residue recycling.

Spread of Commercial Bribery and Private Sector Responsibilities in China

After years of governance, the momentum of the spread of commercial bribery in China has yet to be effectively curbed. Commercial bribery has become a major form ofcorruption in China, but there are very jew studies on this topic. This paper discusses commercial briber）, in terms of economics on transactions between the supplier （the bribegiver） and the demander （the bribe-taker）, analyzing reasons for the spread of commercial briberyin China from an economic perspective. The authors find that China＇s commercial bribery governance focuses on punishing the public sector and bribe-takers while it lacks sufficient governance measures on the private sector to address bribe-givers. This form of governance is dramatically different from that utilized in countries with mature market economies as well as some international organizations, which have different measures fortackling commercial bribery. Does governance have a causal effect on the spread of commercial bribery in China？The authors use penalty severity to indicate the private sector ＇srole and use a commercial bribery game under perfect rationality and evolutionary game theory models under bounded rationality to reveal the conditions and mechanism of the origin and spread of commercial bribery. The authors also analyze the role of the private sector （the potential bribe-giver） and the role of the punishment mechanism in commercial bribery governance. Results show that the penalties for bribe-giving are less severe than penaltiesfor bribe-taking. There is an especially clear asymmetric relationship between economic penalties for the bribe-giverand economic benefits gained from bribing, and the authors propose that this disparity is the institutional cause of the spread of commercial bribery in China. Froma local equilibrium and static perspective, asymmetric punishment is important for breaking down the alliance between the bribe-giver and the bribe-taken But from the general equilibrium and dynamic perspective, asymmetric punishment raises the potential bribe-giver＇s expected benefits, attracting the potential bribe-giver and encouraging the potential bribe-giver to extend the bribe offer. In this＇ regard, asymmetric punishment is an institutional defect of China＇s commercial bribery governance. Symmetric punishment mechanisms, with an emphasis on prevention and control, makes＇ the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker subject to the same level of criminal punishmentandalso raises a bribe-giver＇s .financial penaltiesto a level higher than the expected benefits. This in turn has the power tolimit the bribe-giver＇s bribery motivation and ability, leading the bribe-giver togive up bribery voluntarily through rational choice, and eventually curbing the spread of commercial bribery.

基于Moran过程的矿工违章行为惩罚机制分析

针对外部环境的高度不确定性对矿工行为的干扰,基于Moran过程构建了惩罚机制下的矿工违章行为的随机演化模型,分别计算了随机因素主导和期望收益主导两种情形下,矿工生产行为策略的均衡解,讨论了静态“连坐”和动态“连坐”惩罚机制对不同风险等级违章行为的规制效果.研究表明:静态“连坐”惩罚机制对违章行为的规制效果与违章行为风险等级相关,可以有效遏制矿工高风险违章行为;动态“连坐”惩罚机制对违章行为的规制效果与违章行为风险等级无关,能够有效规避静态“连坐”惩罚机制对低风险违章行为约束无效的现象.

基于季节性碳交易机制的园区综合能源系统低碳经济调度

为有效提高碳排放配额分配的合理性,并且避免年度结算时碳排放量超标导致环境污染加剧问题,提出基于奖惩因子的季节性碳交易机制,以园区综合能源系统(park integrated energy system,PIES)为对象进行低碳经济调度。首先,构建包含能量层–碳流层–管理层的综合能源系统(integrated energy system,IES)运行框架,建立电气热多能流供需动态一致性模型;其次,分析系统内“日–季节–年度”碳排放特性,打破传统应用指标法的配额分配方法,采用灰色关联分析法建立碳排放配额分配模型,并基于奖惩阶梯碳价制定季节性碳交易机制;最后,以系统内全寿命周期运行成本及碳交易成本最小为目标,对执行季节性碳交易机制的PIES进行低碳经济调度,分析长时间尺度下季节性储能参与调度的减碳量。搭建IEEE 33节点电网5节点气网7节点热网的PIES,并基于多场景进行算例分析,验证此调度方法能够实现零碳经济运行,保证系统供能可靠性,为建立零碳园区奠定理论基础。

颠覆性技术多元化投入的利益分配及激励机制

我国颠覆性创新多元化投入机制的平台支撑体系建设亟待完善,因此需深入研究适用于颠覆性技术多元化投入的利益分配以及政府补贴机制。其中,公平的利益分配和合理化的激励机制是促使颠覆性技术多元投入有效性的关键因素。因此,针对颠覆性技术多元化投入利益分配以及激励机制设计等问题,采取合作-非合作博弈分析颠覆性技术多元投入的各个参与主体行为,引入风险因子探讨不同主体主导下的情况,并进一步研究政府补贴对各主体投入积极性的影响,进而以明晰多元化投入的激励机制方案选择。研究发现:在颠覆性创新多元化投入的过程中会存在创新投入积极性不足的情况,这是由于各主体出于自身利益最大化考虑;由政府牵头时,整个颠覆性技术投入合作较由其他主体主导下的合作收益高;在政府主导下采取政府补贴形式,可以有效激励其他各个颠覆性创新投入主体的积极性。为此,促进颠覆性创新的投入多元化,政府要构建多元化投入机制,设计合理的利益分配机制与激励机制,并在参与合作时设定恰当的成本补贴额度。

政府监管下直播带货平台合谋行为的奖惩机制研究

“直播+电商”的新型商品销售模式正飞速发展,但该过程中存在诸多问题。本文考虑了直播带货平台与平台商家合谋以获取超额利润的现象,建立并分析了不同的奖惩机制下直播带货平台与政府监管机构的演化博弈模型,最终得出以下结论:静态奖惩机制与动态奖励静态惩罚机制下,系统不存在稳定均衡点;静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖励动态惩罚机制下,系统存在稳定均衡点,但动态奖惩机制下直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率更低。动态奖惩机制下,直播带货平台和直播电商合谋行为与奖惩力度有关,当惩罚力度增加时,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率下降,政府监管成本降低;当奖励强度增加时,政府严格监管概率降低,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋概率降低但变化较小。因此,政府监管机构采用科学合理的动态奖惩机制有助于直播带货行业的稳健发展。

一种改进蚁群算法的路径规划研究

针对机器人在复杂环境中的路径规划问题,本文提出了一种改进蚁群算法的路径规划研究方法.首先,在启发函数中引入一种自适应调整的放大因子,以提高相邻节点的启发信息差异,使蚂蚁朝着最优路径的方向搜索;其次,采用一种奖惩机制对路径上的信息素进行更新,使算法的收敛速度得到有效的提高;然后,通过对信息素挥发因子进行动态调整,提高蚁群的搜索速度,使算法快速收敛.最后,在最优路径的基础上,采用拐点优化算法与分段B样条曲线相结合的方法来进行路径优化,有效的改善了路径的平滑性.仿真结果表明,所提的研究方法具有更好的收敛性和搜索能力,更符合机器人运动的实际要求.

前景理论视角下废旧动力电池回收监管演化博弈分析

废旧动力电池具有较强的负外部性,违背了新能源汽车设计的初衷。为促进废旧动力电池有效回收,将前景理论与演化博弈论耦合,综合考虑政府、企业(汽车生产)和公众之间的利益,促使政府和公众对企业进行共同监督,构建三方博弈模型。针对初始意愿、罚款组成、风险态度系数和损失规避系数的不同情况,进行模拟数值仿真,并结合现实中废旧动力电池的认识度、奖惩机制和盈利信心进行分析。研究表明:提高公众或政府的初始监督意愿,可以促进企业回收废旧动力电池;当企业的回收策略为亏损时,提高企业对公众的补偿金额、降低企业的风险态度系数和损失规避系数,可以促进企业积极回收;在废旧动力电池回收过程中,共同监督的效果优于单独监督。

融合IMR-WGAN的时序数据修复方法

工业数据由于技术故障和人为因素通常导致数据异常,现有基于约束的方法因约束阈值设置的过于宽松或严格会导致修复错误,基于统计的方法因平滑修复机制导致对时间步长较远的异常值修复准确度较低.针对上述问题,提出了基于奖励机制的最小迭代修复和改进WGAN混合模型的时序数据修复方法.首先,在预处理阶段,保留异常数据,进行信息标注等处理,从而充分挖掘异常值与真实值之间的特征约束.其次,在噪声模块提出了近邻参数裁剪规则,用于修正最小迭代修复公式生成的噪声向量.将其传递至模拟分布模块的生成器中,同时设计了一个动态时间注意力网络层,用于提取时序特征权重并与门控循环单元串联组合捕捉不同步长的特征依赖,并引入递归多步预测原理共同提升模型的表达能力;在判别器中设计了Abnormal and Truth奖励机制和Weighted Mean Square Error损失函数共同反向优化生成器修复数据的细节和质量.最后,在公开数据集和真实数据集上的实验结果表明,该方法的修复准确度与模型稳定性显著优于现有方法.

以“合宪性、涉宪性”为方法——从“连坐规定案”审查意见的方法逻辑切入

《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于完善和加强备案审查制度的决定》第5条规定了涉宪性审查、合宪性审查的双审原理结构:一是通过涉宪性审查穷尽法律问题,通常情形下,合法性审查已实现有效审查,作为重要备位机制的合宪性审查不再启动;例外情形下,穷尽法律问题仍未能实现有效审查,则进而展开合宪性审查。二是通过合宪性审查援引宪法依据,当明确条款并依序援引,禁止向抽象的法规范逃逸。其中,在基本权利审查场域,具体的基本权利规范优先援引,进而依需要辅助援引或单独援引“概括性人权条款”。据此方法规范,“连坐规定案”审查意见在对“连”与“坐”涉宪性审查后,关于“连”的合宪性审查继续展开,所诉诸的“宪法第二章关于‘公民的基本权利和义务’规定的原则和精神”,包括优先援引的第38条人的尊严条款、第33条第2款平等权条款以及补强援引的第33条第3款“概括性人权条款”。

基于区块链的水权交易机制重构研究

为完善区块链技术下水权交易平台建设,建立统一用水权交易市场,激发水权交易活跃度,结合区块链技术对水权交易机制进行重构研究。将区块链技术与水权交易目前需求进行契合分析,结合微服务技术搭建了水权交易技术框架,初步设计了基于区块链的水权交易流程与奖惩机制,并利用python语言对信用奖惩机制进行仿真。结果表明,区块链技术特征与水权交易需求高度契合,奖惩机制能够保证在不同交易情景下对参与节点进行有效奖励,并对违约节点进行信用和资金处罚,从而激励交易主体积极履行合约,提高整体交易意愿。区块链技术应用在水权全交易流程能够实现水权交易信息的完整性存储、分布式共享和追踪溯源,研究成果可以为优化水权交易机制、提高水权交易活跃度提供参考。

可信拜占庭容错共识机制

针对实用拜占庭容错共识机制中存在共识效率低和激励机制不足的问题,提出一种可信拜占庭容错共识机制。首先,建立引入奖惩机制和时间衰减因子的节点信任评价模型,计算节点的信任值。然后,根据节点信任值进行排序,选择信任值高的节点组成共识节点集,利用可验证随机函数选取共识节点集中信任值高的节点作为主节点。此外,在拜占庭共识过程中利用BLS签名保证主节点不会作恶。实验仿真结果表明,信任模型可以有效惩罚作恶的节点,可信拜占庭容错共识相比于实用拜占庭容错共识交易吞吐量可以提高43%.

面向分布式电力交易的实用拜占庭容错共识算法改进

针对实用拜占庭容错(Practical Byzantine fault tolerance,PBFT)共识算法在分布式电力交易场景下共识时存在的主节点选取策略简单、缺少奖惩措施以及通信资源消耗较大等问题,提出一种改进实用拜占庭容错共识算法。首先,明确分布式电力交易(Distributed power trading,DPT)参与方构成,制定参与方对应节点在共识过程中应承担的权责;其次,制定节点信誉值计算方法,根据节点在共识中的表现筛选不良行为节点,有效限制拜占庭节点参与共识;此外,基于信誉值与散列算法实现了一种可验证的主节点选取方法,使主节点选取难以预测;最后,引入多主节点改进一致性协议,提高算法对拜占庭主节点的容忍程度。实验结果表明,DPT-PBFT算法在通信开销、共识时延等方面相较于PBFT算法均有不同程度的提升,能够有效适用于分布式电力交易场景。

废旧动力电池回收负外部性量化模型及补偿机制

废旧动力电池回收处理过程具有较强的负外部性,为促进废旧动力电池补偿机制的建立,详细分析了废旧动力电池的负外部性表现,分为资源浪费、生态环境破坏和健康安全损害三类。通过运用使用者成本模型、破坏环境成本计量模型和人力资源法模型,将回收过程中的负外部性进行量化,建立资源耗竭成本量化模型、生态环境破坏量化模型和健康安全损害量化模型,并基于上述模型研究了废旧动力电池负外部性补偿机制,包括资源补偿、生态环境补偿、健康安全补偿的主客体、补偿标准、补偿途径等。依据负外部性的表现形式,补偿机制的设置需要考虑废旧动力电池回收量和金属回收率等指标,详细评估对生态环境造成的负外部性,以及量化对人体健康可能造成的损害。

世贸组织《渔业补贴协定》对发展中国家的影响

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