An Application of Heterogeneous Bayesian Regression Models with Time Varying Coefficients to Explore the Relationship between Customer Satisfaction and Shareholder Value

The authors propose new Bayesian models to obtain individual-level and time-varying regression coefficients in longitudinal data involving a single observation per response unit at each time period. An application to explore the association between customer satisfaction and shareholder value is included in the paper. The Bayesian models allow the flexibility of incorporating industry and firm factors in the context of the application to help explain variations of the regression coefficients. Results from the analysis indicate that the effect of customer satisfaction on shareholder value is not homogeneous over time. The proposed methodology provides a powerful tool to explore the relationship between two important business concepts.

Shareholder Structure and Discretionary Regulation of Accounting Results in Enterprises: The Case of Cameroon

Debates on shareholder structure and discretionary management of accounting results have carried forward controversial results. This study is intended to analyze within the Cameroonian context the impact of shareholder structure on the management of accounting results in enterprises. More specifically, its objective is to analyze the impact of shareholder structure on the adjustment of regulating discretionary accounting variables. A panel of enterprises is constituted over the periods 2013, 2014, and 2015 in Cameroon. The modeling of regulating discretionary accounting variables has been carried out according to the model of Jones (1991). The different results obtained show that the degree of concentration of the capital seems not to dissuade the management of result per long-term positions. Foreign ownership and state property stimulate management by regulating discretionary accounting variables.

CES HELD 2001 Shareholder Meeting

On 28 June 2001, CES held 2001 Shareholder Meeting ceremoniously at Qing Song Cheng Hotel.After hearing Board Secretary Luo Zhuping’s accounts on attendance number and shareholding issues, Ye Yigan, President of Eastern Air

The Shareholders' Responsibility for Contribution of Balance of the Equity Assignee

2005年修订的《公司法》第31条规定:"有限责任公司成立后,作为发现设立公司出资的非货币财产的实际价额显著低于公司章程所定价额的应当由交付该出资的股东补足其差额;公司设立时的其他股东承担连带责任。"从该条规定可知,差额补缴责任的主体为公司成立后发现的特定的瑕疵出资人。

The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Corporate Performance——Evidence from China

The separation of ownership and management of companies results in agency problems between shareholders and management to some extent.In Western countries,shareholders usually actively participate in the company’s management and monitor management issues in order to enhance the company’s performance.At present,China’s securities market,as well as institutional investors are undergoing a rapid development,while problems of governance among listed companies in China have been negatively affecting the development of capital markets.Institutional investors have developed to form a certain scale.Moreover,national policies,as well as the split-share structure reform,further encourage the growth of institutional investors,and their active participation in corporate governance in order to better promote the development of capital markets.A great deal of research pertains to the effects of shareholder activism on corporate performance in Western countries.However,research on shareholder activism in China is scanty.Furthermore,chances are that in some specific Chinese regions and industries circumstances are unique,in which the well-established theories cannot be effectively applied.Therefore,this paper empirically analyzes the correlation between shareholder activism and corporate performance so as to examine how effective China’s institutional investors participate in the governance of listed companies.This paper empirically tests the impact of shareholder activism on corporate performance.In this paper,an unbalanced panel data set consisting of observation is constructed.Then,in order to insure validity of results,a series of preliminary tests are conducted.Furthermore,Panel data method and robustness check are performed for empirical analysis.Finally,the result of the empirical tests shows that there is a positive correlation between Chinese institutional shareholding ratio and corporate performance of listed companies.This indicates that shareholder activism can definitely promote the corporate governance and corporate performance in China.

Expropriation of Big Shareholders——Research Review on the Domestic Literature

It is tangible that big shareholders infringe the interests of small and medium shareholders in China's listed companies,and such behaviors of big shareholders influence not only the normal production and business operation of companies but also the sound development of the capital market. At the same time,the economic order of society is also disturbed. Therefore,expropriation of big shareholders shall be governed effectively in time. This paper tries to analyze related research findings on expropriation and make conclusion from three aspects—the ways of expropriation,economic consequences of expropriation and the management effects of expropriation,pointing out the limitation of present research and the direction for the future.

To Be a Fiera Milano Shareholder

When interviewed, Mr. Michele Perini, President of Fiera Milano SPA reveals that they will recommend Italian enterprises to attend Furniture World & Woodworking Machinery China, besides, as he regards, there should be some legal protection on intellectual property right for exhibition organizers.

新《公司法》若干重要问题解读(笔谈)

新《公司法》修订所涉及的内容非常丰富,修订内容包括公司登记制度、股东出资责任、公司治理制度、公司资本制度、控股股东义务、董监高信义义务等方面。赵旭东教授指出,本次《公司法》修订在公司登记与信息公示制度、股东出资责任和法律后果、公司资本制度、公司治理制度、股东权益保护和控股股东义务这五个关键领域实现了重大突破和创新。周林彬教授集中解析了“国家出资公司组织机构的特别规定”一章,认为新《公司法》的亮点之一是通过新设这一章积极回应了我国国有企业治理的“本土实践”与“中国问题”,给出新时期国有企业治理的“中国方案”,推进了中国特色的国有企业治理制度的设计,重塑了国有企业的规范体系。刘凯湘教授对本次《公司法》修订中与公司资本制度相关的若干条文展开解析,包括限期认缴制、新增有限公司股东出资义务加速到期制度、股东违反出资义务的责任承担规则、董事会的催缴出资义务、股东失权制度、董监高对股东抽逃出资的连带责任、类别股的规定、授权资本制等。赵万一教授深入探讨了这次《公司法》修改的主要特点,认为新《公司法》既坚持了其商法属性,同时又充分考虑了《民法典》的既有制度内容,适当兼顾了与《民法典》之间的制度衔接关系,从而既为科学解决民法与商法的关系提供了理念和制度支持,也为中国式法律制度体系的创建提供了完美的立法实践样本。周友苏教授深入解析了新《公司法》在完善股东出资制度方面增加的股东出资缴纳、股东出资“加速到期”、股东失权、股东出资责任这四条新规定,认为新《公司法》在完善股东出资制度方面增加的这些新规定,积极回应了我国自2013年以来公司数量大幅增长所带来的股东盲目认缴、天价认缴、期限过长的现象突出,损害债权人利益的纠纷案件呈明显上升态势等问题,极大地强化了保护债权人的力度。李建伟教授深入解析了《公司法》修订中与法定代表人制度相关的若干条文,认为新《公司法》关于法定代表人的规定较之以往更加体系化,并有望基本解决困扰公司实践许多年的诸多难题,但其中亦存在不完全规范的问题。

机构投资者退出威胁与企业绿色创新

提高企业绿色创新水平是实现高质量发展的重要途径。基于2010—2020年沪深A股上市公司数据,实证检验机构投资者退出威胁对企业绿色创新的影响。研究发现,机构投资者退出威胁能够推动企业绿色创新;而且,以机构投资者持股比例为门槛变量,机构投资者退出威胁对企业绿色创新的影响存在单门槛效应,当机构投资者持股比例超过门槛值后,退出威胁的正向作用得以显现。进一步的路径分析表明,机构投资者退出威胁能够促使企业加大研发投入、积极履行环境责任。此外,在机构投资者为抗压型、企业为非国有性质或重污染行业的情况下,机构投资者退出威胁的绿色创新赋能效应更显著。

机构投资者网络团体如何影响企业ESG表现?

近年来,证券市场中的机构投资者扮演着越来越重要的角色,它们可能通过共同持股关系形成网络团体,采取一致行动。基于中国2010—2020年A股上市公司数据,构建了机构投资者网络团体,结合社会网络理论与代理理论,探究网络团体持股对企业ESG表现的影响。研究结果表明:网络团体持股可以有效提升企业ESG表现;网络团体持股能够缓解2类代理问题,通过提升信息透明度以及抑制大股东私利促进了企业ESG表现;在缓解了内生性问题,并进行了稳健性检验后,网络团体持股提升企业ESG表现的结论仍成立。进一步研究的结果表明,网络团体的特征会影响企业的ESG表现,即团体数量更多、规模越大、背景越丰富,持股越稳定,相对力量越强,企业ESG表现越好。研究结论既丰富了机构投资者网络团体的后果研究和企业ESG表现影响因素的研究,也为上市公司、机构投资者和政府提供了一定的实践启示。

投服中心行权会影响企业劳动投资效率吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

中证中小投资者服务中心(以下简称“投服中心”)推出的持股行权政策是资本市场的重要制度创新,为解决中小投资者保护难题提供了政策思路。基于2014—2020年中国A股上市公司数据,构建多期双重差分模型检验了投服中心行权对企业劳动投资效率的影响。研究发现,投服中心行权能够显著提升企业劳动投资效率。机制检验结果显示,投服中心行权通过降低信息不对称和缓解代理问题进而提升企业劳动投资效率。异质性分析结果表明,在劳动投资不足、治理水平较低的企业中,以及行权方式为专项行动、股东大会和网上行权时,投服中心行权对企业劳动投资效率的提升效应显著。进一步研究发现,投服中心行权通过提升劳动投资效率,提高了企业业绩和企业价值。因此,应充分发挥投服中心行权对企业劳动投资效率的提升作用,提高公司治理水平,以保护中小投资者合法权益。

“监督机制”还是“掏空行为”:超额聘任独立董事与企业环保投资

以2007—2021年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,深入探究超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资的影响效应及作用机制。研究发现:超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资具有显著的促进作用,验证了超额聘任独立董事属于一种“监督机制”;超额聘任独立董事通过抑制管理层短视和大股东掏空行为来促进企业进行环保投资;在重污染行业、两职合一以及独立董事薪酬较低的企业中,超额聘任独立董事对企业环保投资的促进作用更显著。

第一大股东持股与股票市场操纵:加剧还是抑制?

股东治理是股票市场运行的基石。本文以2011—2021年沪深A股非金融上市公司为研究对象,基于股票三秒切片高频交易数据检验了第一大股东持股对股票市场操纵的影响。研究发现,第一大股东持股能够加剧股票市场操纵,缓解内生性问题后结论稳健。影响机制检验表明,第一大股东持股比例增加会加剧大股东掏空效应、降低企业信息透明度、抑制股票流动性,从而促进股票市场操纵行为。进一步分析发现,在非国有企业中,在分析师关注度低、两职合一、独立董事占比低等弱监督制衡机制的环境下,第一大股东持股的影响更加显著。本文建议通过构建适度制衡的股权结构、加大股东监督力度、提升信息披露质量、完善市场操纵监控体系等措施推动我国资本市场高质量发展。