Contrary to the approach in judicial practice,Paragraph 1,Article 153,of the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China,as a rule of invalidity for violating mandatory provisions,does not adopt a dichotomy towards ...Contrary to the approach in judicial practice,Paragraph 1,Article 153,of the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China,as a rule of invalidity for violating mandatory provisions,does not adopt a dichotomy towards mandatory provisions with effectiveness and administrative characteristics,yet it maintains the legislative philosophy of differentiation.It leaves unspecified whether mandatory provisions that do not explicitly render a juristic act invalid impact the act’s validity,entrusting this determination to the discretion of judges on a case-by-case basis.When judges,under the authority of Paragraph 1,Article 153 of the Civil Code,explore the normative intent of mandatory provisions to assess their effect on the validity of juristic acts,they should engage in legal policy analysis centered on consequence-based argumentation to overcome the limitations of norm typological analysis.This analysis employs a reasoning model predicated on the normative purpose,utilizing a consequencefocused interpretative approach for formulating and arguing propositions of rules applicable to pending cases,thereby arriving at case-specific conclusions.Since the invalidation of juristic acts serves as an auxiliary regulatory tool for the state economy and society,a consequence-oriented interpretation needs to be based on the idea of mutual instrumentalization of public and private laws.This entails predicting the outcomes of negating the validity of a juristic act in industrial regulatory scenarios and assessing these outcomes within the framework of public and private regulatory instruments.展开更多
This paper examines the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2002 to 2017,drawing on the theory of equal opportunity and market rules in M&A transactions.This paper investigates the correlation between c...This paper examines the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2002 to 2017,drawing on the theory of equal opportunity and market rules in M&A transactions.This paper investigates the correlation between changes in tender offer policy and M&A tendencies and performance.The findings suggest that following the policy shift and the adoption of market rules,companies that secure an exemption from the mandatory tender offer obligation not only exhibit stronger M&A tendencies but also improved long-term M&A performance.This indicates that market rules are more suitable for China and contribute to enhancing the efficiency of the M&A market.The paper also presents evidence of a moderating effect,demonstrating that exemptions from the mandatory tender offer obligation positively influence the relationship between policy change and M&A performance.Lastly,this paper finds that state-owned and large-scale firms tend to exhibit a higher degree of M&A tendencies.展开更多
文摘Contrary to the approach in judicial practice,Paragraph 1,Article 153,of the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China,as a rule of invalidity for violating mandatory provisions,does not adopt a dichotomy towards mandatory provisions with effectiveness and administrative characteristics,yet it maintains the legislative philosophy of differentiation.It leaves unspecified whether mandatory provisions that do not explicitly render a juristic act invalid impact the act’s validity,entrusting this determination to the discretion of judges on a case-by-case basis.When judges,under the authority of Paragraph 1,Article 153 of the Civil Code,explore the normative intent of mandatory provisions to assess their effect on the validity of juristic acts,they should engage in legal policy analysis centered on consequence-based argumentation to overcome the limitations of norm typological analysis.This analysis employs a reasoning model predicated on the normative purpose,utilizing a consequencefocused interpretative approach for formulating and arguing propositions of rules applicable to pending cases,thereby arriving at case-specific conclusions.Since the invalidation of juristic acts serves as an auxiliary regulatory tool for the state economy and society,a consequence-oriented interpretation needs to be based on the idea of mutual instrumentalization of public and private laws.This entails predicting the outcomes of negating the validity of a juristic act in industrial regulatory scenarios and assessing these outcomes within the framework of public and private regulatory instruments.
基金Supported by Guangdong Province Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project(GD22CGL41,GD23XGL062,GD24CYJ20)Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation(2021A1515011479)。
文摘This paper examines the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2002 to 2017,drawing on the theory of equal opportunity and market rules in M&A transactions.This paper investigates the correlation between changes in tender offer policy and M&A tendencies and performance.The findings suggest that following the policy shift and the adoption of market rules,companies that secure an exemption from the mandatory tender offer obligation not only exhibit stronger M&A tendencies but also improved long-term M&A performance.This indicates that market rules are more suitable for China and contribute to enhancing the efficiency of the M&A market.The paper also presents evidence of a moderating effect,demonstrating that exemptions from the mandatory tender offer obligation positively influence the relationship between policy change and M&A performance.Lastly,this paper finds that state-owned and large-scale firms tend to exhibit a higher degree of M&A tendencies.
