The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-...The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system （denoted by the probability distribution） and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.展开更多
This study made it possible to determine by the application of thermodynamics in finished time, the points of instruction necessary to the development of a regulation system for the rationalization of the power consum...This study made it possible to determine by the application of thermodynamics in finished time, the points of instruction necessary to the development of a regulation system for the rationalization of the power consumption in a cold store. These points were obtained by determining the optimal variations of temperature as well to the condenser and the evaporator corresponding to the minimum capacity absorptive by the compressor for a maximum COP.展开更多
基金Supported by the Major National Science and Technology program (2011ZX03005-002)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60872041, 61072066, 60963023, 60970143)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (JY10000903001, JY10000901034)
文摘The rational secret sharing cannot be realized in the case of being played only once, and some punishments in the one-time rational secret sharing schemes turn out to be empty threats. In this paper, after modeling 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing based on Bayesian game and considering different classes of protocol parties, we propose a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme to solve cooperative problem of a rational secret sharing scheme being played only once. Moreover, we prove that the strategy is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to their belief system （denoted by the probability distribution） and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels.
文摘This study made it possible to determine by the application of thermodynamics in finished time, the points of instruction necessary to the development of a regulation system for the rationalization of the power consumption in a cold store. These points were obtained by determining the optimal variations of temperature as well to the condenser and the evaporator corresponding to the minimum capacity absorptive by the compressor for a maximum COP.
文摘为保证综合需求响应(integrated demand response,IDR)经济高效的实施,该文对传统用户模型提出3方面改进:首先考虑多种能源家用负荷使用时的耦合特性,建立能源舒适度耦合矩阵改进用户的舒适成本模型;进一步,引入参照依赖理论以描述不同时段激励间的耦合性,建立激励参照矩阵以优化用户响应量与激励价格的关联关系模型;最后,分析由于有限理性产生的羊群效应对用户参与IDR概率的影响,引入动态参与率以实现对用户间响应行为耦合特性的表征。在证明用户–多态能源服务商(multi-energy service provider,MESP)模型最优解唯一性的基础上,由仿真结果可知:考虑以上因素改进用户模型后,有效降低了响应偏差与MESP的总成本,提高了用户总收益与用能舒适度,实现了用户与MESP的共赢。研究表明,对于用户的精细化建模能够保障MESP以更低成本维持多态能源系统的供需平衡。
