In this paper,I will explore some philosophical implications of Williamson’s thesis that knowing is a state of mind(KSM).Using the fake barn case,I will introduce a way to evaluate Williamson’s KSM thesis and determ...In this paper,I will explore some philosophical implications of Williamson’s thesis that knowing is a state of mind(KSM).Using the fake barn case,I will introduce a way to evaluate Williamson’s KSM thesis and determine whether the Williamsonian mental state of knowing can be plausibly distinguished from certain other similar but epistemologically distinctive states of mind(i.e.,accidentally true beliefs).Then,some tentative externalist accounts of the supposed differences between the Williamsonian mental state of knowing and accidentally true beliefs will be critically assessed,implying that the evaluated traditional versions of externalism in semantics and epistemology do not fit well with Williamson’s KSM thesis.Ultimately,I suggest that the extended-mind or extended-knower approach may be more promising,which indicates that active externalism would be called for by Williamson’s KSM thesis.展开更多
Do we really care whether our beliefs are true？ Stephen Stich gives us a very surprising but challenging answer： Once we find out what it means for a belief to be true, the answer to the above question is ＂a consis...Do we really care whether our beliefs are true？ Stephen Stich gives us a very surprising but challenging answer： Once we find out what it means for a belief to be true, the answer to the above question is ＂a consistently negative＂ one. He argues that there is neither intrinsic nor instrumental value in having true beliefs. However, his argument is based on some very dubious reasons. For instance, one of his reasons is that if we value true beliefs intrinsically, we will leave out a huge space of mental states that have no truth values but would vastly increase their user＇s power or happiness or biological fitness. But this is false because we can value different things intrinsically at the same time. He is even less successful in arguing against instrumental value in having true beliefs. He admits that he does not establish a knockdown argument against the value of having true beliefs, but he insists that the burden of argument be surely on those who maintain that there is value in having true beliefs. To meet his challenge, we have shown that there is cognitive intrinsic value in holding true beliefs and that generally, true beliefs are more conducive to our survival than false beliefs. If we completely depend on our false beliefs to achieve our goals, we will act like a blind cat who can only catch a mouse by chance.展开更多
基金supported by the National Social Sciences Fund of China(project no.14CZX038)the Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences in Universities by the Ministry of Education of China(project no.16JJD720003).
文摘In this paper,I will explore some philosophical implications of Williamson’s thesis that knowing is a state of mind(KSM).Using the fake barn case,I will introduce a way to evaluate Williamson’s KSM thesis and determine whether the Williamsonian mental state of knowing can be plausibly distinguished from certain other similar but epistemologically distinctive states of mind(i.e.,accidentally true beliefs).Then,some tentative externalist accounts of the supposed differences between the Williamsonian mental state of knowing and accidentally true beliefs will be critically assessed,implying that the evaluated traditional versions of externalism in semantics and epistemology do not fit well with Williamson’s KSM thesis.Ultimately,I suggest that the extended-mind or extended-knower approach may be more promising,which indicates that active externalism would be called for by Williamson’s KSM thesis.
文摘Do we really care whether our beliefs are true？ Stephen Stich gives us a very surprising but challenging answer： Once we find out what it means for a belief to be true, the answer to the above question is ＂a consistently negative＂ one. He argues that there is neither intrinsic nor instrumental value in having true beliefs. However, his argument is based on some very dubious reasons. For instance, one of his reasons is that if we value true beliefs intrinsically, we will leave out a huge space of mental states that have no truth values but would vastly increase their user＇s power or happiness or biological fitness. But this is false because we can value different things intrinsically at the same time. He is even less successful in arguing against instrumental value in having true beliefs. He admits that he does not establish a knockdown argument against the value of having true beliefs, but he insists that the burden of argument be surely on those who maintain that there is value in having true beliefs. To meet his challenge, we have shown that there is cognitive intrinsic value in holding true beliefs and that generally, true beliefs are more conducive to our survival than false beliefs. If we completely depend on our false beliefs to achieve our goals, we will act like a blind cat who can only catch a mouse by chance.
