Improving Federated Learning through Abnormal Client Detection and Incentive

Data sharing and privacy protection are made possible by federated learning,which allows for continuous model parameter sharing between several clients and a central server.Multiple reliable and high-quality clients must participate in practical applications for the federated learning global model to be accurate,but because the clients are independent,the central server cannot fully control their behavior.The central server has no way of knowing the correctness of the model parameters provided by each client in this round,so clients may purposefully or unwittingly submit anomalous data,leading to abnormal behavior,such as becoming malicious attackers or defective clients.To reduce their negative consequences,it is crucial to quickly detect these abnormalities and incentivize them.In this paper,we propose a Federated Learning framework for Detecting and Incentivizing Abnormal Clients(FL-DIAC)to accomplish efficient and security federated learning.We build a detector that introduces an auto-encoder for anomaly detection and use it to perform anomaly identification and prevent the involvement of abnormal clients,in particular for the anomaly client detection problem.Among them,before the model parameters are input to the detector,we propose a Fourier transform-based anomaly data detectionmethod for dimensionality reduction in order to reduce the computational complexity.Additionally,we create a credit scorebased incentive structure to encourage clients to participate in training in order tomake clients actively participate.Three training models(CNN,MLP,and ResNet-18)and three datasets(MNIST,Fashion MNIST,and CIFAR-10)have been used in experiments.According to theoretical analysis and experimental findings,the FL-DIAC is superior to other federated learning schemes of the same type in terms of effectiveness.

An Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning:A Continuous Zero-Determinant Strategy Approach

As a representative emerging machine learning technique, federated learning(FL) has gained considerable popularity for its special feature of “making data available but not visible”. However, potential problems remain, including privacy breaches, imbalances in payment, and inequitable distribution.These shortcomings let devices reluctantly contribute relevant data to, or even refuse to participate in FL. Therefore, in the application of FL, an important but also challenging issue is to motivate as many participants as possible to provide high-quality data to FL. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism for FL based on the continuous zero-determinant(CZD) strategies from the perspective of game theory. We first model the interaction between the server and the devices during the FL process as a continuous iterative game. We then apply the CZD strategies for two players and then multiple players to optimize the social welfare of FL, for which we prove that the server can keep social welfare at a high and stable level. Subsequently, we design an incentive mechanism based on the CZD strategies to attract devices to contribute all of their high-accuracy data to FL.Finally, we perform simulations to demonstrate that our proposed CZD-based incentive mechanism can indeed generate high and stable social welfare in FL.

Carbon Abatement Cost-Sharing Strategy for Electric Power Sector Based on Incentive and Subsidy Mechanisms

The green and low carbon transition and development of the electricity industry is the most crucial task in realizing the“dual-carbon target”,and it is urgent to explore the incentive and subsidy mechanism to promote green electricity consumption and the cost-sharing strategy of carbon reduction,to alleviate the pressure of carbon abatement cost of each subject of the electricity supply chain.Against this background,this paper takes into account the low-carbon subsidies provided by the government and the incentive subsidies for users,and studies the optimal decision-making of each subject in the electricity supply chain,so that each of them can obtain the optimal profit and achieve carbon emission reduction at the same time.Firstly,taking into account the direct power purchase mode of large users and the electricity-selling companies emerging after the reform of the power sales side,we have established a cooperative mechanism for sharing the cost of carbon emission reduction in the electricity supply chain and clarified the relationship between the supply and demand of electricity among the main parties.Subsequently,considering government low-carbon subsidies and user incentive subsidies,the optimal decisionmaking model is established under two scenarios of decentralized and centralized cooperative games in the supply chain,respectively,with the objective of maximizing profits and carbon reduction rates.Solving for the optimal proportion of carbon abatement costs shared by each participant in the electricity supply chain in achieving game equilibrium.Finally,we analyze the role of the government’s low-carbon subsidies,users’incentive subsidies,and other factors on the profit and carbon reduction effect of the electricity industry through the example analysis and further analyze the impact of carbon abatement cost-sharing measures to provide recommendations for the electricity industry to realize low-carbon abatement and make decisions.

Stackelberg Game-Based Optimal Dispatch for PEDF Park and Power Grid Interaction under Multiple Incentive Mechanisms

The integration of photovoltaic,energy storage,direct current,and flexible load(PEDF)technologies in building power systems is an importantmeans to address the energy crisis and promote the development of green buildings.The friendly interaction between the PEDF systems and the power grid can promote the utilization of renewable energy and enhance the stability of the power grid.For this purpose,this work introduces a framework of multiple incentive mechanisms for a PEDF park,a building energy system that implements PEDF technologies.The incentive mechanisms proposed in this paper include both economic and noneconomic aspects,which is the most significant innovation of this paper.By modeling the relationship between a PEDF park and the power grid into a Stackelberg game,we demonstrate the effectiveness of these incentive measures in promoting the friendly interaction between the two entities.In this game model,the power grid determines on the prices of electricity trading and incentive subsidy,aiming to maximize its revenue while reducing the peak load of the PEDF park.On the other hand,the PEDF park make its dispatch plan according to the prices established by the grid,in order to reduce electricity consumption expense,improve electricity utility,and enhance the penetration rate of renewable energy.The results show that the proposed incentive mechanisms for the PEDF park can help to optimize energy consumption and promote sustainable energy practices.

Flexible Load Participation in Peaking Shaving and Valley Filling Based on Dynamic Price Incentives

Considering the widening of the peak-valley difference in the power grid and the difficulty of the existing fixed time-of-use electricity price mechanism in meeting the energy demand of heterogeneous users at various moments or motivating users,the design of a reasonable dynamic pricing mechanism to actively engage users in demand response becomes imperative for power grid companies.For this purpose,a power grid-flexible load bilevel model is constructed based on dynamic pricing,where the leader is the dispatching center and the lower-level flexible load acts as the follower.Initially,an upper-level day-ahead dispatching model for the power grid is established,considering the lowest power grid dispatching cost as the objective function and incorporating the power grid-side constraints.Then,the lower level comprehensively considers the load characteristics of industrial load,energy storage,and data centers,and then establishes a lower-level flexible load operation model with the lowest user power-consuming cost as the objective function.Finally,the proposed method is validated using the IEEE-118 system,and the findings indicate that the dynamic pricing mechanism for peaking shaving and valley filling can effectively guide users to respond actively,thereby reducing the peak-valley difference and decreasing users’purchasing costs.

Research on the Improvement of Incentive Mechanism for Pharmaceutical Sales Personnel - Taking Company A as an Example

Objective To analyze the improvement of the incentive mechanism of sales personnel in pharmaceutical company A,and to promote the smooth operation and further development of the company in a long term.Methods Compensation incentive,performance appraisal,welfare benefit,training incentive,promotion motivation and enterprise cultural inspiration were explored through questionnaires,telephone interviews and in-person interviews.Results and Conclusion This company’s incentive mechanism has problems in two aspects:Material incentives and spiritual incentives.As to the company’s characteristics and strategic development,the optimization countermeasures of incentive mechanism are proposed from the following three aspects:constructing a reasonable incentive system,establishing an efficient spiritual incentive mechanism,and implementing the dynamic incentive and differentiated incentive simultaneously.

Effects of Super Absorbent Polymers on Yield and Water-saving and Drought-escaping Mechanism in Spring Maize

The effects of super absorbent polymers （SAP） on yield as well as water-saving and drought-escaping mechanism in spring maize in the seasonal drought region were studied. As shown by the results, during the seasonal drought in southern China, SAP treatment promoted the soil moisture, improved the capability of absorption and transportation of roots, promoted physiological and biochemical functions, increased the chlorophyll content, photosynthetic rate and intercellular CO2 concentration, and reduced the stomatal conductance and transplre.tion rate. As a result, the economic characters of spring maize were improved, and the yield was increased.

Characteristics and Functions of Cooperative Economic Organizations for Water-saving Irrigation in Agricultural Development in Arid Areas

Agricultural cooperative economic organization for water-saving irrigation in arid areas is a new form of economic organization in production,operation and management during the application process of water-saving irrigation technologies.Currently,there are few researches on this cooperative economic organization.In this study,connotations of cooperative economic organizations for water-saving irrigation are specifically defined,and the characteristics and functions of this cooperative economic organization are analyzed.Based on that,several suggestions are proposed on the continuous development of cooperative economic organizations for water-saving irrigation.

Incentive mechanism analysis of information security outsourcing based on principal-agent model

In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent.

Application of Automatic Water-saving Irrigation System in Roof Gardens

Based on the special site conditions of roof gardens,it was put forward to introduce automatic water-saving irrigation system into the roof garden constructions,such as the solar energy and microcomputer auto water-saving irrigation system,aiming to solve the photosynthetic noon break phenomenon of plants and relieve the stress from high temperature.

Design and Construction of Rainwater Harvesting and Water-saving Irrigation System of Toona sinensis on Mountain Slopes

In order to collect rainwater and resist drought to enhance the utilization rate of rainfall and water resources, through project rainwater harvesting measures, the total annual rainwater harvesting amount of the six greenhouses was calculated according to annual average precipitation 542.2 mm, up to 1 095.7 m^3. The upper natural slopes of cultivated land were as rainwater harvesting areas, and total annual rainwater harvesting amount was 49 242 m^3 on the mountain slopes with an area of 73.37 hm^2, while total water storage amount was 39 394 m^3 in theory, so it could meet water use for the irrigation of 26.28 hm^2 of T. sinensis land. To be convenient for rainwater harvesting, irrigation and supplying water to the water-saving cellars, one pert-cut and part-fill reservoir （which was 470 m^3 in volume） was built on the mountain slopes at the right rear of the greenhouses, and their altitude difference was 50 m. The reservoir was sealed and was built with reinforced concrete. Water-saving cellars were distributed in front and the middle and at the back of two rows of greenhouses, and they were connected with each other. The reservoir could supply water to the water-saving cellars and also collect water by mountain slopes, from the lower water-saving cellars or deep wells. Two rainwater hervesting ditches that were 1 650 m in length were at the lower edge of arable land in the upper reaches of slopes to intercept rainfall runoff and make it flow into channels and then the sedimentation tanks. The total annual rainwater harvesting amount of the reservoir and water-saving cellars was 1 222.5 m^3.

Effects of Water Stress on Economic Characters of Water-saving Rice Variety Luhan No.1

[Objective] This study aimed at exploring the utilization rate of water of the new water-saving rice variety ＂Luhan No.1＂ and providing references and basis for the further demonstration and extension.[Method] Water-saving rice variety ＂Luhan No.1＂ and original receptor ＂6527＂ were used for dry processing without aquifer,and rice under regular irrigation conditions was used as the control.[Result] Under conditions which had economized on 67.4% of water compared with the regular irrigation,decreasing rates of 1 000-seed weight,seed setting rate,plant height and effective panicles of ＂Luhan No.1＂ were relatively small and had not achieved a significant level,while the decreasing rates of production of the region,total grains per panicle,theoretical production and filled grains per panicle of the original receptor ＂6527＂ were all over 25% and had attained very significant levels（P0.01）.[Conclusion] ＂Luhan No.1＂ had shown stable production,energy conservation,reducing environmental pollution and other advantages under water-conservating cultivation conditions.

A Study on the Multi-Task Incentive Mechanism for the Service Provider

Both conflict and asymmetric information exist betweenthe telecom operators and the service provider,and result in illegal behaviors of the service provider.The relationship between the telecom operators andthe service provider is classical multi-task principalagentrelationship. The multi-task incentive for theservice provider is considered in the design of theprincipal-agent incentive contract, and it is necessaryto add the multi-task incentive to the serviceproviders through the analysis of the risk costs andthe agency costs of this problem.

RTRC:A Reputation-Based Incentive Game Model for Trustworthy Crowdsourcing Service

The ubiquity of mobile devices have promoted the prosperity of mobile crowd systems, which recruit crowds to contribute their resources for performing tasks. Yet, due to the various resource consumption, the crowds may be reluctant to join and contribute information. Thus, the low participation level of crowds will be a hurdle that prevents the adoption of crowdsourcing. A critical challenge for these systems is how to design a proper mechanism such that the crowds spontaneously act as suppliers to contribute accurate information. Most of existing mechanisms ignore either the honesty of crowds or requesters respectively. In this paper, considering the honesty of both, we propose a game-based incentive mechanism, namely RTRC, to stimulate the crowds to contribute accurate information and to motivate the requesters to return accurate feedbacks. In addition, an evolutionary game is designed to model the dynamic of user-strategy selection. Specially, the replicator dynamic is applied to model the adaptation of strategy interactions taking into account the dynamic nature in time dependence and we also derive the evolutionarily stable strategies(ESSs) for users. Finally, empirical results over the simulations show that all the requesters and suppliers will select honest strategy to maximize their profit.

Incentive Scheme for Slice Cooperation Based on D2D Communication in 5G Networks

In the 5th generation(5G)wireless communication networks,network slicing emerges where network operators(NPs)form isolated logical slices by the same cellular network infrastructure and spectrum resource.In coverage regions of access points(APs)shared by slices,device to device(D2D)communication can occur among different slices,i.e.,one device acts as D2D relay for another device serving by a different slice,which is defined as slice cooperation in this paper.Since selfish slices will not help other slices by cooperation voluntarily and unconditionally,this paper designs a novel resource allocation scheme to stimulate slice cooperation.The main idea is to encourage slice to perform cooperation for other slices by rewarding it with higher throughput.The proposed incentive scheme for slice cooperation is formulated by an optimal problem,where cooperative activities are introduced to the objective function.Since optimal solutions of the formulated problem are long term statistics,though can be obtained,a practical online slice scheduling algorithm is designed,which can obtain optimal solutions of the formulated maximal problem.Lastly,the throughput isolation indexes are defined to evaluate isolation performance of slice.According to simulation results,the proposed incentive scheme for slice cooperation can stimulate slice cooperation effectively,and the isolation of slice is also simulated and discussed.

Patient attitudes about financial incentives for diabetes self-management:A survey

AIM:To study the acceptability of incentives for behavior changes in individuals with diabetes,comparing financial incentives to self-rewards and non-financial incentives.METHODS:A national online survey of United States adults with diabetes was conducted in March 2013(n = 153).This survey was designed for this study,with iterative testing and modifications in a pilot population.We measured the demographics of individuals,their interest in incentives,as well as the perceived challenge of diabetes self-management tasks,and expectations of incentives to improve diabetes self-management(financial,non-financial and self-rewards).Using an ordered logistic regression model,we assessed the association between a 32-point score of the perceived challenge of the self-management tasks and the three types of rewards.RESULTS:Ninety-six percent of individuals were interested in financial incentives,60% in non-financial incentives and 72% in self-rewards.Patients were less likely to use financial incentives when they perceived the behavior to be more challenging(odds ratio of using financial incentives of 0.82(95%CI:0.72-0.93) for each point of the behavior score).While the effectiveness of incentives may vary according to the perceived level of challenge of each behavior,participants did not expect to need large amounts to motivate them to modify their behavior.The expected average amounts needed to motivate a 5 lb weight loss in our population and to maintain this weight change for a year was $258(interquartile range of $10-100) and $713(interquartile range of $25-250) for a 15 lb weight loss.The difference in mean amount estimates for 5 lb and 15 lb weight loss was significant(P < 0.001).CONCLUSION:Individuals with diabetes are willing to consider financial incentives to improve diabetes selfmanagement.Future studies are needed to explore incentive programs and their effectiveness for diabetes.

More children nutrition distribution, less labor incentive: Evidence from Chinese collective agriculture

Distribution system will affect the labor incentive that has been heatedly discussed by recent literatures.Using a unique micro dataset, this paper dem on strates that the equalitaria n distributi on system is one of the reas ons for the in sufficie nt labor incentive during the Chinese Collective Agriculture period. Specifically speaking, in the distribution of basic rations, the proportion for children (aged 1-3 and 4-7 years) was often beyond their nutrition demand, resulting the dissatisfaction of other families with more laborers and less children, thus these households will reduce their labor supply gradually. At the same time, the existence of outstanding accounts makes it a failure to use work points to buy distributions, which is the mechanism of the distribution system and insufficient labor incentive. All the results have been accepted by the robustness tests. The study will help to understand the distribution system and labor incentive, as well as the failure of the Chinese collective agriculture.

The Potential Contribution of Subsurface Drip Irrigation to Water-Saving Agriculture in the Western USA

Water shortages within the western USA are resulting in the adoption of water-saving agricultural practices within this region. Among the many possible methods for saving water in agriculture, the adoption of subsurface drip irrigation （SDI） provides a potential solution to the problem of low water use efficiency. Other advantages of SDI include reduced NO3 leaching compared to surface irrigation, higher yields, a dry soil surface for improved weed control, better crop health, and harvest flexibility for many specialty crops. The use of SDI also allows the virtual elimination of crop water stress, the ability to apply water and nutrients to the most active part of the root zone, protection of drip lines from damage due to cultivation and tillage, and the ability to irrigate with wastewater while preventing human contact. Yet, SDI is used only on a minority of cropland in the arid western USA. Reasons for the limited adoption of SDI include the high initial capital investment required, the need for intensive management, and the urbanization that is rapidly consuming farmland in parts of the western USA. The contributions of SDI to increasing yield, quality, and water use efficiency have been demonstrated. The two major barriers to SDI sustainability in arid regions are economics （i.e., paying for the SDI system）, including the high cost of installation; and salt accumulation, which requires periodic leaching, specialized tillage methods, or transplanting of seedlings rather than direct-seeding. We will review advances in irrigation management with SDI.

THE BALANCE BETWEEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF WATER RESOURCES AND THE WATER-SAVING POTENTIAL FOR AGRICULTURE IN THE HEXI CORRIDOR

The Hexi Corridor is an important base of agriculture development inNorthwest China. According to recent statistics, there are 65. 94 x 10~8m^3 of water resourcesavailable in the Hexi Corridor. At present, net consumption in development and utilization is 43. 33x 10~8m^3. Water supply and demand reach a balance on the recent level of production, but loss ofevaporation and evapotranspiration is as much as 25. 69 x 1010~8m^3. So net use efficiency of waterresources is 59% Based on analyzing balance between water and land considering ecologicalenvironment at present, there exists the serious water shortage in the Shiyang River system whereirrigation lands have overloaded. There is a comparative balance between supply and demand of waterresource in the Heihe River system; and the Sule River system has some surplus water to extendirrigation land. Use of agriculture water accounts for 83. 3% and ecological forest and grass for 6.9% . The Hexi Corridor still has a great potential for water saving in agriculture production.Water-saving efficiency of irrigation is about 10% by using such traditional technologies as furrowand border-dike irrigation and small check irrigation, and water-saving with plastic film cover andtechniques of advanced sprinkler and drip/micro irrigation etc. can save more than 60% of irrigatedwater. Incremental irrigation area for water-saving potential in the Hexi Corridor has beenestimated as 56% - 197% to original irrigation area. So the second water sources can be developedfrom water saving agriculture in the Hexi Corridor under Development of the Western Part of China inlarge scale. This potential can be realized step by step through developing the water-savingmeasures, improving the ecological condition of oasis agriculture, and optimizing allocation ofwater resources in three river systems.