Based on a new panel data,we find a very significant and robust empirical relation:there is distinct crowding out effect of government debt to private investment.After controlling a few variables emphasized by investm...Based on a new panel data,we find a very significant and robust empirical relation:there is distinct crowding out effect of government debt to private investment.After controlling a few variables emphasized by investment literature,the higher government debt-GDP ratio is,the lower private investment rate is.This kind of negative effect of government debt may come from the fluctuation of government debt-GDP ratio.There are enough attritions in the real world that lapse the Ricardian equivalence proposition.展开更多
The relation between deposit insurance and moral hazard is the focus of constructing deposit insurance system.In this paper,a model is constructed from the view of bank for illustrating this relation and is applied in...The relation between deposit insurance and moral hazard is the focus of constructing deposit insurance system.In this paper,a model is constructed from the view of bank for illustrating this relation and is applied in China.The conclusion of this paper is the degree of moral hazard doesn’t depend on the type but depend on the parameter of deposit insurance system.When it comes to China,the transformation from implicit deposit insurance system to explicit deposit insurance system can efficiently improve monitoring level of bank,reduce the emergence of moral hazard.展开更多
文摘Based on a new panel data,we find a very significant and robust empirical relation:there is distinct crowding out effect of government debt to private investment.After controlling a few variables emphasized by investment literature,the higher government debt-GDP ratio is,the lower private investment rate is.This kind of negative effect of government debt may come from the fluctuation of government debt-GDP ratio.There are enough attritions in the real world that lapse the Ricardian equivalence proposition.
文摘The relation between deposit insurance and moral hazard is the focus of constructing deposit insurance system.In this paper,a model is constructed from the view of bank for illustrating this relation and is applied in China.The conclusion of this paper is the degree of moral hazard doesn’t depend on the type but depend on the parameter of deposit insurance system.When it comes to China,the transformation from implicit deposit insurance system to explicit deposit insurance system can efficiently improve monitoring level of bank,reduce the emergence of moral hazard.
