专名指称的一种因果描述观点

The focus of this paper is the following question: How is the reference of a proper name determined in the actual world? I first introduce Kripke’s criticism of the traditional descriptive theories concerning the reference of proper names. Then I discuss Kripke’s own causal theory and the problems it faces. After presenting and analyzing Evans’s important work on this topic, I propose and defend a causal and descriptive solution to the above central question. I argue that this solution combines the merits of both the descriptive theory and the causal theory and it can solve all currently known difficulties faced by various theories of reference.

知识论证与物理主义

知识论证是当前心灵哲学中反对物理主义的几个最有影响的论证之一。本文介绍、讨论了近二十年来关于知识论证的各种主要类型的反对意见,并指出了它们各自的缺陷。我也提出了自己对知识论证的分析和批评,并探讨了这一论证对物理主义的最本质的挑战是什么,以及这一挑战向我们提出的形而上学和语义学中的难题。