In order to provide integrity protection for the secure operating system to satisfy the structured protection class' requirements, a DTE technique based integrity protection formalization model is proposed after the ...In order to provide integrity protection for the secure operating system to satisfy the structured protection class' requirements, a DTE technique based integrity protection formalization model is proposed after the implications and structures of the integrity policy have been analyzed in detail. This model consists of some basic rules for configuring DTE and a state transition model, which are used to instruct how the domains and types are set, and how security invariants obtained from initial configuration are maintained in the process of system transition respectively. In this model, ten invariants are introduced, especially, some new invariants dealing with information flow are proposed, and their relations with corresponding invariants described in literatures are also discussed. The thirteen transition rules with well-formed atomicity are presented in a well-operational manner. The basic security theorems correspond to these invariants and transition rules are proved. The rationalities for proposing the invariants are further annotated via analyzing the differences between this model and ones described in literatures. At last but not least, future works are prospected, especially, it is pointed out that it is possible to use this model to analyze SE-Linux security.展开更多
The growing interest in the application of formal methods of cryptographic pro-tocol analysis has led to the development of a number of different ways for analyzing protocol. Inthis paper, it is strictly proved that i...The growing interest in the application of formal methods of cryptographic pro-tocol analysis has led to the development of a number of different ways for analyzing protocol. Inthis paper, it is strictly proved that if for any strand, there exists at least one bundle containingit, then an entity authentication protocol is secure in strand space model (SSM) with some smallextensions. Unfortunately, the results of attack scenario demonstrate that this protocol and the Yahalom protocol and its modification are de facto insecure. By analyzing the reasons of failure offormal inference in strand space model, some deficiencies in original SSM are pointed out. In orderto break through these limitations of analytic capability of SSM, the generalized strand space model(GSSM) induced by some protocol is proposed. In this model, some new classes of strands, oraclestrands, high order oracle strands etc., are developed, and some notions are formalized strictly in GSSM, such as protocol attacks, valid protocol run and successful protocol run. GSSM can thenbe used to further analyze the entity authentication protocol. This analysis sheds light on why thisprotocol would be vulnerable while it illustrates that GSSM not only can prove security protocolcorrect, but also can be efficiently used to construct protocol attacks. It is also pointed out thatusing other protocol to attack some given protocol is essentially the same as the case of using themost of protocol itself.展开更多
基金supported by the Beijing Natural Science Foundation(Grant No.4052016)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.60573042)the National Grand Fundamental Research 973 Program of China(Grant No.G1999035802).
文摘In order to provide integrity protection for the secure operating system to satisfy the structured protection class' requirements, a DTE technique based integrity protection formalization model is proposed after the implications and structures of the integrity policy have been analyzed in detail. This model consists of some basic rules for configuring DTE and a state transition model, which are used to instruct how the domains and types are set, and how security invariants obtained from initial configuration are maintained in the process of system transition respectively. In this model, ten invariants are introduced, especially, some new invariants dealing with information flow are proposed, and their relations with corresponding invariants described in literatures are also discussed. The thirteen transition rules with well-formed atomicity are presented in a well-operational manner. The basic security theorems correspond to these invariants and transition rules are proved. The rationalities for proposing the invariants are further annotated via analyzing the differences between this model and ones described in literatures. At last but not least, future works are prospected, especially, it is pointed out that it is possible to use this model to analyze SE-Linux security.
基金National Key Basic Research Program of China under,国家自然科学基金,国家杰出青年科学基金
文摘The growing interest in the application of formal methods of cryptographic pro-tocol analysis has led to the development of a number of different ways for analyzing protocol. Inthis paper, it is strictly proved that if for any strand, there exists at least one bundle containingit, then an entity authentication protocol is secure in strand space model (SSM) with some smallextensions. Unfortunately, the results of attack scenario demonstrate that this protocol and the Yahalom protocol and its modification are de facto insecure. By analyzing the reasons of failure offormal inference in strand space model, some deficiencies in original SSM are pointed out. In orderto break through these limitations of analytic capability of SSM, the generalized strand space model(GSSM) induced by some protocol is proposed. In this model, some new classes of strands, oraclestrands, high order oracle strands etc., are developed, and some notions are formalized strictly in GSSM, such as protocol attacks, valid protocol run and successful protocol run. GSSM can thenbe used to further analyze the entity authentication protocol. This analysis sheds light on why thisprotocol would be vulnerable while it illustrates that GSSM not only can prove security protocolcorrect, but also can be efficiently used to construct protocol attacks. It is also pointed out thatusing other protocol to attack some given protocol is essentially the same as the case of using themost of protocol itself.