Qualitative analysis of compassion fatigue and coping strategies among nurses

Objectives:Nurses are considered to be at risk of experiencing compassion fatigue,which can affect their personal and professional lives.The aim of this study was to investigate stressful factors contributing to the development of compassion fatigue in nurses,their experiences of compassion fatigue,and the coping strategies they used to cope with compassion fatigue.Methods:The convenience sample of 86 nurses fromCentral Europewas recruited via social networking sites during the pandemic of COVID-19.Data collection was conducted via an online battery of questionnaires which included open-ended questions on the stressful factors,experiences,and coping strategies for compassion fatigue.The data were analysed using a theoretical thematic analysis based on Figley’s descriptions of compassion fatigue.The initial datawas read several times to identify recurring statements.Each statement was then categorized into the emerging domains,subdomains,categories,and subcategories.Results:The results of our study show that stressful factors,experiences,and coping strategies for compassion fatigue in nurses in Central Europe could be related to cognitive,emotional,behavioural,somatic,personal relations,spiritual,and work-related symptoms of compassion fatigue as identified by Figley and that these may resemble experiences of nurses in North America,Japan,and Spain.Conclusion:This study provides a detailed overview of the stressful factors,experiences,and coping strategies for compassion fatigue,which could be used to develop an early screening tool and interventions for alleviating compassion fatigue and for preventive adaptation of the health care system.

An Algorithm for Infinite Horizon Lot Sizing with Deterministic Demand

We analyze an infinite horizon discrete time inventory model with deterministic but non-stationary demand for a single product at a single stage. There is a finite cycle of vectors of characteristics of the environment (demand, fixed ordering cost, variable procurement cost, holding cost) which is repeated after a finite number of periods. Future cost is discounted. In general, minimization of the sum of discounted total cost over the cycle does not give the minimum of the sum of discounted total cost over the infinite horizon. We construct an algorithm for computing of an optimal strategy over the infinite horizon. It is based on a forward in time dynamic programming recursion.

Collusion between Aggregated Industries in General Equilibrium

We analyze an infinite horizon difference game between four aggregated industries-production of producer goods, production of consumption goods, federation of labor unions, and commercial banking sector. Consumers do not behave strategically. They make their decisions on the basis of maximization of average discounted utility. Therefore, we do not include them in the set of players in the game. The payoffof each production industry and the commercial banking sector is equal to the average discounted sum of real dividends of its owners. The payoff of the federation of labor unions is equal to the average discounted sum of real wages and real unemployment benefits. A strict strong perfect general equilibrium is the applied solution concept for the game. It requires that there does not exist a coalition of players that can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation payoffs of its members in some subgame by a coordinated deviation. It is a refinement of Rubinstein＇s concept of a strong perfect equilibrium. We formulate and prove the sufficient condition for its existence. It is based on the assumption that no one of the aggregated industries can have a positive output without using some minimal amount of output of each other aggregated industry as an input. By definition, in each subgame, the equilibrium payoff vector in a strict strong perfect general equilibrium is strictly Pareto efficient. Thus, if each consumer either has only income from wage and unemployment benefit or receives dividend from only one aggregated industry, and his nominal income in each period along the equilibrium path exceeds social minimum, it is not possible to weakly Pareto improve the vector of consumers＇ average discounted real incomes. This holds not only for the whole game but also for each subgame starting in the first phase of some period.

Equilibria Immune to Deviations by Coalitions in Infinite Horizon Non-Cooperative Games

Infinite horizon discrete time non-cooperative games with observable actions of players and discounting of future single period payoffs are a suitable tool for analyzing emergence and sustainability of cooperation between all players because they do not contain the last period. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a standard solution concept for them. It requires only immunity to unilateral deviations in any subgame. It does not address immunity to deviations by coalitions. In particular, it does not rule out cooperation based on punishments of unilateral deviations that the grand coalition would like to forgive. We first briefly review concepts of renegotiation-proofness that rule out such forgiveness. Then we discuss the concept of strong perfect equilibrium that requires immunity to all deviations by all coalitions in all subgames. In games with only one level of players (e.g. members of the population engaged in the same type of competitive activity), it fails to exist when the Pareto efficient frontier of the set of single period payoff vectors has no sufficiently large flat portion. In such a case, it is not possible to punish unilateral deviations in a weakly Pareto efficient way. In games with two levels of players (e.g. members of two populations with symbiotic relationship, while activities within each population are competitive), it is possible to overcome this problem. The sum of benefits of all players during a punishment can be the same as when nobody is punished but its distribution between the two populations can be altered in favor of the punishers.