Objective: To review, categorise, and synthesise findings from literature on health information technology (HIT) functionalities, HIT use, and the impact of HIT on hospital performance. Materials and Methods: We condu...Objective: To review, categorise, and synthesise findings from literature on health information technology (HIT) functionalities, HIT use, and the impact of HIT on hospital performance. Materials and Methods: We conducted a systematic integrative literature review based on a compre-hensive database search. To organise, categorise and synthesise the ex-isting literature, we adopted the affordance actualization theory. To align the literature with our research framework, we used four categories: 1) the functionalities of HIT and how these functionalities are measured;2) use and immediate outcomes of HIT functionalities;3) different perfor-mance indicators and how HIT functionalities affect them;and 4) what hospital characteristics influence the outcome of hospital performance. Results: Fifty-two studies were included. We identified four types of HIT. Only ten studies (19.2%) define the use of HIT by explicitly meas-uring the use rate of HIT. We identified five dimensions of hospital per-formance indicators. Every dimension showed mixed results;however, in general, HIT has a positive impact on mortality and patient readmis-sions. We found several hospital characteristics that may affect the rela-tionship between HIT and hospital-level outcomes. Discussion: Further efforts should focus on embedded research on HIT functionalities, use and effects of HIT implementations with more performance indicators and adjusted for hospital characteristics. Conclusion: The proposed framework could help hospitals and researchers make decisions regard-ing the functionalities, use and effects of HIT implementation in hospi-tals. Given our research outcomes, we suggest future research opportuni-ties to improve understanding of how HIT affects hospital performance. .展开更多
This paper addresses the coordination problem of price and quality setting insurers, arising on the health insurance market under regulated competition, as introduced, for instance, in the Netherlands in 2006. We use ...This paper addresses the coordination problem of price and quality setting insurers, arising on the health insurance market under regulated competition, as introduced, for instance, in the Netherlands in 2006. We use an experimental study to gain novel insights on the impact of the uncertainty about consumer preferences on the coordination problem. This fundamental uncertainty implies uncertainty about the identity of the payoff dominant equilibrium, while the risk dominant equilibrium is independent of the state of the world. The experimental results show that insurers are more likely to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium under incomplete information. When insurers face not only strategic but also fundamental uncertainty in the coordination problem, they delay the response to the risk dominant strategy, and persist longer in trying to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium. For the market we study, this implies that the co-ordination under incomplete information will result in consumers paying higher prices, in contrast to the original objectives of the regulated competition.展开更多
Introduction: Since the introduction of the Health Insurance Act in the Netherlands in 2006, insurers are incentivized to compete on prices for basic health insurance, and on price and quality for supplementary insura...Introduction: Since the introduction of the Health Insurance Act in the Netherlands in 2006, insurers are incentivized to compete on prices for basic health insurance, and on price and quality for supplementary insurance. The new health insurance system aimed to create a more competitive market in which consumers would switch health plans, thereby stimulating insurers to price competition and quality improvement. This article evaluates the switching behavior of Dutch consumers and evaluates whether this behavior is advantageous to the goals of the reform. Methods: Three surveys were conducted: from 2005-2006 (n = 478), 2008-2009 (n = 389), and 2010-2011 (n = 191). Results: In 2005-2006, almost 20 percent of the Dutch consumers switched their insurance company. In between 2006 and 2012, however, the percentage of switchers decreased to less than four percent. The main cause of this decrease is that consumers no longer perceive sufficient differences between insurance companies in terms of premium and service. In addition, consumers have difficulties finding the proper information making the right decision and believe they may not be accepted for the supplementary insurance. Consequently, insurance companies only perceive limited incentives to create a more competitive market. Conclusion: Clear and unambiguous information, combined with an obligatory acceptance for the supplementary insurance might help to improve the potential mobility of Dutch consumers.展开更多
文摘Objective: To review, categorise, and synthesise findings from literature on health information technology (HIT) functionalities, HIT use, and the impact of HIT on hospital performance. Materials and Methods: We conducted a systematic integrative literature review based on a compre-hensive database search. To organise, categorise and synthesise the ex-isting literature, we adopted the affordance actualization theory. To align the literature with our research framework, we used four categories: 1) the functionalities of HIT and how these functionalities are measured;2) use and immediate outcomes of HIT functionalities;3) different perfor-mance indicators and how HIT functionalities affect them;and 4) what hospital characteristics influence the outcome of hospital performance. Results: Fifty-two studies were included. We identified four types of HIT. Only ten studies (19.2%) define the use of HIT by explicitly meas-uring the use rate of HIT. We identified five dimensions of hospital per-formance indicators. Every dimension showed mixed results;however, in general, HIT has a positive impact on mortality and patient readmis-sions. We found several hospital characteristics that may affect the rela-tionship between HIT and hospital-level outcomes. Discussion: Further efforts should focus on embedded research on HIT functionalities, use and effects of HIT implementations with more performance indicators and adjusted for hospital characteristics. Conclusion: The proposed framework could help hospitals and researchers make decisions regard-ing the functionalities, use and effects of HIT implementation in hospi-tals. Given our research outcomes, we suggest future research opportuni-ties to improve understanding of how HIT affects hospital performance. .
文摘This paper addresses the coordination problem of price and quality setting insurers, arising on the health insurance market under regulated competition, as introduced, for instance, in the Netherlands in 2006. We use an experimental study to gain novel insights on the impact of the uncertainty about consumer preferences on the coordination problem. This fundamental uncertainty implies uncertainty about the identity of the payoff dominant equilibrium, while the risk dominant equilibrium is independent of the state of the world. The experimental results show that insurers are more likely to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium under incomplete information. When insurers face not only strategic but also fundamental uncertainty in the coordination problem, they delay the response to the risk dominant strategy, and persist longer in trying to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium. For the market we study, this implies that the co-ordination under incomplete information will result in consumers paying higher prices, in contrast to the original objectives of the regulated competition.
文摘Introduction: Since the introduction of the Health Insurance Act in the Netherlands in 2006, insurers are incentivized to compete on prices for basic health insurance, and on price and quality for supplementary insurance. The new health insurance system aimed to create a more competitive market in which consumers would switch health plans, thereby stimulating insurers to price competition and quality improvement. This article evaluates the switching behavior of Dutch consumers and evaluates whether this behavior is advantageous to the goals of the reform. Methods: Three surveys were conducted: from 2005-2006 (n = 478), 2008-2009 (n = 389), and 2010-2011 (n = 191). Results: In 2005-2006, almost 20 percent of the Dutch consumers switched their insurance company. In between 2006 and 2012, however, the percentage of switchers decreased to less than four percent. The main cause of this decrease is that consumers no longer perceive sufficient differences between insurance companies in terms of premium and service. In addition, consumers have difficulties finding the proper information making the right decision and believe they may not be accepted for the supplementary insurance. Consequently, insurance companies only perceive limited incentives to create a more competitive market. Conclusion: Clear and unambiguous information, combined with an obligatory acceptance for the supplementary insurance might help to improve the potential mobility of Dutch consumers.
