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战略顾客下零售商努力对跨渠道竞争决策的影响 被引量:2
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作者 计国君 陈秀妹 Kim Hua Tan 《统计与决策》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第17期45-49,共5页
顾客多渠道之间选择购买,分散了传统零售渠道的客流,降低了零售商的影响力。这两类冲突会降低零售商的销售热情,影响分渠道销售能力,甚至可能引起恶性竞争。文章基于消费者效用理论,探讨零售商努力行为能否引导消费者提前购买商品和缓... 顾客多渠道之间选择购买,分散了传统零售渠道的客流,降低了零售商的影响力。这两类冲突会降低零售商的销售热情,影响分渠道销售能力,甚至可能引起恶性竞争。文章基于消费者效用理论,探讨零售商努力行为能否引导消费者提前购买商品和缓解渠道冲突。通过不存在零售商努力和存在零售商努力情形下的研究表明:在战略顾客下跨渠道供应链中,零售商采取努力行为,不仅能使战略顾客提前购买,且能使制造商和零售商获得更好的收益。由此以制造商为主导的跨渠道供应链应关注实体店的努力行为以缓解渠道冲突并实现制造商与零售商的互利共赢。 展开更多
关键词 跨渠道 零售商努力 战略顾客
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基于双渠道环境下在位制造商的阻止策略研究 被引量:7
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作者 计国君 王东 Kim Hua TAN 《系统工程理论与实践》 EI CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2018年第9期2230-2241,共12页
双渠道运营以提高顾客的购买体验为核心,不仅要求各渠道建立合理定价策略,同时要实现渠道间协同,这放大了制造商与零售商之间乃至整条供应链的冲突,进一步刺激链外企业进入行为,从而加剧在位制造商采取阻止策略.基于链外进入行为的普遍... 双渠道运营以提高顾客的购买体验为核心,不仅要求各渠道建立合理定价策略,同时要实现渠道间协同,这放大了制造商与零售商之间乃至整条供应链的冲突,进一步刺激链外企业进入行为,从而加剧在位制造商采取阻止策略.基于链外进入行为的普遍性与在位阻止的现实性,研究结果表明:当进入成本较低时,在位制造商无法阻止外来制造商进入;当进入成本过高时,在位制造商不用改变定价即可阻止进入;而当进入成本适中时,在位制造商可以通过降低产品在直销渠道上的零售价达到阻止进入的目的.同时结合数值计算得到了一些管理启示. 展开更多
关键词 双渠道定价 链外进入 阻止策略
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A STUDY ON DECISION-MAKING OF FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN BASED ON BIG DATA 被引量:7
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作者 Guojun Ji Limei Hu Kim Hua Tan 《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 SCIE EI CSCD 2017年第2期183-198,共16页
As more and more companies have captured and analyzed huge volumes of data to improve the performance of supply chain, this paper develops a big data harvest model that uses big data as inputs to make more informed pr... As more and more companies have captured and analyzed huge volumes of data to improve the performance of supply chain, this paper develops a big data harvest model that uses big data as inputs to make more informed production decisions in the food supply chain. By introducing a method of Bayesian network, this paper integrates sample data and finds a cause-and-effect between data to predict market demand. Then the deduction graph model that translates products demand into processes and divides processes into tasks and assets is presented, and an example of how big data in the food supply chain can be combined with Bayesian network and deduction graph model to guide production decision. Our conclusions indicate that the analytical framework has vast potential for supporting support decision making by extracting value t^om big data. 展开更多
关键词 Big data Bayesian network deduction graph model food supply chain
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FALSE FAILURE RETURNS: OPTIMAL PRICING AND RETURN POLICIES IN A DUAL-CHANNEL SUPPLY CHAIN 被引量:5
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作者 Guojun Ji Shangqing Han Kim HuaTan 《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》 SCIE EI CSCD 2018年第3期292-321,共30页
This paper aim is to examine the optimal pricing and return policies for false failure returns in a dual-channel supply chain. Four prevailing return policies in which a manufacturer both operates an E-shop and sells ... This paper aim is to examine the optimal pricing and return policies for false failure returns in a dual-channel supply chain. Four prevailing return policies in which a manufacturer both operates an E-shop and sells its product through a brick-and-mortar retailer are analyzed, i.e. (I) the manufacturer handlings E-shop's returns, while the retailer addresses brick-and-mortar store's returns (NR); (II) the retailer tackles the whole (both E-shop's and brick-and-mortar store's) returns (ORR); (III) the manufacturer tackles the whole returns (ORM); and (IV) the manufacturer and the retailer are jointly responsible for the whole returns (RRM). Firstly, the optimal pricing and return policies comparing these four scenarios under uniform-pricing strategy are presented. Our conclusions show that the ORR is an optimal return policy. Compared with the NR, consumers will get a lower product pricing under the ORR and a higher product pricing under the ORM. With regard to the RRM, the product pricing is depended on consumer preference, return-rates of the E-shop and the brick-and-mortar store. Then, the optimal pricing and return policies are analyzed under differential-pricing strategy by conducting two-stage sequential games between the manufacturer and the retailer. The findings show that if consumers in the market prefer to purchase via the E-shop, the ORR is an optimal return policy. Otherwise, the NR is the optimal return policy. Compared with the NR, the ORR retailer's product pricing will rely on the retailer's and the manufacturer's return-costs; the RRM retailer's product pricing will depend on the return-costs of the retailer and the manufacturer, the return-rates of the E-shop and the brick-and-mortar store and so on. Finally, the influences of the manufacturer and the retailer establishing a Buy-back contract are discussed. Our results illustrated that the Buy-back contract doesn't affect optimal pricing and return policies under both the uniform and the differential pricing strategies. 展开更多
关键词 DUAL-CHANNEL optimal return policy optimal pricing false failure returns game theory
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