This paper investigates 218 related party transactions （RPTs） in Israel, an economy characterized by a high percentage of closely-held finns and identifies a non-linear inverted U connection between the value effect...This paper investigates 218 related party transactions （RPTs） in Israel, an economy characterized by a high percentage of closely-held finns and identifies a non-linear inverted U connection between the value effect of RPT and the level of finn ownership concentration. This non-linear connection is similar to the worldwide documented quadratic （inverted U） relation between ownership concentration and a finn＇s Tobin＇s Q. The relation becomes even statistically stronger, when measuring ownership concentration using a strategic power approach, in an attempt to identify the source of this puzzling connection.展开更多
文摘This paper investigates 218 related party transactions （RPTs） in Israel, an economy characterized by a high percentage of closely-held finns and identifies a non-linear inverted U connection between the value effect of RPT and the level of finn ownership concentration. This non-linear connection is similar to the worldwide documented quadratic （inverted U） relation between ownership concentration and a finn＇s Tobin＇s Q. The relation becomes even statistically stronger, when measuring ownership concentration using a strategic power approach, in an attempt to identify the source of this puzzling connection.
