In China there have been two models of stock land renewal:formal renewal and informal renewal,and there have been a wealth of studies on formal renewal.However,few studies have addressed informal renewal,as well as th...In China there have been two models of stock land renewal:formal renewal and informal renewal,and there have been a wealth of studies on formal renewal.However,few studies have addressed informal renewal,as well as the governance logic behind the renewal model.Based on the analysis of policy documents,extensive interviews and a case study of Guangzhou,we explore the evolution,governance logic,consequence of renewal,and governance dilemmas of collectively owned industrial land renewal since 2000.Through redefining the land development rights of stock collectively owned land and reducing the transaction cost of land use change,informal renewal activities of collective industrial land have been legalized from top to bottom.Meanwhile,informal renewal meets local governments’demand for rural industrialization transition.The empirical study of Panyu District in Guangzhou shows that owing to lacking policy resilience,ineffective planning control,and village collectives’dependence on the rental economy,collective industrial land renewal results in frequent interest conflicts and continuation of transfer and lease,presenting a real estate-oriented feature.Therefore,the renewal policy should be innovated in terms of differentiated policy design,a balance of interests,and through improvement of the transfer and transaction mechanism,to strengthen informal renewal management.展开更多
The recent prevalence of property-led urban renewal in Chinese cities has generated problems such as"nail households"1 and the loss of public welfare.This paper begins with the theoretical framework of spati...The recent prevalence of property-led urban renewal in Chinese cities has generated problems such as"nail households"1 and the loss of public welfare.This paper begins with the theoretical framework of spatial governance in urban renewal and then discusses the problems of property-led urban renewal.From a perspective of spatial governance,it proposes the framework,process,and policy design for the transition of the urban renewal model characterized by"government leadership and self-renewal of village collectives."By taking an urban village within a large city in south China as a case study,this paper compares the profit distribution among each party between the property-led urban renewal model and the village collectives’self-renewal.It concludes with the significance of this new model for the establishment of a spatial governance system and highquality urban and rural development in China.展开更多
基金supported by grants from the National Key R&D Program of China(No 2018YFD1100105)the Ministry of Education of Humanities and Social Science Project(20YJCZH214)the Natural Foundation of Suzhou University of Science and Technology(XKQ2019005)。
文摘In China there have been two models of stock land renewal:formal renewal and informal renewal,and there have been a wealth of studies on formal renewal.However,few studies have addressed informal renewal,as well as the governance logic behind the renewal model.Based on the analysis of policy documents,extensive interviews and a case study of Guangzhou,we explore the evolution,governance logic,consequence of renewal,and governance dilemmas of collectively owned industrial land renewal since 2000.Through redefining the land development rights of stock collectively owned land and reducing the transaction cost of land use change,informal renewal activities of collective industrial land have been legalized from top to bottom.Meanwhile,informal renewal meets local governments’demand for rural industrialization transition.The empirical study of Panyu District in Guangzhou shows that owing to lacking policy resilience,ineffective planning control,and village collectives’dependence on the rental economy,collective industrial land renewal results in frequent interest conflicts and continuation of transfer and lease,presenting a real estate-oriented feature.Therefore,the renewal policy should be innovated in terms of differentiated policy design,a balance of interests,and through improvement of the transfer and transaction mechanism,to strengthen informal renewal management.
基金jointly supported by a grant from Beijing Outstanding Young Scientist Program“Research on the Theory and Planning Methodology of Urban and Rural Land Use and Housing Development in Beijing”(Project No.JJWZYJH01201910003010)Key Project of National Natural Science Foundation of China“Research on Key Factors and Reform of New Urbanization Development”(Project No.71533007)。
文摘The recent prevalence of property-led urban renewal in Chinese cities has generated problems such as"nail households"1 and the loss of public welfare.This paper begins with the theoretical framework of spatial governance in urban renewal and then discusses the problems of property-led urban renewal.From a perspective of spatial governance,it proposes the framework,process,and policy design for the transition of the urban renewal model characterized by"government leadership and self-renewal of village collectives."By taking an urban village within a large city in south China as a case study,this paper compares the profit distribution among each party between the property-led urban renewal model and the village collectives’self-renewal.It concludes with the significance of this new model for the establishment of a spatial governance system and highquality urban and rural development in China.
