This paper investigates optimal decisions for private banking development in China under two innovative organizational structures—the big retail mode(BRM)and the independent development mode(IDM).Under the BRM,the re...This paper investigates optimal decisions for private banking development in China under two innovative organizational structures—the big retail mode(BRM)and the independent development mode(IDM).Under the BRM,the retail and private banking divisions form a cooperative relationship wherein the former transfers highnet-worth customers to the latter.In addition,retail banking receives a share of private banking revenues.We investigate the optimal revenue-sharing ratio between the two divisions and the optimal effort by private banking to serve transferred customers within the cooperative relationship.The analytical results show that as the private banking division becomes more developed,the optimal revenue-sharing ratio decreases,and the private banking division’s optimal effort to serve transferred customers decreases because it puts more effort into acquiring new customers.Under the IDM,the two divisions form a competitive relationship since they compete to acquire customers independently.We investigate customer acquisition efforts in this interdivisional competition.Optimal customer acquisition efforts by both divisions increase in potential assets and rates of return.This paper contributes to the literature by(1)analyzing financial innovation by private banks from an organizational perspective;(2)providing an economic analysis for private banking development in China.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.72101281,72192843,71872171,71988101)the National Social Science Fund of China(Grant No 22VRC055)Program for Innovation Research in Central University of Finance and Economics.
文摘This paper investigates optimal decisions for private banking development in China under two innovative organizational structures—the big retail mode(BRM)and the independent development mode(IDM).Under the BRM,the retail and private banking divisions form a cooperative relationship wherein the former transfers highnet-worth customers to the latter.In addition,retail banking receives a share of private banking revenues.We investigate the optimal revenue-sharing ratio between the two divisions and the optimal effort by private banking to serve transferred customers within the cooperative relationship.The analytical results show that as the private banking division becomes more developed,the optimal revenue-sharing ratio decreases,and the private banking division’s optimal effort to serve transferred customers decreases because it puts more effort into acquiring new customers.Under the IDM,the two divisions form a competitive relationship since they compete to acquire customers independently.We investigate customer acquisition efforts in this interdivisional competition.Optimal customer acquisition efforts by both divisions increase in potential assets and rates of return.This paper contributes to the literature by(1)analyzing financial innovation by private banks from an organizational perspective;(2)providing an economic analysis for private banking development in China.
