Hybrid Energy Sharing Mechanism for Integrated Energy Systems Based on the Stackelberg Game

Integrating the sharing economy and the power industry is of positive significance for the development of the energy market.With the energy market transforming from a traditional vertical structure to an interactive and competitive structure,users'roles need to change,along with supply and demand interacting more frequently.Thus,the traditional centralized optimization method for a single energy source can hardly reveal the complex multi-entity behavior of multi-energy coupling.Therefore,this paper establishes a distributed electrical-gas-thermal energy sharing mechanism centered on an energy hub that can converse energy,and build a more applicable integrated energy system body.First,the supply-demand interaction and the energy conversion process is constructed with reference to the operationa丨mode of’a sharing economy and the dual role of prosumers.A Stackelberg model is established with the integrated energy system operator as the leader and prosumers as the followers,to simultaneously optimize the profit of the leader in the upper level and the comfort of the fo!lowers,energy use and utility in the lower level.Furthermore,for protecting the participants’privacy,a distributed algorithm is used to find the optimal solution to equilibrate the model,and the existence and uniqueness of the solution is proved.Finally,a case study validates the effectiveness of the hybrid energy sharing mechanism and provides a reference for the integration of the energy sharing economy with the integrated energy system.

Network-Constrained Energy Consumption Game for Dynamic Pricing Markets

The electricity distribution network is experiencing a profound transformation with the concept of the smart grid,providing possibilities for selfish consumers to interact with the distribution system operator(DSO)and to maximize their individual energy consumption utilities.However,this profitseeking behavior among consumers may violate the network constraints,such as line flows,transformer capacity and bus voltage magnitude limits.Therefore,a network-constrained energy consumption(NCEC)game among active load aggregators(ALAs)is proposed to guarantee the safety of the distribution network.The temporal and spatial constraints of an ALA are both considered,which leads the formulated model to a generalized Nash equilibrium problem(GNEP).By resorting to a well-developed variational inequality(VI)theory,we study the existence of solutions to the NCEC game problem.Subsequently,a two-level distributed algorithm is proposed to find the variational equilibrium(VE),a fair and stable solution to the formulated game model.Finally,the effectiveness of the proposed game model and the efficiency of the distributed algorithm are tested on an IEEE-33 bus system.