In this paper,we study a class of dynamic games consisting of finite agents under a stochastic growth model with jumps.The jump process in the dynamics of the capital stock of each agent models announcements regarding...In this paper,we study a class of dynamic games consisting of finite agents under a stochastic growth model with jumps.The jump process in the dynamics of the capital stock of each agent models announcements regarding each agent in the game occur at Poisson distributed random times.The aim of each agent is to maximize her objective functional with mean-field interactions by choosing an optimal consumption strategy.We prove the existence of a fixed point related to the so-called consistence condition as the number of agents goes large.Building upon the fixed point,we establish an optimal feedback consumption strategy for all agents which is in fact an approximating Nash equilibrium which describes strategies for each agent such that no agent has any incentive to change her strategy.展开更多
基金Supported by Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.11971368)the Key Research Program of Frontier Sciences,CAS(Grant No.QYZDB-SSW-SYS009)。
文摘In this paper,we study a class of dynamic games consisting of finite agents under a stochastic growth model with jumps.The jump process in the dynamics of the capital stock of each agent models announcements regarding each agent in the game occur at Poisson distributed random times.The aim of each agent is to maximize her objective functional with mean-field interactions by choosing an optimal consumption strategy.We prove the existence of a fixed point related to the so-called consistence condition as the number of agents goes large.Building upon the fixed point,we establish an optimal feedback consumption strategy for all agents which is in fact an approximating Nash equilibrium which describes strategies for each agent such that no agent has any incentive to change her strategy.
